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How transnational pharmaceutical groups manipulate scientific publications
Isabell Hensel and Gunther Teubner

censorship clauses in research contracts, the use of ghostwriters, pressure put on researchers to prevent studies from being carried out 6 and even the dismissal of researchers by financially dependent research institutions. 7 Underlying these cases is a conflict of incompatible rationalities 8 that ultimately leads to publication bias. 9 This term is used to describe the statistical distortion of data

in Critical theory and legal autopoiesis
Derrida, Luhmann, Wiethölter
Gunther Teubner

grandiosity of law in the ruins Duncan Kennedy on Rudolf Wiethölter 1 I  Conflicts of laws under suspicion of paradox Twenty-five years ago, when the great paradoxologists of our times were still quite differently engaged

in Critical theory and legal autopoiesis
On late modernity and social statehood
Author: Darrow Schecter

Populism, neoliberalism, and globalisation are just three of the many terms used to analyse the challenges facing democracies around the world. Critical Theory and Sociological Theory examines those challenges by investigating how the conditions of democratic statehood have been altered at several key historical intervals since 1945. The author explains why the formal mechanisms of democratic statehood, such as elections, have always been complemented by civic, cultural, educational, socio-economic, and, perhaps most importantly, constitutional institutions mediating between citizens and state authority. Critical theory is rearticulated with a contemporary focus in order to show how the mediations between citizens and statehood are once again rapidly changing. The book looks at the ways in which modern societies have developed mixed constitutions in several senses that go beyond the official separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers. In addition to that separation, one also witnesses a complex set of conflicts, agreements, and precarious compromises that are not adequately defined by the existing conceptual vocabulary on the subject. Darrow Schecter shows why a sociological approach to critical theory is urgently needed to address prevailing conceptual deficits and to explain how the formal mechanisms of democratic statehood need to be complemented and updated in new ways today.

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The vain search for legal unity in the fragmentation of global law
Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner

learning within each social system must be supported through normatisation. 1 Subsequent analyses added a complementary prediction: should the law of a global society become entangled within sectoral interdependences, a wholly new form of conflicts law will emerge; an ‘inter-systemic conflicts law’, derived not from collisions between the

in Critical theory and legal autopoiesis
Abstract only
Allyn Fives

We have been examining the two opposing approaches to moral conflict that predominate in political thought. For value pluralists, in a situation of moral conflict, when moral claims demand different and incompatible things from us, there is no general rule for its resolution. In contrast, value monists maintain that they have in fact identified the general rule needed to resolve any such conflict. Now, one of the issues about which these two positions sharply diverge concerns the nature and status of our obligation to obey the law. What is

in Judith Shklar and the liberalism of fear
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Allyn Fives

Value monism is not only a specific approach to moral conflict; it also offers a distinctive way in which to conceptualise freedom. So far, I have said very little about freedom itself. Although I did refer to competing conceptualisations of that term in the last chapter, I could not do justice to the issue there. However, the whole of the present chapter is devoted to this question, and I think this level of scrutiny is justified for at least two reasons. The first is that value pluralism tells us something about freedom that is profoundly

in Judith Shklar and the liberalism of fear
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Allyn Fives

. This is the case as her liberalism of fear offers a value monist position on both moral conflict and the conceptualisation of freedom. As we shall in this chapter, the liberalism of fear is a product of Shklar's publications in the latter part of her career. And the sceptical monism of her mature work represents a sharp departure from the value pluralist (and sceptical) approach to moral conflict evident in her early work. As I shall try to show in the present chapter, this transformation is most clearly evident when we consider her changing views

in Judith Shklar and the liberalism of fear
Open Access (free)
Philip Nanton

in the local telling. 4 In the 1999/2000 tourist season some of these early issues spilled over into a protest involving a week-long attempted blockade of the resort, arrests, rock-throwing incidents, demonstrations against CRD and public meetings with Government officials. The conflict also brought into the open the feeling that official priorities were not in the interests of the populations of

in Frontiers of the Caribbean
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Allyn Fives

, oppressive, and cruel (Shklar 1957 , p. 97; 1964a , p. 169; 1989a , p. 30; 1993a , p. 183). However, in her early work she maintains that we owe obligations of justice even in such circumstances, and we can be faced with moral conflicts precisely in relation to these demands. In contrast, by the time of her mature work, in the 1980s and 1990s, she concludes that tyranny cancels obligations of justice. There are a number of distinct strands of argumentation evident in Shklar's mature position on tyranny. As we saw in the last chapter, she maintains

in Judith Shklar and the liberalism of fear
Abstract only
Allyn Fives

she abandons her earlier value pluralism so as to embrace value monism. This way of thinking about Shklar's early and mature political theory also allows us to reflect on the role and limits of political theory more generally. We can see that, although her mature work stands opposed to political moralism, nonetheless the liberalism of fear is prescriptive. This is the case because, as I try to show below, her mature work takes a value monist approach to moral conflict. In contrast, in her early work (in particular, her second book and articles

in Judith Shklar and the liberalism of fear