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- Author: Charlotte Wagnsson x
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Can Russia, the European Union and the three major EU member states adopt a unified policy line in the global arena? This book investigates the cohesiveness of ‘greater Europe’ through the detailed scrutiny of policy statements by the leadership elites in the UK, France, Germany, Russia and the EU in connection with three defining events in international security. The crisis in Kosovo of 1999; the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the Iraq crisis of 2003. This extensive empirical enquiry results in a critical constructivist response to neorealist understandings of European security. The book contrasts the EU's new way of ‘doing security’ with the established, competitive bilateral interplay in the European security sphere and provides a clue to the kind of security politics that will prevail in Europe. A joint Moscow Brussels approach would improve the chances of both increasing their relative strength vis-a-vis the USA, but serious cleavages threaten to undermine such a ‘greater European’ common view on security. The book considers the extent to which the major European players pursue similar objectives, and assesses the possible implications for and the chances of greater Europe emerging as a cohesive global actor.
The war in Iraq of spring 2003 is a major crisis, and one that continues to affect global security dynamics. The USA invaded Iraq, using as its key argument that rogue states with links to terrorism demand forceful action. According to the 2002 version of the US National Security Strategy, the USA would defend itself not only in a reactive way, but also in a proactive way—invoking self-defence in order to act pre-emptively against terrorists. This chapter scrutinises the leaders' framing of the Iraq crisis from the build-up to the war from 1 December 2002 until its official end on 1 May 2003.
This chapter evaluates the EU's internal cohesion by extrapolating the findings from the case studies into three major ‘gaps’ in reasoning on security. The gaps revolve, to a significant extent, around the role of norms in international affairs, around the governments' favoured methods of preserving stability, and around the issue of the role of the USA in global security. The chapter extends the analysis by analysing a number of more recent EU documents. It ends by elaborating on the consequences for practical cooperation.
This chapter analyses the central rhetorical divergences exposed by case studies which seriously hamper cooperation between Russia and the EU. The divergences appear to mirror deep policy controversies that are tied to existential issues and consequently to the two parties' identities. Given the difficulties in eradicating their basic differences, the chapter suggests that pragmatism is the most plausible way for Russia and the EU to advance their integration in the sphere of security. Increased cooperation on as many issues and levels as possible might boost a kind of neo-functionalism, which might, in the long run, contribute to further rapprochement in the sphere of security.
This chapter makes a case for the book's contribution to the constructivist field of research in international relations. The main part of the chapter is dedicated to further reflections on the empirical findings. Above all, it emphasises how diverging norms and bilateral disturbances complicate European actorness; but it also sheds light on the potential for closer EU-Russia co-operation in the global arena, and suggests possible consequences for the USA.
In order to provide further insight into how and to what degree major European security actors converge and diverge, this book presents an extensive and thorough analysis of official standpoints. The focus is on the relationship between the EU and Russia, and also on bilateral relations between Russia and the major EU member states. The empirical enquiry contrasts Russia's standpoints on security with those of the EU bureaucracy and with those of the three major EU member states: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. This chapter examines the possibility of a pan-European approach, competing constructions of security, ‘EU-Europe’ as a security actor, and the background to EU-Russia relations.
The 11 September 2001 case serves to illuminate important dividing lines and convergences among the European actors. For many, it signified a paradigm shift after which international interaction abandoned its dominant focus on state-to-state relations. A new, diffuse and not even united actor—international terrorism—had interrupted the ordinary mechanisms of international relations. This chapter discusses the dramatic events that led to major transformations in the machinery of the international system. It examines the actors' framing of 11 September 2001, from the terrorist attacks to the official end of the US campaign in Afghanistan on 5 December 2001, when an agreement on the future of Afghanistan was signed in Rome.
The first case examined in this book involved a ‘wake up call’ that sparked the evolution of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). It was also one of the significant events that prompted a reconsideration of norms and rules for action in the international system. It was later used as both a negative and a positive example of how conflicts should be handled. This chapter analyses verbal reactions to ‘Operation Allied Force’ in Kosovo, which began on 24 March 1999 and officially ended on 10 June the same year. In spite of severe differences, most notably between Russia and the UK, the conflict in Kosovo also moved EU-Russian relations forward. Above all, the subsequent strengthening of the EU's actorness favoured a gradual rapprochement.