politics, on the other. Berlin himself identifies a division of labour between theoretical reflection and practicaljudgement: he shows that the former has not been successful in its various attempts to identify the general rule for the resolution of moral conflicts, leaving that instead in the realm of practical reasoning and practicaljudgement. One area where practical reasoning and judgement is required is the decision to tolerate difference. I would say that toleration of difference is not logically entailed by value pluralism. Rather, whether or not we tolerate any
pluralists, theory will not resolve these dilemmas for us. As Berlin says, although we can offer reasons to justify the way in which we resolve a moral conflict in a specific situation, crucially, the reasons ‘cannot always be clearly stated, let alone generalised into rules or universal maxims’ (Berlin 2004  , pp. 172–3). Hence, according to value pluralism, political theory does not provide us with the general rule to resolve moral conflicts. When we resolve conflicts, we do so by exercising practical reason and practicaljudgement.