Search results

You are looking at 1 - 10 of 190 items for :

  • "International law" x
  • Manchester Security, Conflict & Peace x
  • All content x
Clear All
Alexis Heraclides and Ada Dialla

Advocates and opponents of humanitarian intervention From the 1860s onwards, international law became an academic discipline in its own right in Europe and the Americas, taught separately from philosophy, natural law or civil law, and came to be written by professional academics or theoretically inclined diplomats. 1 Until then what existed was the droit public de l’Europe or ‘external public law’. Britain in particular had to

in Humanitarian intervention in the long nineteenth century
Setting the precedent

This book is an attempt at a comprehensive presentation of the history of humanitarian intervention in the long nineteenth century, the heyday of this controversial doctrine. It starts with a brief presentation of the present situation and debate. The theoretical first part of the book starts with the genealogy of the idea, namely the quest for the progenitors of the idea in the sixteenth and seventeenth century which is a matter of controversy. Next the nineteenth century ‘civilization-barbarity’ dichotomy is covered and its bearing on humanitarian intervention, with its concomitant Eurocentric/Orientalist gaze towards the Ottomans and other states, concluding with the reaction of the Ottomans (as well as the Chinese and Japanese). Then the pivotal international law dimension is scrutinized, with the arguments of advocates and opponents of humanitarian intervention from the 1830s until the 1930s. The theoretical part of the book concludes with nineteenth century international political theory and intervention (Kant, Hegel, Cobden, Mazzini and especially J.S. Mill). In the practical second part of the book four cases studies of humanitarian intervention are examined in considerable detail: the Greek case (1821-1831), the Lebanon/Syria case (1860-61), the Balkan crisis and Bulgarian case (1875-78) in two chapters, and the U.S. intervention in Cuba (1895-98). Each cases study concludes with its bearing on the evolution of international norms and rules of conduct in instances of humanitarian plights. The concluding chapter identifies the main characteristics of intervention on humanitarian grounds during this period and today’s criticism and counter-criticism.

Abstract only
Christoph Menke in dialogue
Series: Critical Powers
Editor: Christoph Menke

This book focuses on the paradoxical character of law and specifically concerns the structural violence of law as the political imposition of normative order onto a "lawless" condition. The paradox of law which grounds and motivates Christoph Menke's intervention is that law is both the opposite of violence and, at the same time, a form of violence. The book develops its engagement with the paradox of law in two stages. The first shows why, and in what precise sense, the law is irreducibly characterized by structural violence. The second explores the possibility of law becoming self-reflectively aware of its own violence and, hence, of the form of a self-critique of law in view of its own violence. The Book's philosophical claims are developed through analyses of works of drama: two classical tragedies in the first part and two modern dramas in the second part. It attempts to illuminate the paradoxical nature of law by way of a philosophical interpretation of literature. There are at least two normative orders within the European ethical horizon that should be called "legal orders" even though they forego the use of coercion and are thus potentially nonviolent. These are international law and Jewish law. Understanding the relationship between law and violence is one of the most urgent challenges a postmodern critical legal theory faces today. Self-reflection, the philosophical concept that plays a key role in the essay, stands opposed to all forms of spontaneity.

Third edition
Author: Leslie C. Green

It has been accepted since antiquity that some restraint should be observed during armed conflict. This book examines the apparent dichotomy and introduces any study of the law of armed conflict by considering the nature and legality of war. The purpose of what is known as the law of armed conflict or, more commonly, the law of war is to reduce the horrors inherent therein to the greatest extent possible, bearing in mind the political purpose for which the war is fought, namely to achieve one's policies over one's enemies. The discussion on the history and sources of the law of armed conflict pays most attention to warfare on land because that is the region for which most agreements have been drawn up, although attention has been accorded to both aerial and naval warfare where it has been considered necessary. Traditionally, international law was divided into the law of war and the law of peace, with no intermediate stage between. Although diplomatic relations between belligerents are normally severed once a conflict has commenced, there remain a number of issues, not all of which are concerned with their inter-belligerent relations, which require them to remain in contact. War crimes are violations of the and customs of the law of armed conflict and are punishable whether committed by combatants or civilians, including the nationals of neutral states. The book also talks about the rights and duties of the Occupying Power, civil defence, branches of international law and prisoners of war.

Just war and against tyranny
Alexis Heraclides and Ada Dialla

The just war doctrine The original just war doctrine was not concerned with intervening in other states for humanitarian reasons, but with providing just reasons for resorting to an inter-state war. It was only by the sixteenth century, coinciding with the birth of international law, then known as jus gentium or law of nations, under the sway of natural law, that support for those suffering from tyranny and maltreatment was seen as one of the

in Humanitarian intervention in the long nineteenth century
Leslie C. Green

Classic position Historically, international law is concerned only with the relations between states. As a result, the law of armed conflict developed in relation to inter-state conflicts and was not in any way concerned with conflicts occurring within the territory of any state or with a conflict between an imperial power and a colonial

in The contemporary law of armed conflict
Tony Blair, humanitarian intervention, and the “new doctrine of the international community”
Jim Whitman

armed forces is much more significant than that: at present—and for the purpose of this discussion, in the UK in particular—moral justifications for military actions do not merely bolster the practical case for action against the strictures of international law and/or popular disquiet: they also facilitate the climate that makes such actions less uniquely challenging—and eventually, unexceptional. This

in Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq
Leslie C. Green

committed within a belligerent’s lines and intended to harm and aid the adverse party. However, such acts are offences only against the law of the particular belligerent, and, since they are not forbidden by international law, do not constitute war crimes in the proper sense of the term. The concept of war crimes, with trial and condemnation of those committing them, is not new. In ancient Greece ‘treacherous

in The contemporary law of armed conflict
Leslie C. Green

The traditional view One of the longest and best established principles of international law has been that which recognises that states have no right to intervene in the internal or domestic affairs of another state. This principle receives conventional recognition in Article 2 (7) of the Charter of the United Nations, which declares that

in The contemporary law of armed conflict
Matt Killingsworth

will be argued here, contrary to Akhavan, that the UN-constituted Tribunals (and the ICC) contribute to a pluralist international order, as opposed to a cosmopolitan world order, where states remain the primary actors and international law, acknowledged as integral to maintaining order, remains informed by Vattelian interpretations of sovereignty. The International Criminal

in Violence and the state