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Joe Earle, Cahal Moran and Zach Ward-Perkins

increase of inequality over time as the alreadywealthy cement their position.53 Piketty argues that ‘the history of the distribution of wealth has always been deeply political, and it cannot be reduced to purely economic mechanisms’.54 He uses the example of changes in corporate governance in the UK since the 1980s, which have seen boards legally obliged to maximise shareholder value. In Germany, in contrast, firms typically have worker representatives on their boards, who are naturally less enthusiastic about higher shareholder pay-outs and executive pay, and income

in The econocracy
Oonagh McDonald

-party repos certainly put it in a strong position to see the way in which such securities were valued. However, in response to the illiquid markets, pressure from Congress and the political fall-out both in the USA and in Europe, on 30 September 2008 the standard setters issued new guidance, designed to address the most immediately urgent fair value measurement questions. The guidance confirmed that management's internal assumptions regarding, for example, expected cash flows, could be used, in appropriate circumstances, to measure fair value when the

in Lehman Brothers
Abstract only
John Wilson

to the ordinary shareholders, having deducted taxation, minority interests and extraordinary charges from the figures given in column 2. c This sum includes both preference and ordinary share dividends, but it is important to emphasise that the former never cost the company more than £100,000 per annum. Source: Ferranti Annual Reports 1986–93. Figure 8.1 Ferranti International share price, 1990–93 was so tight by that time that no less than 187 writs had been received in September 1992 from unsecured creditors. While the chief executive was able to persuade the

in Ferranti: A History
Costas Simitis

‘balanced economic growth’, ‘a competitive social market economy’, ‘social justice’ – while the loftier aims of ‘solidarity between member states’ 3 were relegated to rhetoric. European integration aimed at ‘growth’, a ‘social’ Europe beyond the common market, the single currency and a vague notion of a common foreign policy. The political and economic conditions prevailing after 2004 expedited this trend, turning attention exclusively to the problems of the single market, and the single currency. Policies for growth and initiatives to reduce the imbalances between member

in The European debt crisis
Open Access (free)
The evolving international financial architecture
Shalendra D. Sharma

The Asian financial crisis 6 Beyond the Asian crisis: the evolving international financial architecture We face a world of crisis. If Hong Kong, with its sound fundamentals and prudent financial management, can be brought to the brink of systemic breakdown by aggressive cross-border speculation, then something must be wrong with the world financial order (Joseph Yam, chief executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, January 5, 1999).1 Shortly after the Mexican peso crisis, the G-7 countries launched an effort to strengthen the international financial system

in The Asian financial crisis
Open Access (free)
Crisis, reform and recovery
Shalendra D. Sharma

). Perhaps Indonesia’s greatest vulnerability lay in its weak financial system, especially its dangerously undercapitalized and poorly supervised banks. What explains this weakness, and why was it allowed to persist? A brief background is necessary. First, while the central bank, Bank Indonesia, was responsible for supervising the country’s banking system, it nevertheless reported directly to the president during the Suharto era. This left the entire banking system open to both indirect and direct political interference. It is widely agreed that on numerous occasions

in The Asian financial crisis
Open Access (free)
Issues, debates and an overview of the crisis
Shalendra D. Sharma

reserves had dwindled to US$45 billion, below the level of its short-term debt. As the real came under renewed pressure from speculators the Brazilian government sought external assistance.16 In November the IMF announced a US$41.5 billion multilateral loan package (with the IMF contributing US$18.1 billion under a three-year Stand-By Arrangement), to sustain the value of the real and help Brazil with its balance of payments problem.17 However, the calming effects of the IMF program were short-lived. The failure by the authorities to reach political agreement on the

in The Asian financial crisis
Oonagh McDonald

fact, the agreement went further than that. A Department of Trade and Industry internal briefing note, dated 9 July 1984, set out the full terms of that agreement: 8 A decade of deregulation? • action to dismantle, by stages, minimum scales of stockbroking commissions, completing this by 31 December 1986; • continuation of rules prescribing the separation of capacity of brokers and jobbers; • permission for non-members of the Stock Exchange to become non-executive directors of corporate member firms; • introduction of lay members to the Council of the Stock

in Holding bankers to account
Open Access (free)
Crisis, reform and recovery
Shalendra D. Sharma

developmental state, and (2) elimination of corruption in the political and economic systems” (E-M. Kim 1997, 100). After ruling the country for two and a half years as coup leader, Park was elected president. This served to increase further the institutional coherence and capacity of the state. Park “quickly converted the ‘corrupt soft’ state he had 187 The Asian financial crisis inherited into a ‘developmental hard’ state . . . He then proceeded to execute an industrial policy, using a large battery of targeted and un-targeted interventions to implement his detailed vision

in The Asian financial crisis
Open Access (free)
Crisis, reform and recovery
Shalendra D. Sharma

The Asian financial crisis 2 Thailand: crisis, reform and recovery During the period of economic growth, we were too complacent. In good times we forgot many important truths and neglected many important tasks; we opened up our economy, but our stated plans to pursue discipline were not followed up; we attracted massive flows of cheap foreign capital, which we did not always spend or invest with enough prudence . . . we did not examine the fundamentals of our politics and governance or tackle issues such as bureaucratic inefficiency, lack of transparency and lack

in The Asian financial crisis