had begun to undercut the arms control regime long before the 1998 Indian nuclear tests. But
India’s open defiance of the global nuclear order marked the real beginning
of the end of the non-proliferation regime, the bedrock of Cold War international security, and the consequences for globalsecurity have been nothing
less than revolutionary. Forced by India’s open challenge to the global arms
control and disarmament framework in May 1998, major powers in the
international system have been re-evaluating their orientation toward global
arms control and non
“Five Eyes” cooperative intelligence arrangement in which the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand continue to share intelligence on globalsecurity concerns.
Ultimately, however, the members of NATO and the European Union represent the heart of the West, and thus the well-being of the transatlantic alliance is key to the survival of the West. Moreover, not all members of this core group have always met the high standards set in the North Atlantic Treaty and the several treaties that comprise the EU’s constitution. Without the
mechanisms such as its military cooperation component, the Conselho de Defesa Sul-Americano (CDS). The CDS was inaugurated at the 2009 Quito UNASUL Summit, bringing member-country defence ministers together in a forum to advance cooperation around security issues with a particular emphasis on fostering confidence-building measures, enhancing collaboration in military industrial production and humanitarian action, and formulating common positions on globalsecurity issues. Further efforts in this inward turn for collective support come from the December 2012 launching of a
Malacca Straits, and India’s rapid reaction to the
Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 won accolades from the Pentagon. It is by no
means an exaggeration to suggest that the United States would like a strong
US–India alliance to act as a “bulwark against the arc of Islamic instability
running from the Middle East to Asia and to create much greater balance
The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of the United States
strongly emphasizes India’s importance for the United States in the emerging
globalsecurity architecture.13 While a concern with China’s rising
with Brazilian decision makers historically reluctant to undertake African operations because of the frequent need to use coercive force as part of the mission (Kenkel, 2013c ). Where the Haitian case becomes important for Brazil’s broader agenda of becoming a viable globalsecurity provider with a focus on South–South questions is in the proof of concept it offered for the holistic approach to conflict resolution and stabilization outlined by Amorim to Congress. The result was an expansion of Brazil’s participation in UN missions during the PT presidencies of Lula
both sides assuming that their actions and intent were clear to the other. For Brazil, the implications of the process were obvious: the Tehran nuclear deal was a clear attempt by Brazil to demonstrate that it is a major world power capable of delivering the sort of globalsecurity goods necessary to have a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Embedded in this attitude was an attempt to reshape relative power relations and their impact on the larger structural question through sheer effort of will by simply acting as if the terrain had shifted and legal
, distancing Brazil from globalsecurity flashpoints. Brazil can thus absent itself from major international security questions should it so choose, but conversely has to work harder to make a case for its involvement when it does choose to become engaged, which was a sustained challenge during the Lula era. The national security benefits stemming from this accident of geography are magnified by the existence of something approximating a regional security community in South America and the wider area of Latin America. While the formal structures to this end are weak and the
.M. Reisman, ‘Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern’ (1968) 62 AJIL 753.
46 UN Doc S/RES/841 (1993).
47 UN Doc S/RES/757 (1992).
48 UN Doc S/RES/661 (1990).
49 UN Doc S/RES/748 (1992).
50 O’Connell n. 37 at 68.
51 W.M. Reisman, ‘Assessing the Lawfulness of Nonmilitary Enforcement: The Case of Economic Sanctions’ (1996) 89 AJIL 37.
52 UN Doc S/RES/917 (1994).
53 P. Hough, Understanding GlobalSecurity (Routledge 2nd edn 2008) 107.
54 UN Doc S/RES/661 (1990); UN Doc S/RES/665 (1990).
55 UN Doc S
security problems tended to be
contagious. Local disputes in Africa or Latin America became globalsecurity issues precisely because of the competition between
superpowers. That phenomenon seemed to disappear in the 1990s and
security issues around the world were treated largely as isolated
problems. But globalisation has recreated a different sort of contagion
between types and areas of instability. Physical mobility between one
crisis zone and another for fighters, weapons, money and information has