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Denis O’Hearn

circle’ of ten super-wealthy property developers who received ‘secret loans’ finally came to public light although the regulator apparently had known about them for some years. Construction, now the main source of Irish growth, came to a virtual halt. Seventy-five thousand new houses per year were 400000 350000 Million Euro 300000 Totallending 250000 GDPcurrent 200000 150000 Constructionbased lending 100000 Govtdebt 50000 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Figure 4.3 Construction-based private debt drives the Irish debt crisis Source: Irish Central

in Are the Irish different?
Open Access (free)
George Philip

, there was a significant literature on transitions to democracy, with a 202 AREAS good deal of discussion of pacts and the general tactics of democratization. The region as a whole also suffered from a severe economic setback, following the foreign debt crisis of 1982. Even today it has not fully recovered from the resulting problems, with the result that the region’s record of strongly positive growth during 1945–82 was followed by a much more disappointing performance during 1982–2002. Discussions of political economy were inevitably dominated during the 1980s by

in Democratization through the looking-glass
Tom Gallagher

crisis managers denied that there was any euro crisis at all. Rather, in the eyes of Merkel, Trichet, the head of the ECB and Jean-Claude Juncker, the head of Ecofin, the body of EU finance ministers, it was simply a debt crisis in some eurozone countries. There was an adamant failure to recognise that without a common currency, Greece’s problems would have been unlikely to spill over into Spain and Italy. 14 An acknowledgement that the crisis was a systemic one that arose from a monetary experiment whose defects had been exacerbated by low-grade political oversight

in Europe’s path to crisis
A new beginning?
Costas Simitis

€50 billion for the direct recapitalisation of its banking sector, Greece could ensure sovereign debt would fall below 100% of GDP by 2020. Beyond any doubt, debt would be then sustainable. Greece’s return to the markets could be accelerated. The European Commission indicated that such support was available only to countries in which the crisis was as a result of shortcomings in the banking sector, not to nations afflicted by a sovereign debt crisis already in receipt of major support from either fellow member states or the EFSF.23 The political posturing and

in The European debt crisis
Seeking a new solution
Costas Simitis

the crisis was going from bad to worse because of a fundamental inability to agree collective action. This is not a debt crisis. This is a political crisis.… The leaders of the Eurozone will soon face the choice between an unimaginable step forward to political union, or an equally unimaginable step back.12 The major questions and painful decisions, such as any restructuring of Greek debt, were just being perpetually postponed; one can only posit a lack of political courage or the naïve belief that an imminent reversal in circumstances would remove their necessity

in The European debt crisis
The external image of Germany’s foreign policy
Siegfried Schieder

Service and the Goethe Institute, add further value to what scholars famously called ‘soft power’. 79 Two recent developments – Germany’s role during the eurozone and migration crises – seem to have confirmed the country’s positive image abroad. Surveys conducted in eight EU countries and the US during the sovereign debt crisis in Europe established that Germany is the most admired Member State in the EU. 80 Roughly eight in ten people in France (84 per cent), the Czech Republic (80 per cent) and Poland (78 per cent) hold a favourable view of Germany. Significantly

in Prussians, Nazis and Peaceniks
Nicola Negri and Chiara Saraceno

, 19(3): 295–307. Petmesidou, M., and Mossialos, E. (2006). Social Policy Developments in Greece. Aldershot: Ashgate. Rhodes, M. (2003). National ‘pacts’ and EU governance in social policy and the labour market. In J. Zetlin and D. M. Trubek (eds), Governing Work and Welfare in a New Economy: European and American Experiments. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 129–57. Royo, S. (2013). Portugal in the European Union: the limits of convergence. South European Society and Politics, 18(2): 197–216. Sacchi, S. (2013). Social policy reform in the Italian debt crisis

in Western capitalism in transition
Scott L. Greer

state and structural funds together paint a picture of the EU in social policy until about 2010, when the Eurozone debt crisis was an opportunity for a major increase in regulatory ambition over member states combined with a strong distrust of social expenditure entrenched in policy. Since 2010 the member states of the EU have opted to increase the breadth and ambition of its role in social policy through fiscal governance mechanisms – a great expansion of the EU’s fiscal regulatory state (Schelkle 2009 ; Greer and Jarman 2016a ). The Eurozone crisis, and the

in The European Union after Brexit
Abstract only
Changing images of Germany
Jens Steffek and Leonie Holthaus

leadership ’, Survival , 58 : 2 ( 2016 ), pp. 135 – 54 ; C. J. Schneider and B. L. Slantchev , ‘ The domestic politics of international cooperation: Germany and the European debt crisis ’, International Organization , 72 : 1 ( 2017 ), pp. 1 – 31 . 24 R. Jervis , The Logic of Images in International Relations ( Princeton : Princeton University Press , 1970 ), p. 5 . 25 P. Hanks (ed.), Collins Dictionary of the English Language ( London : Collins , 1984 ), p. 731 . 26 G. Roberts , ‘ History, theory and the narrative turn in IR ’, Review

in Prussians, Nazis and Peaceniks
Isabelle Hertner

), which sets limits to public debt. The 19 member states in the Eurozone, including France and Germany, have committed themselves permanently to limiting their budget deficits to 3 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) and their national debt to 60 per cent of GDP. This ‘conservative straitjacket’ (Wall, 2014: 73) has been particularly challenging for centre-​left parties in government. The SPD and PS, both of which were in office during the peak of the Greek debt crisis, struggled to formulate and implement a social democratic strategy at the European level. Yet, a

in Centre-left parties and the European Union