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structure is perhaps unsurprising since the wider context for post-war liberalism was always communism and fascism, which had swept across Europe and East Asia. 70 Fear of populist ideologies that had uprooted societies abroad amplified the concern with populism on the fringe of American liberal democracy. This dimension is drawn to the fore when
utility of a project which has not always respected diversity and the plurality of knowledge. Critics suggest that ‘indelibly tainted by association with the meta-narratives of modernity,’ the historical experience of emancipation is one that ‘has become complicit in the suffering engendered by the practices and pathologies of modernism (broadly defined)’ ( Wyn Jones, 2005
Development Theory: The Contemporary Debate (London: Taylor & Francis, 2005); B. Hindess, ‘The Past is Another Culture’, International Political Sociology , 1:4 (2007), pp. 325–338; and T. A. McCarthy, ‘From Modernism to Messianism: Liberal Developmentalism and American Exceptionalism’, Constellations , 14:1 (2007), pp. 3
make references to Crusaders and Mongols but rather to a string of ‘broken promises’ dating back to World War I, when European powers divided up the Ottoman Empire to suit their own interests. They planted Israel in the midst of the Middle East, so the analysis goes, in order to drive a wedge between Arab states, and the United States
different kind of political community unconnected to the European history and culture that the Pilgrim Fathers escaped from – expresses the collective belief that Americans are a special people (see Hughes 2003). Officials have tapped into this national myth by suggesting that the suffering caused by the attacks is unique and special; America is an exceptional kind of victim. One of the purposes of
