Under Vladimir Putin, the Russian leadership has consistently sought to shape a strategic agenda. This book discusses the strategy planning process and the legislative and policy architecture that has taken shape. It explores the nature of the agenda itself, particularly Putin's May Edicts of 2012, which set out Moscow's core strategic agenda. The book examines the questions raised by the numerous problems in planning and the extent to which they undermine the idea of Russian grand strategy. It explores what the Russian leadership means by a 'unified action programme', its emphasis on military modernisation, problems that Russian observers emphasise, strategy undermining, and the relation of mobilisation with the Russian grand strategy. The book argues that Russian strategy is less to be found in Moscow's plans, and more in the so-called vertical of power. The broader picture of Russian grand strategy, and the leadership's ability to implement those plans, is examined. The book discusses patriotic mass mobilisation often referred to as the 'Crimea effect', and the role of the All Russian Popular Front in the implementation of the leadership's plans, especially the May Edicts. It talks about the ongoing debate in the Russian armed forces. Finally, some points regarding Russian grand strategy are discussed.
This book offers a nuanced and detailed examination of Russia’s international activity. In broad terms, the book contributes to two of the most important current debates about contemporary Russian actions: whether Moscow is acting strategically or opportunistically, and whether this should be understood in regional or global terms. The book goes against the majority opinions on both questions, and introduces contributions in a number of under-researched themes. It argues that Moscow is not acting in a simply ad hoc, reactive way, but in a consistently strategic manner, and that this is best understood not by analysing Russia’s return to specific regions, but in a more holistic way with a global horizon, linking activity across different regions. This means that the Russian challenge is likely to continue rather than fade away. The book addresses core themes of Russian activity – military, energy, and economic. But it offers an unusual multi-disciplinary analysis to these themes, incorporating both regional and thematic specialist expertise. Underpinned by detailed analyses of the revolution in Russian geospatial capabilities and the establishment of a strategic planning foundation, the book includes chapters on military and maritime strategies, energy security, and economic diversification and influence. This serves to highlight the connections between military and economic interests that shape and drive Russian strategy.
This book focuses on the Western difficulties in interpreting Russia. It begins with by reflecting on some of the problems that are set in the foundations of Russia's post-Cold War relationship with the West. The book points to problems that emerge from linguistic and historical 'interpretation'. It looks at the impact of Russia's decline as a political priority for the West since the end of the Cold War and the practical impact this has had. It then reflects on the rising influence, especially, but not only, in public policy and media circles, of 'transitionology' as the main lens through which developments in Russia were interpreted. The book then examines the evolution of the West's relationship with Russia since the end of the Cold War, focusing particularly on the NATO-Russia relationship. It focuses on the chronological development of relations and the emergence of strategic dissonance from 2003. The book also looks at Russian domestic politics, particularly the Western belief in and search for a particular kind of change in Russia, a transition to democracy. It continues the exploration of domestic politics, but turns to address the theme of 'Putinology', the focus on Putin as the central figure in Russian politics.
Some doubt the idea of a Russian grand strategy. Michael McFaul, a former US ambassador to Russia, is among those who argue that Putin does not know what he wants from the Ukraine crisis, has no grand plan and makes policy up as he goes. This introduction also presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in this book. The book explores the implications of the emphasis on military modernisation, the problems that Russian observers emphasise and the ways they undermine strategy, and the ways hints at 'mobilisation' relate to Russian grand strategy. It argues that Russian strategy is less to be found in Moscow's plans, and more in the so-called vertical of power. In so doing, the book reveals important shifts underway in the Russian political and security landscape and shapes an argument about a missed diagnosis of Russian state mobilisation.
Mobilisation is associated both with modernisation of the armed forces and security of the nation and, related to that, readiness to face challenges as the leadership seeks to establish the kind of force structures required to resolve weaknesses and maximise advantages. This chapter discusses the ongoing debate in the Russian armed forces about structure, particularly the need for large armies in modern war and the difficulty of economically sustaining them. The Russian armed forces are undergoing an intensive period of reform and re-equipment. Following the Russo- Georgia war in 2008, the Russian leadership instigated what Mikhail Barabanov has called the 'most radical military reform since the creation of the Red Army following the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution'. Alongside the reform, re-equipment and establishment of new structures, many thousands of exercises have been conducted. These have taken three main forms: civil defence and emergency management, policing and military.
