possibility of starting a direct dialogue between the Israeli and the German governments on the question of Holocaust reparations. 6 At the time of Mendelsohn’s travels, many in Israel opposed the idea of having economic, political or social contacts with Germany – let alone of accepting any kind of material restitution or compensation for the horrors committed by the Nazis against the Jews. While his mission was not secret (indeed, several newspapers found out about his activities and reported them), it was not to be widely advertised, either, and Mendelsohn tried to
The rapprochement between Germany and Israel in the aftermath of the Holocaust is one of the most striking political developments of the twentieth century. German Chancellor Angela Merkel recently referred to it as a ‘miracle’. But how did this ‘miracle’ come about? Drawing upon sources from both sides of the Iron Curtain and of the Arab–Israeli conflict, Lorena De Vita traces the contradictions and dilemmas that shaped the making of German–Israeli relations at the outset of the global Cold War. Israelpolitik offers new insights not only into the history of German–Israeli relations, but also into the Cold War competition between the two German states, as each attempted to strengthen its position in the Middle East and the international arena while struggling with the legacy of the Nazi past.
When the negotiations between West Germans and Israelis began, on 21 March 1952, the atmosphere was tense. The opening announcement read by the Israeli delegation stated that no amount of reparation would ever be enough to compensate the Jewish victims of the Nazi crimes. The one read by the West German delegation recognised the unprecedented nature of the crimes committed against the Jews – but it also stressed the importance of recognising Bonn’s limited ability to pay reparations under the present circumstances. 1 The slow rhythm of the exchange was marked
take on the events was rather different. As he made clear during his talks with the German negotiators, Naguib insisted that the FRG ‘“owed” [the] Arab States an “indemnity”’ and that the ‘long-term credits to [the Arab States], of which Egypt would get [the] lion’s share, should “at least” equal [the] amount of reparations paid [to] Israel’. 4 US Ambassador Caffery worked hard to help the West Germans reach out to the local authorities, and explained to the Bonn delegation the main issues that were behind the attitude of the Egyptian counterparts – i.e. their
British Museum (respectively) systematically refuse restitutions. Therefore, it seems possible to link past injustice with the present by looking at the harm that injustice is still producing today. In this sense, it may be rightly said that reparations are “not for the sake of the past, but for the sake of the future”. 63
Revisiting the origins of the Eurozone crisis
In this section, I discuss the origins of the sovereign debt crisis and its impacts on the current functioning of the Eurozone from a normative perspective. I have already deconstructed the
first Anglo-Sikh War in 1846. (British forces also won the second Anglo-Sikh War in 1849.) The victorious East India Company then concluded two consecutive treaties. The first was the Treaty of Lahore on 9 March, which, amongst other matters, imposed reparations on the losers. The second, exactly a week later, was the Treaty of Amritsar with Raja Gulab Singh who, in 1846, assisted the British against the Sikhs.
According to the Frenchman, Victor Jacquemont, who met Gulab Singh in 1831, he ‘was a soldier of fortune
The Sikh Empire then ruled Kashmir until 1846, when the British obtained this region from the defeated Sikhs in war reparations. Gulab Singh needed British military assistance to impose his regime over rebellious Kashmiris in his newly purchased Kashmir Valley.
The second British intervention in J&K was from 1889 to 1905. A British-led Council of State ‘temporarily deposed’ J&K's third ruler, Maharaja Pratap Singh, and administered the state because
, prima facie wrongs, such as the ones we have identified in Shklar's own proposals, will be a common feature of even legitimate political projects. Pluralists can both identify and acknowledge the wrongs committed, while at the same time judging the utopian project to be, all things considered, legitimate. At the same time, if our legitimate projects do involve prima facie wrongs, we must take this on board, maybe by finding ways to avoid those wrongs, maybe by lessening the felt wrong when it is unavoidable, maybe by making reparations to those who are wronged
The 2008 Italy–Libya Friendship Treaty and thereassembling of Fortress Europe
Chiara De Cesari
, and is said, on the day of the agreement,
to have bowed before Al-Muktar’s son, expressing ‘in the name of the Italian
people, … apologies for the deep wounds’ caused to the Libyans (Di Caro 2008).
Yet the Treaty stipulates reparations for abuses that are never explicitly mentioned. Several commentators, including the most important historian of Italian
colonialism, were quick to emphasize this aspect, namely the lack of history and
memory (Del Boca, 2009). Following the preamble, the text of the Treaty consists
of three parts: first, the general principles
upon important facts. The FRG agreed to pay reparations to Israel seven years after the liberation of the last concentration camp. The agreement that the two countries signed in 1952 was unprecedented and revolutionary in the history of post-genocidal reconciliation. At that time, Benjamin Ferencz, former Chief Prosecutor for the US Army at the Einsatzgruppen trial at the Nuremberg war trials, stressed that with the agreement Germany had ‘established a milestone in international morality’. 1 Up to that moment, only victors in a war could demand reparations from