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1930s and disappeared almost without trace after 1945. By 1889 43,960 students had enrolled in 2,940 public schools in Burma. Education was on the brink of transforming society. 2 Winston had dreamed of a day when networks of Wesleyan primary schools would feed mission ‘high schools and training institutions’. 3 Political antagonism and lack of resources ultimately prevented the fulfilment of his ambition. Despite this, within two years Winston had established five schools with a total of 139 pupils. 4 Three of the

in Conflict, politics and proselytism
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churches and Muslim mosques. Senior pongyis mounted vigorous protests, which prompted the Revolutionary Council to retreat. Confusingly, it explained that the regulation applied only to ‘religious associations’ involved in ‘political activities’. 37 By April 1964 Bishop was the last ‘front-line’ Methodist missionary in Upper Burma and the last European of any sort in Monywa. 38 Barbara Bishop had returned to Britain with their children in February. Bishop discovered only by accident that his colleague, Rev. Broxholme

in Conflict, politics and proselytism
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an unhealthy place for European missionaries. Office politics caused difficulties too, and personnel problems cropped up with increasing regularity as more missionaries arrived. Winston was beside himself in 1897 when the Missionary Committee issued nambypamby new guidelines for the selection of missionaries. Winston had one trusty selection criterion. He looked for ‘a strong man in every sense’. 61 It seemed to him that the Committee just wanted men ‘fond of sitting quiet’. Winston felt particularly sore because

in Conflict, politics and proselytism
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April 1944. Acheson did not reply in case it fell into Japanese hands. U Po Wine was leader of the Kalemyo Methodists. 12 SOAS/MMS/Correspondence/FBN4/W. Brown-Moffett (BCMS), 19 December 1944; Chemi, a Lushai girl, translated for him. She was educated at Mandalay Girls High School, had trained as a nurse in Moulmein and became prominent in the post-war Church. 13 Dorothy Hess Guyot, ‘The Political Impact of the Japanese Occupation of Burma’, unpublished PhD

in Conflict, politics and proselytism

Calling to Mind , H.E.W. Braund’s history of Steel Brothers (Oxford, Pergamon, 1975), but Kennedy is mentioned in various private papers. 50 SOAS/MMS/Uncatalogued/MRP/6D/26/Firth Papers: Letter from Firth, June 1942. 51 The evacuation had profound political repercussions. It caused abrasions within the civil administration and rifts between the civil and military authorities. Useful analyses of the episode are provided by Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper

in Conflict, politics and proselytism
The Radcliffe award

desires and goals, or that the division’s failings were due to South Asian squabbling. When it came down to it, partition was (from the British perspective) a means of avoiding British responsibility while shedding the economic burden that India had become. This fact is not surprising – it simply reflects political realities – but it does not jibe with imperialist propaganda about empire’s benefits for

in Borders and conflict in South Asia

-Allied propaganda. Rather, it came about because of a tangible, quantitative change in the scale of the assault, and the qualitative change in its counterpart, fear. Bombing formed part of the ‘single biggest collective phenomenon’ of war: fear.85 But anger at the bombers was never a collective phenomenon; the population remained broadly on the side of the bombers, as help for downed airmen demonstrates. German and collaborationist propaganda played on fear of the Allies, not the bombs, for political gain. Pro-Allied propaganda focused on the bombs themselves, contextualising

in French children under the Allied bombs, 1940–45

they would get their reward at the liberation, when ‘you’ll be able to say that you helped to make it happen’.39 Suffering became a tool to inspire resistance; thus bombing could be better contextualised as part of war, and enduring it was part of resistance. Children’s actions were attributed importance, and some agency. This was mostly situated in domestic realm. Yet inciting political graffiti and participating in liberation placed them on the public stage. In wartime, children could act as Trojan horses, carrying ideologies home to parents. But did they? And

in French children under the Allied bombs, 1940–45
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into historical writing – what people felt, believed, hoped, feared. Years ago, Patrick O’Farrell lambasted the method for producing history ‘of the heart’.14 But surely a history ‘of the head’ is just one part of human experience: ‘subjectivity is as much the business of history as are the more visible “facts” ’.15 Certainly, the affective turn in the humanities has brought emotion to the fore as an important category for understanding social, cultural and political change: Jenny Harding notes the shift from ‘thinking about emotions as “things” people “have” ’ to a

in French children under the Allied bombs, 1940–45

also evolved. The March raid on Renault used a new ‘intensified system of flare illumination’. Fifteen Wellingtons dropped phosphorescent markers, lighting the factories throughout the attack.4 This raid was experimental. The new navigational aid Gee was also tested and then used in France for difficult targets such as the Gien tank park in July 1942.5 Certain changes to the tactics of bombing France were politically motivated. Despite calls from the Chief of Air Staff to bomb the ‘Free Zone’ during 1941, political chiefs refused, as Vichy France was still

in French children under the Allied bombs, 1940–45