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institutional power in the French political field. This implies more generally that the roles of the executive and of the administration are given priority over the legislative. This built-in structure of political domination is structurally similar to the one in place in the evolving European political field. The European Parliament's political marginality in the French political field manifests itself in yet another, more general form - that of structural instability. 96 Democracy, social resources and political power in the European Union The overall turnover of the

in Democracy, social resources and political power in the European Union

mayors (Magre 1999), and officials and ministers in the regional executive as well as on the careers and backgrounds of several cohorts of members of the Catalan Parliament (Pitarch and Subirats 1982; Morata 1992; Argelaguet 1999; Calvet 1999). While these studies on Scottish and Catalan politicians provide invaluable and quite detailed information on various sections of the respective political classes, they remain generally wedded to political and social background analysis and a single-institution recruitment perspective. They are concerned neither with a cross

in Towards a regional political class?
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symptom was an The transfer of powers to increase in voting for nationalist parties at regional assemblies and elections. The SNP had 1 seat at Westminster executives, but not sovereignty, up to 1970. By the October 1974 election, i.e. powers can be taken back by the central authority. however, the party had 11 seats as a result of winning over 30 per cent of the vote in Scotland. Plaid Cymru secured 11.5 per cent of the vote in Wales in 1970 but no seats. However, by October 1974 it had 3 seats and had established itself in Welsh politics. The reasons why there was an

in Understanding British and European political issues
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politics, and you didn’t if it wasn’t.23 In the 1960s and 1970s the Clubs at Golcar, Springhead, Linthwaite, Marsden and the Liberal Rooms at Holmfirth were the venues of meetings of the Colne Valley Women Liberals. The Colne Valley Liberals held their General Meeting at the Clubs in Marsden in 1963 and 1971 and Honley in 1975, and the Committee met at Linthwaite and Springhead Clubs during the same Parliament.24 In the 1980s, the Divisional Association Executive met regularly in these and Liberal Clubs at Crosland Moor, Golcar and Lindley.25 When the seat was lost in

in Richard Wainwright, the Liberals and Liberal Democrats

2 The security problem The two-year period, from the introduction of direct rule to the fall of the Northern Ireland Executive, accounted for the highest level of violence over the entire course of the conflict. Improving security on an all-Ireland basis was therefore a prominent political concern during these years. This was because cross-border attacks on Northern Ireland security forces were then commonplace. The Sunningdale Communiqué of 1973 made explicit reference to such attacks, and the British and Irish governments agreed to make the Northern Ireland

in Template for peace

impact upon the degree of Europeanisation of the party as well as its political visibility and effectiveness on the European political stage – what we might regard as its political presence . First, we comment briefly on the distinction between full member parties, observer parties and organisations with which EL has signed partnership agreements (a new category of association, introduced in 2017). Then, we examine the internal organisation of the EL – the role of party Congresses, the General Assembly (introduced in 2017), the Executive Board and the Council of

in The European Left Party
Comparing the Sunningdale Agreement and the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement

position within the UK would be deemed unconstitutional in Irish courts, there was to be no written formulation of Dublin’s position on the status of Northern Ireland: it was to be enunciated through an oral declaration by the Taoiseach, Liam Cosgrave, but only on the occasion of a final agreement covering such matters as a Council of Ireland and the formation of a Northern Ireland power-sharing executive. The oral declaration would recognise the ‘different elements’ who lived on the island; that political unity should be pursued through reconciliation alone; and, so

in Sunningdale, the Ulster Workers’ Council strike and the struggle for democracy in Northern Ireland
A regional political class for itself

power at different territorial levels has clearly further undermined the relatively weak position of the Catalan Parliament in a political system that had been executive dominated from the very start. The lack of government alternation between 1980 and 2003 had turned CDC and UDC into the parties of the Catalan state.18 With the whole Generalitat administration to back up their policy production, they simply had no strong interest in extending infrastructural and staff support for members of parliament and parliamentary groups, as this would only strengthen the

in Towards a regional political class?
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Eliciting a response from the Irish parliament to European integration

a communication aspect, involving both transmitting the views of the electorate to European institutions, and, conversely, informing the electorate of what is happening at EU level. It also includes imposing democratic accountability on the executive concerning its EU-​level activities level. How well the Oireachtas has exercised influence over the Government in EU matters, particularly insofar as concerns ministers in Council and Taoisigh in the European Council, is a topic which both this chapter and Chapter 4 address. Of the EU’s political institutions, the

in The evolving role of national parliaments in the European Union
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two accords is insufficient to explain why the current peace settlement took so long to achieve. The naively optimistic view that the Sunningdale settlement represented a ‘lost peace process’, and that the IRA’s intermittent ceasefire of 1975 was a ‘missed opportunity’ to achieve a peaceful settlement, is rejected.18 Between 1972 and 1975, the British government’s emphasis was on creating an executive consisting of moderate political parties. Those engaged in paramilitary violence were excluded. As a result their violent campaigns continued, and spoiled the

in Template for peace