battles, its pronouncements are never objective, self-evident or universally applied ( Evans, 2013 ). Arendt’s claim that violence can be justified but never legitimate must be reversed: violence is often legitimated in political arenas and juridical courts; but it can never be justified through an invocation of justice, except where the latter is limited to a reductive juridical paradigm. Justice is not law ( Derrida, 1992 ). Justice is the ability to live a life with dignity and free from lawful violence. Justice in this regard is not the end of power. It is an
statement of facts that seeks
to minimize our exposure to uncertainty, incongruity, or paradox. They
change as we change.
Storytelling is about securitizing; it is about securitising narratives and
enshrouding them in a protective layer of reproduction so that their
salience, relevance, and accuracy cannot be questioned. The witness,
The ethics of researching war
Derrida notes, is committed to telling the same story in the same ways each
and every time. It is only in the ability to seamlessly corroborate
different imaginations of advocacy, activism, and the rights of refugees have been articulated through a specifically urban frame of reference.
In doing so, the chapter develops as follows. I begin by briefly outlining recent work on the ‘politics of urbanism’ (Magnusson, 2011 ) that has sought to contest the dominance of a statist perspective in understanding contemporary politics. Building on this urban political focus, I then discuss Derrida's ( 2001 ) deconstruction of hospitality and his call to establish ‘cities of refuge’ that challenge
witness heard, the
witness experienced. The witness must reproduce, faithfully, the substance
of the testimony on demand, with no inconsistencies, no paradoxes, no
intuition, or counter-intuition. Derrida argues that: ‘When I commit myself
to speaking the truth, I commit myself to repeating the same thing, an
instant later, two instants later, the next day, and for eternity, in a certain
way. But this repetition carries the instant outside itself. Consequently the
instant is instantaneously, at this very instant, divided, destroyed by what
it nonetheless makes possible
binaries that has got us this far in law and in
ethics in the first place. For Derrida, this is expressed as the asymmetrical
relationship between law and justice. Law is not justice because it provides
prescription for action and is structurally incapable of taking into account
the contingency – the particularity – of justice. Justice is fundamentally
reliant on undecidability and on différance – the paradoxical imperative
associated with both the requirement to defer the decision, and the simultaneous urgency that calls for an immediate response.
formulation; justice is un-ethical and violent.’26
Yet, for Jacques Derrida, the violence associated with the ineluctable,
necessary, and just entry of the Third suggests that there is also an ethical
violence in the relationship of the face-to-face that the Third tempers or
mitigates. For Derrida, the Third protects against the violence of the possibility of unicity – of absolute affinity – between the Self and the Other. The
Third mitigates against the possibility of rapture or ecstasy, against the
possibility of the fusion of the Other with the Self. Indeed, the Third
and personification onto units of analysis, such as states, it would not seem that I am
guilty of any greater misrepresentation.
The ethics of researching war
An opština is roughly equivalent to a county or municipality.
A tepsija is an all-purpose baking pan.
Derrida argues that ‘friendship does not keep silence, it is preserved by silence.’ in George
Collins (trans.) Politics of Friendship (London: Verso, 1997), p. 53.
The question ‘čija si ti?’ translates
about the trace in a way that is readable is even more difficult. Along
these lines, William Large asks:
How is it possible to write about the trace, when it is not a phenomenon which offers itself to thematization and conceptualization? To
adequately portray, if such a thing is possible, this signifying prior to a
system of signs, would it not require a different kind of writing which
did not operate at the level of description, designation and objectivity?25
Interestingly, Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas, both of whom
are referenced extensively
Derrida, 2003; Garton Ash, 2007), which coincided with (ultimately
unsuccessful) efforts to give the EU a constitution.
In addition to the internal identity-building function, the propagation of
NPE has an external dimension. The EU has a strong interest in trying to
shape the world in its own image. During the Gulf War, the Belgian foreign
minister, Mark Eyskens, famously described the EU as an “economic giant,
a political dwarf and a military worm” (quoted in Manners, 2010: 75).
Nearly twenty years later, it is still true that the EU is a major trading power,
that arise from embedding sanctuary within the legal and social fabric of a city. In this sense, as Ridgley ( 2008 : 56) argues, the sanctuary city ‘is not only a space of protection from an increasingly anti-immigrant national security agenda, but also a potential line of flight out of which alternative futures can be materialized’. Finally, discussions in a European context have drawn attention to the growth of sanctuary-oriented movements (see Lundberg and Strange, 2017 ; Pyykkonen, 2009 ). From Derrida's ( 2001 ) evocative vision of a ‘city of refuge’ that may