, competing with the USA for influence in decolonised Africa, Khrushchev targeted the ‘Third World’ with cultural diplomacy, propaganda and student exchanges, and later Soviet leaders equipped and trained southern African armed liberation movements (Westad 2005 ; Matusevich (ed.) 2007 ; Bradley 2010 ). US and Soviet geopolitics of race evolved in interaction, in mainstream diplomacy and even the gendered structures of feeling and domesticity through which both powers constituted themselves against each other (Baldwin 2016 ). Permanent, as opposed to temporary, black and
persisted since the 1950s. From this perspective it is understandable why many see the EU’s enduring democratic deficit as the ‘ faut de M. Monnet .’ 24
However, the EU has taken certain steps towards greater democratic legitimacy. To start, although the structures of the EU clearly do not meet the criteria for national democracies, it has been able to draw some legitimacy from its constituent parts. Most of its leading functions – such as central banking, constitutional adjudication, civil prosecution, economic diplomacy, and technical administration – have
Memory, leadership, and the fi rst phase of integration (1945– 58)
Peter J. Verovšek
, especially France. 16 However, in the interwar years Adenauer’s commitment to economic cooperation with the west and to the reconciliation of France and Germany seem to have been mainly rhetorical. Despite the fact that the basic themes of Adenauer’s political thought began to emerge in the interwar period, he was not yet prepared to act upon his ideas in the aftermath of the Great War.
While Monnet, Schuman, and Adenauer had begun to think of alternatives, they all accepted the return to traditional politics and diplomacy after the failure of the ‘utopian moment
The Eurozone crisis, Brexit, and possible disintegration
Peter J. Verovšek
itself to non-Europeans.’ More specifically, they pointed out that the ‘bellicose past [that] entangled all European nations in bloody conflicts’ had led the continent to integrate based on a number of differences from other parts of the world – even from other parts of the developed west, such as the United States. These characteristics include the secular nature of European politics, the continental faith in government, a preference for the welfare state, a suspicion of under-supervised markets, an aversion to the use of force, and a desire for multilateral diplomacy
masculinities and NATO adding gender analysts to missions (plus encouraging members to open more military posts to women) after adopting the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda in 2007. Croatia's Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, assistant NATO secretary-general for public diplomacy in 2011–14, first embodied NATO's WPS commitment as its first female assistant secretary-general, then as Croatian president and commander-in-chief (2015–), and symbolised the evolution of Croatian military prowess since the beginning of the Homeland War (Croatia having now fulfilled Tuđman's goal of
What does race have to do with the Yugoslav region?
Cold War politics of race both prompted the USA to give African-American artists key roles in public diplomacy towards state socialist countries and, arguably, to grant greater civil rights at home (Dudziak 2000 ; Borstelmann 2001 ; Von Eschen 2006 ).
of international diplomacy.’ Nations continued to tell nationalist narratives and individuals returned to traditional practices of memory. 43
The Second World War was not merely a repeat of the horrors of the Great War as it involved death and destruction on a far greater scale. It also brought about the industrial production of corpses at Auschwitz and the other Nazi extermination camps. In line with the double structure of rupture I identified in Benjamin’s work, 1945 was not only violent enough to rip the fabric of historical time; it was also the second
; critically interrogate discourses about Bosnians being treated ‘like Africans’ or ‘a Third World country’; or position exclusivist ethnonationalisms in the Yugoslav region, Republika Srpska's genocidal strategy of homogenisation and apartheid's bureaucratic racism within one connected account of race, identity, territory, violence and diplomacy in the twentieth century. 2
Of all the modes for approaching race and the Yugoslav region, the mode of connection is the most challenging and the most necessary.
Connecting race and the Yugoslav
of a global consumer culture that commercialises racialised gazes and desires into exotica (Gilroy 2000 ) and of the complex global imagination of ‘America’: indeed, African-American music and musicians were important for US cultural diplomacy during the Cold War (Von Eschen 2006 ), towards Non-Aligned Yugoslavia (Vučetić 2012 ) as well as the USSR. Sounds, songs, stars and genres deeply embedded in US racial politics, from jazz to Michael Jackson through Motown, were also cultural artefacts that entered Yugoslavia as symbols of Americanness, coolness and
Eurosclerosis (1959– 84) and the second phase of integration (1985– 2003)
Peter J. Verovšek
Policy (CAP) – a crucial issue for rural France – came up, he departed from the usual procedure by informing the European Parliament (EP) before sending the proposal to the Council of Ministers.
De Gaulle’s reaction was based on two simultaneous sentiments: rage at this attempt to further supranationalism, which he opposed, and fear that involving the EP would adversely affect France on the CAP and the other issues subjected to majority voting. In a move drawn directly from the playbook of traditional bilateral diplomacy, de Gaulle recalled France’s ambassador to the