This chapter discusses a series of important problems faced by Moscow. Richard Connolly has noted that the 'most obvious external cause of the economic slowdown in Russia has been the prolonged stagnation in the economies of Europe. He also noted that Russia has been negatively affected by the strengthening of the US dollar as the consequence of the tapering of monetary expansion in the United States. The chapter describes a wide range of other problems that constrain and undermine Russian strategy-making. These problems can be broadly divided into two categories: the effective balancing of resources and the 'conducting of the orchestra'. Russian observers often talk of a crisis of administration, a problem publicly acknowledged by the leadership. The vertical of power, the means through which the leadership attempts to implement its policies, is often dysfunctional and only works when it is micro-managed by the top leadership.
Dmitri Medvedev stated in 2014 that 'Russia is experiencing triple pressure for the first time'. This included global economic instability, the 'unfriendly policies of some leading countries', particularly the sanctions, leading to a 'deteriorated international environment' and 'internal structural limitations'. Vladimir Putin has emphasised that 'only by mobilising all the resources at our disposal both administrative and financial' that Russia would be able to respond to the grave long- term challenges that faced it. This chapter provides a discussion on patriotic mass mobilisation often referred to as the 'Crimea effect'. It discusses the role of the All Russian Popular Front in the implementation of the leadership's plans, especially the May Edicts. The chapter explores the 'economic sovereignty' introduced in the economic sector by the Russian leadership. Russia's political and economic model is focused on reducing vulnerability and emphasising consolidation and security.
Under Vladimir Putin, the Russian leadership has consistently sought to shape a strategic agenda. He identified a strong state and efficient economy as the keys to its recovery, and what Russia needed, he suggested, was to 'formulate a long-term strategy' to overcome the crisis. This chapter discusses the strategy planning process and the legislative and policy architecture that has taken shape. It explores the nature of the agenda itself, partly as framed in the documents relating to foreign and security policy, but more particularly Putin's May Edicts of 2012, which set out Moscow's core strategic agenda. The chapter examines the questions raised by the numerous problems in planning and the extent to which they undermine the idea of Russian grand strategy, even at the stage of its formulation. Russian strategic planning is flawed both in terms of achieving consensus, and in balancing the political flexibility.
This chapter discusses four points regarding Russian grand strategy. First, the Russian leadership has a strategic agenda. A structured process, with the Security Council at its heart, has taken shape from the mid- 2000s, resulting in the overhaul of Moscow's strategic planning. Second, Russian grand strategy does not lie in Moscow's goals or even its agenda, but in its execution. Third, the assumptions that influence strategic thinking and planning. Fourth, transformation of the Russian political and security landscape as new organisations have been established, including Rosgvardia, the All Russian Popular Front and the National Defense Management Center. Generating grand strategy is always difficult, but Moscow's attempt is purposeful, security focused, and proving successful in some areas. By the 2020s, there will still be a balance between Russian strength and weakness, but the results of mobilisation will mean that Russia will pose a very different proposition to the Euro-Atlantic community.
This chapter focuses on some of the problems that are set in the foundations of Russia's post-Cold War relationship with the West. It then points to problems that emerge from linguistic and historical 'interpretation'. In the West, the Russian middle class is understood to be a driver of political change, part of an evolving entrepreneurial private sector and civil society increasingly free and independent from the state. Swedish analysts have suggested that the Ukraine crisis has revealed that the West and Russia are 'speaking different dialects' on security. The chapter presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in the subsequent chapters of this book. The book takes the form of an essay about Russia and how it is understood in the West. It examines the evolution of the West's relationship with Russia since the end of the Cold War, focusing particularly on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)-Russia relationship.