Colonialism in the photographs and letters of the young cosmopolitan Carl Heinrich Becker, 1900–2
untangling the complicated web of relations between science and colonialism in an
era when Germany was establishing dedicated colonial sciences. 68 The time of ‘armchair scholarship’ was over,
and men like Becker, personally linked to Germany's political class, having read
the works of Mungo Park and carried Kipling's novels in their travel libraries, 69 brought back vivid impressions from
their expeditions. Besides the social networks they established, the most
important impact of
Germany, 1890–1990 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1994), p. 3.
Ibid., p. 155; David B. Dennis, Beethoven in
GermanPolitics, 1870–1989 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1996), p. 22.
Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy , pp. 9
The discovery, commemoration and reinterment of eleven Alsatian victims of Nazi terror, 1947– 52
Devlin M. Scofield
: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 282.
10 Lagrou, The Legacy of Nazi Occupation, pp. 279–80.
11 Vergangenheitspolitik or ‘politics of the past’ refers to West Germanpolitical leaders’ approach to the memory and legacies of the recent National
Socialist period. Political parties were divided on the issue. The Christian
Democratic Union (CDU) led by Konrad Adenauer focused on reintegrating and reconciling former Nazis to the democratic West German
government at the expense of confronting Germans’ roles in the Third
Reich and justice for its victims. The Social Democratic Party
Reconstruction and reconciliation; confrontation and oppression
Kjell M. Torbiörn
united Germany suggested by the Soviet Union
in the early 1950s. A new Germany including the eastern part would have
given added weight to the nascent Social Democratic Party and a
22/9/03, 12:32 pm
1950s: reconstruction and reconciliation
stronger communist role in Germanpolitics – and would perhaps even
have carried the risk of a coup d’état along the lines of that in Czecho15
slovakia in 1948. The declaration of the day of the East Berlin uprising
– 17 June – as a national day of the Federal Republic, and the 1949
The analysis has indicated, that domestic support will materialise when it comes
to engaging the Bundeswehr alongside the armed forces of major allies as a last
resort in managing crises that entail large-scale ethnic violence or abuse of
human rights. Such interventions will appear legitimate to politicians across the
Germanpolitical spectrum. The composite consensus, however, will not sustain
a potential policy of unilateral deployments of the Bundeswehr outside of established organisational frameworks. It will also prove shaky where a German
how German military
leaders described the ideal peace keeper – a description corresponding closely to
the image of civilised soldiers that dominated the Germanpolitical discourse
throughout the late 1990s.43
There are no systematic comparative studies of the style of German, British,
French, and American peacekeepers. Thus, strong conclusions about whether
the German style was singular are not warranted. However, in the perception of
a number of political–military elites in Berlin, Paris, and Washington, the
Bundeswehr took an approach that diﬀered from the
since 1949’, GermanPolitics, 5, 1 (April 1996), p. 26.
5 Stuart Wavell, ‘Apartheid in the UK? They’re Having a Genetic Joke’, Sunday
Times News Review, 23 July 2006, p. 7.
6 Whilst the findings of opinion polls have to be approached with some care, a
Gallup poll conducted in August 1945 in Britain revealed a mixed response to
the question ‘What are your feelings at the present time towards the German
people?’. Whilst 21% of those asked indicated ‘hatred’ and 14% indicated ‘dislike’, it is significant that 25% expressed ‘sympathy’. See George H. Gallup
Politics and Territorial Representation in the Federal
Republic of Germany,” West European Politics 22, no. 2 (April 1999), pp.
159–161; for a somewhat similar view, see Roland Sturm, “Party Competition and the Federal System: The Lehmbruch Hypothesis Revisited,” in
Recasting German Federalism, edited by Charlie Jeffery (London and New
York: Pinter, 1999), pp. 197–216.
48 Stephen J. Silvia, “Reform Gridlock and the Role of the Bundesrat in GermanPolitics,” West European Politics 22 (April 1999), pp. 167–181.
49 This section is based on Uwe Leonardy, “The Working
: ‘Euthanasia’ in Germany 1900–1945
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); P. Weindling, Health, Race
and GermanPolitics between National Unification and Naziism, 1870–1945
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
48 Burleigh, Death and Deliverance; B. Müller-Hill, Murderous Science: Elimination
by Scientific Selection of Jews, Gypsies and Others: Germany 1933–1945, trans.
G.R. Fraser (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Proctor, Racial Hygiene;
W. Wolfensberger, ‘The extermination of handicapped people in World War II
Germany’, Mental Retardation 19
had its roots not only in the divisions perpetuated by the
Versailles demands. Reconciliation also failed because the conditions
in which the Armistice was arranged led many in the 1920s and 1930s
to reject the Allied victory as neither decisive nor final. Particularly for
those on the Germanpolitical right, the argument that capitulation had
come about not through Allied military superiority but rather as the
result of insidious British propaganda, Bolshevik agitation or the weakness and disloyalty of the home front provided a basis on which to assert