‘Singapore’ and, where local epistemic communities are
Yet at the same time, it is just such an idealized
desire which, more often than not, gets in the way of thinking
outside of a state-centred security discourse and towards a more
holistic human-centred one, for the simple reason that the extant
debate on the agency of Singaporean security studies
, low-level violence perpetrated by non-stateactors
that ranges from criminality and lawlessness, to communal violence and
electoral violence, and in some cases results in fatality rates similar
to during the war.
This chapter examines the function and purpose of such
violence in the aftermath of civil wars, with a particular focus on
Liberia, South Sudan and Cambodia. These three countries experienced
approaches that claimed replicability and predictability.
However, according to what is by now a familiar
historiographical narrative, the dissolution of the USSR, the rising
significance of non-stateactors, and the broadening of the security
agenda beyond state-centred militarism set the conditions for new
understandings of security threats (Buzan et al., 1998 ; Buzan and Hansen, 2009 ). Since
the end of
Anglo-American relief during the Hamidian massacres, 1894–98
, which would combine openness and multilateral international relations through state and non-stateactors. As such, the relief movement for Armenians can be identified as a pivotal point in international history, posing a challenge to the common assumption that such ideals emerged only in the context of the First World War. 85
1 Papers of J. R. Harris, Cadbury Library, Birmingham, DA/21/1/1/26, f. 171. See also ‘Armenia’, The Parents’ Review , VII (1896), 681–4.
2 S. Deringil, ‘“The Armenian Question Is Finally Closed”: Mass Conversions of
combatants and families.’ 36 For Hizbullah, then, there is a clear delineation of the various political phenomena it is facing. On the one hand, there is a regional situation legislated by realist politics and in which states and non-stateactors interact. On the other, there is a cultural or ideological battle being fought against an enemy that puts into question the ideological foundation not just of an Islamic political group such as Hizbullah but the Shia sect at large. Facing the enemy involves a fierce media-related battle to reclaim the legacy of the Prophet and
for the full development of human security. In this
context, it analyses the so-called ‘track-two’ approach
and the role of other, non-stateactors. The final section examines
how these various debates unfold in Japan, which has an important
role in the development of regional approaches to comprehensive
security. The conclusion assesses the potential for the
state and non-stateactors. Stéphanie Prévost relates how this humanitarian intervention that moved from providing relief to supporting emigration preceded the usually assumed origin date for such initiatives, that is the years of the First World War, and shows that the mid-1890s were the ‘starting point’ or ‘pivotal point’ for what has been called ‘humanitarian diplomacy’. From its inception international humanitarianism faced serious obstacles from those with isolationist and nationalist impulses, both on the right and the left, who preferred domestic relief to
, culture governs the interpretation of terrorist violence in a far more powerful way than the politics or history of the state. In each of these cases, one or more factors mattered more than the others in shaping the country's perspective on terrorism and the suitable responses.
What is clear is that the frame for terrorism and the responses to it are internally contested between stakeholders of different kinds, including governments, religious authorities, non-stateactors and others. Yet this contestation is also not always symmetric. One of the key themes
Extremism and the ‘politics of mutual envy’ in Nigeria?
within the UK and how it has been adopted in Nigeria as a ‘soft’ makeover on its previously ‘hard’ approach to countering Boko Haram.
Third, the chapter addresses extremism through an entangled reading of British and Nigerian countering-violence and violent-extremism projects, thus showing how governments attempt to delegitimise the Other to further the goals of the self. Fourth, the chapter addresses the reciprocal envy by non-stateactors in their bid to challenge the authority and legitimacy of states through examining local discourses on Boko Haram. Ultimately
the sole actors with international legal personality.
As a result, while non-stateactors may – for
various reasons – claim the ‘right’ to use force,
states are the only agents for whom such behaviour is codified in
international law. Moreover, non-stateactors, whether ethnic groups,
religious minority populations or socio-economically disadvantaged
people, tend to seek protection from harm in material