In 1937, Harold Nicolson, still the best-known modern writer on diplomacy, wrote a slim volume with the title The Evolution of Diplomatic Method (  1998 ). In 2011, Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne released the second edition of their The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory, and Administration . The last century has seen a series of books, essays and even blog spots on diplomacy that advertise themselves as somehow evolutionary. However, almost all of them use the concept of evolution in the everyday sense of emergence. 1 They do not make
Extant work on the emergence of diplomacy is largely textual. 1 And yet, diplomacy works not only through text but also in other social registers. One of these registers is visual. This chapter looks at how visual practices have come to constitute an international institution in the same way that diplomacy has historically, and identifies the evolutionary variation and stability in contemporary visual diplomacy. I draw up a taxonomy of three visual strategies, one of which is dominant, or hegemonic. The two others are subaltern, or dominated.
THIS CHAPTER EXAMINES the
practical manifestation of the War of Ideas strategy in United
States (US) State Department public diplomacy, as well as more
recent counter-radicalisation efforts under the Obama
administration. It does so by focusing on several programmes
involved in direct engagements with anti-Americanism and extremist
establishing diplomatic relations with Israel while promoting its interests in the Arab world and stepping up as one of main donors contributing, for example via the UNRWA and the German Red Cross, to improving life conditions for Palestinian refugees. The GDR, in contrast, had not. In focusing so centrally on anti-Israeli and anti-West German propaganda for the Arab world, the SED regime lost sight of the multiple channels that Bonn’s (often economic) diplomacy was pursuing in the region, managing to reach out simultaneously to Israel, the Arab states and the Arab League
As both candidate and throughout his first two years as president to early 2019, Donald Trump employed unilateral actions and flamboyant posturing in upending the strong commitment to positive diplomacy and political engagement of regional governments and organisations of the previous administrations of Barack Obama. Two years into his presidential term, Trump remained avowedly unpredictable as he junked related policy transparency, carefully measured responses, and avoidance of dramatic action, linkage or spill-over among competing interests
This book complements extant histories of diplomacy by discussing change in the form of tipping-points, understood as the culmination of long-term trends. The first part of the book discusses social evolution on the general level of institutions. The diplomatic institution has undergone four tipping-points: between culturally similar small-scale polities, between culturally different large-scale polities, permanent bilateral diplomacy, and permanent multilateral diplomacy. The consular institution has seen three: the emergence of the consul as the judge of a trading colony, the judge as a representative of the state, and the imbrication of the consular institution in unitary foreign services. The second part challenges extant literature’s treatment of diplomacy as a textual affair and an elite concern. It lays down the groundwork for the study of visual diplomacy by establishing diplomacy’s visual genres, discussing how diplomats spread images to wider audiences and drawing up a taxonomy of three visual strategies used for this purpose: a hegemonic and Western strategy, a national strategy, and a strategy that is spiteful of Western hegemony. Two case studies discuss the evolving place of the visual in one diplomatic practice, namely accreditation, and the importance of the social imagination. One possible evolutionary effect of the latter seems to be as a lair of hibernation for the otherwise threatened idea that diplomacy is not about dialogue but about the confrontation between good and evil. The book concludes by seeing the future of diplomacy in a continued struggle between state-to-state-based diplomacy and diplomacy as networked global governance.
The Arab–Israeli conflict has been at the centre of international affairs for decades. Despite repeated political efforts, the confrontation and casualties continue, especially in fighting between Israelis and Palestinians. This new assessment emphasizes the role that military force plays in blocking a diplomatic resolution. Many Arabs and Israelis believe that the only way to survive or to be secure is through the development, threat, and use of military force and violence. This idea is deeply flawed and results in missed diplomatic opportunities and growing insecurity. Coercion cannot force rivals to sign a peace agreement to end a long-running conflict. Sometimes negotiations and mutual concessions are the key to improving the fate of a country or national movement. Using short historical case studies from the 1950s through to today, the book explores and pushes back against the dominant belief that military force leads to triumph while negotiations and concessions lead to defeat and further unwelcome challenges. In The sword is not enough, we learn both what makes this idea so compelling to Arab and Israeli leaders and how it eventually may get dislodged.
Conspiracy theory and American foreign policy examines the relationship between secrecy, power and interpretation around international political controversy, where foreign policy orthodoxy comes up hard against alternative interpretations. It does so in the context of American foreign policy during the War on Terror, a conflict that was quintessentially covert and conspiratorial. This book adds a new dimension to the debate by examining what I coin the ‘Arab-Muslim paranoia narrative’: the view that Arab-Muslim resentment towards America was motivated to some degree by a paranoid perception of American power in the Middle East. Immediately after 9/11, prominent commentators pointed to an Arab-Muslim culture of blame and a related tendency towards conspiracy theories about America’s regional influence as an important cultural driver of anti-Americanism. This narrative subsequently made its way into numerous US Government policy documents and initiatives advancing a War of Ideas strategy aimed at winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of Arab-Muslims. The book provides a novel reading of the processes through which legitimacy and illegitimacy is produced in foreign policy discourses. It will also appeal to a wider cross-disciplinary audience interested in the burgeoning issues of conspiracy, paranoia, and popular knowledge, including their relationship to and consequences for contemporary politics.
The previous chapters of this book have discussed diplomacy’s deep past and its present, including how it is presently being imagined. When viewed as an evolutionary result of broader forces, diplomacy emerges as a hard-won achievement of the species. Chapter 2 stressed how, by the nineteenth century, diplomacy had adopted a form and a multilateral aspect that are still with us. Chapter 3 added the story of how, with the firming up of the principle of state sovereignty and territorial law, diplomacy enveloped the consular institution. Chapters 4 and 5
Diplomacy is about handling the Other. Whether it is defined as ‘the transmitting of messages between one independent political community and another’ (Bull 1977 : 164), ‘the conduct of business between states by peaceful means’ (Satow 1979 : 3) or ‘the mediation of estrangement’ (Der Derian 1987 ), the overall theme is one of establishing settings where possible conflict and cooperation may play out, and establishing ways in which to play. Traditionally, students of diplomacy looked mainly at negotiation games and their outcomes. In the phrase of G.M. Young