ambiguities within discourses which resist them. Notably, the method of this study was phenomenological. It aims to unpack the range of ‘what it feels like’ – not to quantify Islamophobia, Orientalism, racism or their lack among hiloni millennials.
The first part of the chapter provides context. It analyses how the Jewish-Israeli public reads Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah and Iran through the lens of the long historical experience of Jews with anti-Semitism in Europe and the Middle East. Stereotypes of Islamic fanaticism emerged in their contemporary form in Israel in
theories of secularism and secularization generally ignored Judaism. 28 The ignoring was mutual. Prior to the 1990s, historians, philosophers and religious studies scholars of Jewish cases did not widely engage theories of the secular, seeing them as conceptually inapplicable. 29
However, since the early modern period, Jewish thinkers have engaged extensively with questions raised by Europeanmodernism, including about ontology, identity, ethics and politics. In the introduction to their 2015 edited collection, Secularism in Question: Jews and Judaism in Modern Times
‘Flow and boundary’ – a suggestive image for a new
constellation of border crossings. (Habermas, 2001 ) 1
From its conception to the referenda of 2005 where it
met its end, German philosopher Jürgen Habermas wrote in support of the European
Constitution. An account of his efforts must, however, be more than a catalogue of texts. For
his status as the last of the great system builders of European philosophy, comparable with
Hegel in the breadth and explanatory power of his thought
This book examines the impact that nostalgia has had on the Labour Party’s political development since 1951. In contrast to existing studies that have emphasised the role played by modernity, it argues that nostalgia has defined Labour’s identity and determined the party’s trajectory over time. It outlines how Labour, at both an elite and a grassroots level, has been and remains heavily influenced by a nostalgic commitment to an era of heroic male industrial working-class struggle. This commitment has hindered policy discussion, determined the form that the modernisation process has taken and shaped internal conflict and cohesion. More broadly, Labour’s emotional attachment to the past has made it difficult for the party to adjust to the socioeconomic changes that have taken place in Britain. In short, nostalgia has frequently left the party out of touch with the modern world. In this way, this book offers an assessment of Labour’s failures to adapt to the changing nature and demands of post-war Britain.
Muslims in Europe as colonialist occupiers. It’s easier therefore for Muslim Europeans
who have found it hard to integrate to identify with the Palestinians.17
As Ajami concludes, the encounter with the West, with modernism and with
freedom of expression is very painful. What is perceived as the non-integration
of Muslim migrants – the ‘dish cities’ of many TV satellite dishes tuned to Arabic
or Muslim channels – is a result of this encounter. In painful, even cruel words
Ajami focuses on some of the ruins and disasters of this encounter:
There is an Arab
Fiqh al-Aqalliyat (Muslim jurisprudence on minorities); Dina de-Malchuta Dina (the law of the kingdom is the law); Dar al-Islam (abode of Islam); Dar al-Harb (abode of war)
has nothing to hope for from God – except in self-defense.’ (Koran 3:28).
Islam contributed much to the rise of European medieval culture, but its
contribution was much less during the post-medieval era. The emergence of
modern European and Western philosophies, liberal democracy, modern social
achievements and scientific discoveries occurred largely without Muslim contributions. Jews, by comparison, have been a built-in element, part and parcel,
and in certain areas the fulcrum, of modern European cultures and civilisation.
Notwithstanding historical, and in
system are to be reduced. ‘Inflation of rising expectations’ and
‘ungovernability’ are the slogans of a policy that aims at a greater detachment
of administration from public will-formation . . . Third, cultural policy is assigned the
task of operating on two fronts.
On the one hand, it is to discredit intellectuals as the social bearers of modernism ... On
the other hand, traditional culture and the stabilising forces of conventional morality,
patriotism, bourgeois religion, and folk culture are
, European novels and other relevant texts are looked at,
both as descriptions and embodiments of the Zeitgeist – in them are discerned
‘cartographies of disenchantment’, vying accounts of the causes, consequences and
agents of rationalisation. Habermas’s Frankfurt School predecessor Leo Lowenthal engaged
in a comparable exercise, though with an orientation to social, rather than cultural,
Löwenthal’s studies of drama and fiction in the nineteenth
century served to show in detail that the
rights in Western countries. British
socialism has been deeply influenced by the nonconformist Christian
tradition. Conservatism in Britain and the Christian Democratic parties of
Germany and Italy have been closely identified with particular forms of the
Christian tradition (Anglicanism in Britain and Catholicism in Germany and
However, the Christian tradition in
Western Europe is declining in
, Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional
Society: Modernising the Middle East, London, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1958.
5 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories
of Nations and Nationalism, London, Routledge, 1998, p. 44.
6 Otto Dann, ‘Modernity and the Project of the Modern Nation’, in Johannes U. Müller
and Bo Stråth, eds, Nationalism and Modernity, EUI Working Paper HEC No. 99/1,
Florence, European University Institute, 1999, p. 24.
7 Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, London, Harvard University