Search results

You are looking at 1 - 10 of 29 items for :

  • "International Court of Justice" x
  • All content x
Clear All

This collection of chapters provides the most comprehensive study of the theory and practice on the contribution of international organisations and non-State actors to the formation of customary international law. It offers new practical and theoretical perspectives on one of the most complex questions about the making of international law, namely the possibility that actors other than states contribute to the making of customary international law. Notwithstanding the completion by the International Law Commission of its work on the identification of customary international law, the making of customary international law remains riddled with acute practical and theoretical controversies which have been left unresolved and which continue to be intensively debated in both practice and scholarship. Making extensively reference to the case-law of international law courts and tribunals as well as the practice of treaty-monitoring bodies while also engaging with the most recent scholarly work on customary international law, this new volume provides innovative tools and guidance to legal scholars, researchers in law, law students, lecturers in law, practitioners, legal advisers, judges, arbitrators, and counsels as well as tools to address contemporary questions of international law-making.

Lorenzo Gasbarri

reflects its capacity to autonomously contribute to the formation of customary international law. The aim of the following pages will be to describe an alternative framework able to reconcile these two faces of the same coin. Consider this paradox: while certain institutional organs play a major part in the identification and application of customary law, they refuse to acknowledge the role of their organization. For instance, the International Court of Justice actively contributes to the identification of customary law while avoiding taking a stance on the role of the

in International organisations, non-State actors, and the formation of customary international law
William Thomas Worster

Kosovo advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice found that UNMIK regulations are not to be considered domestic acts of Kosovo, but legislation imposed by the United Nations on the basis of the United Nations Charter, i.e. from international law obligations. 19 However, this view was not unanimous. Cançado Trindade took a different approach, concluding that Kosovo under UNMIK was a trusteeship. 20 Yusuf went further and concluded that UNMIK regulations were the domestic law of Kosovo. 21 In his view, we can distinguish between the authority to govern

in International organisations, non-State actors, and the formation of customary international law
Mirror or looking-glass?
Luíza Leão Soares Pereira

output of the International Law Commission. Such output does, however, merit special consideration in the present context. As has been recognized by the International Court of Justice and other courts and tribunals, a determination by the Commission affirming the existence and content of a customary rule may have particular value ; as may a conclusion by it that no such rule exists. This flows from the Commission’s unique mandate from States to promote the progressive development of international law and its codification, the thoroughness of its procedures

in International organisations, non-State actors, and the formation of customary international law
Nikolaos Voulgaris

relevant discussion was permeated by a purely State-centric view of international lawmaking. Scholars have debated whether international organisation resolutions may be constitutive of State practice or opinio juris . 6 The debate was sparked by the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice and mainly the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States) judgment 7 and the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion. 8 In the former case, the Court held that: ‘ opinio juris may, though with

in International organisations, non-State actors, and the formation of customary international law
Maiko Meguro

malfunctioning of the dominant approach of custom as a ‘source’ of international law, and suggests avenues to refresh international lawyers’ reflections on customary international law. 1 Opinio juris and State practice in the dominant approach to customary international law Despite the widespread scholarly inclination to extract the two-element variant of the doctrine of customary law from Article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice, it can be defended that the two elements of custom, namely, practice

in International organisations, non-State actors, and the formation of customary international law
Shaping custom
Kasey McCall-Smith

of customary international law. 1 Human rights treaty bodies as interpreters Because the value of utilising the treaty bodies as the ultimate interpreters has been addressed by the author and others elsewhere, this section simply will recap the important role played by the treaty bodies in interpreting human rights. 9 United Nations human rights treaty bodies have been accepted as expert interpreters of human rights treaty obligations across many international fora, though this idea is equally contested. The International Court of Justice has clarified that

in International organisations, non-State actors, and the formation of customary international law
Abstract only
Between mental states and institutional objects
Sufyan Droubi

, State will (i.e. intention) – has in fact disappeared . 40 Looking at the wording of Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, Pellet argues that ‘acceptance … is, by no means, achieved by the expression of will of individual States, but a general, communal acceptance of some more or less openly expressed conviction by States or by international bodies’. 41 This prompts Pellet to emphasise the material element of customary international law and to reduce the importance of the will of the State. Pellet lays bare many of the shortcomings of

in International organisations, non-State actors, and the formation of customary international law
Michael Wood

international organizations in exactly the same way, 18 is unconvincing. As the International Court of Justice put it as long ago as in 1949, ‘[t]‌he subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights’. 19 Third, the conclusions do recognize the potential role of international organizations in the formation of customary international law and indeed highlight it. To the extent that ‘such a role has never been captured by the modern categories of the doctrine of the sources of international law’, 20 then the

in International organisations, non-State actors, and the formation of customary international law
Fabian Cardenas

that of States, 13 anchored in a classic view of international law as a juridical order regulating the relations (only) between States. 14 Although the referential clause contained in Art. 38 1 (b) of the International Court of Justice Statute does not specify whose practice and whose acceptance as law is to be looked upon, the Court’s jurisprudence and dominant scholarship has interpreted it as being limited to the practice and opinio of States. 15 The International Court of Justice has affirmed on this regard that ‘it is of course axiomatic that the material of

in International organisations, non-State actors, and the formation of customary international law