civilian powers ’, Foreign Affairs , 69 : 5 ( 1990 ), pp. 91 – 106 ; H. W. Maull , ‘ From “civilian power” to “trading state”? ’, in S. Colvin (ed.), Routledge Handbook of GermanPolitics and Culture ( London : Routledge , 2014 ), pp. 409 – 24 .
3 P. H. Gordon , ‘ Berlin’s difficulties: the normalization of German foreign policy ’, Orbis , 38 : 2 ( 1994 ), pp. 225 – 43 , at p. 225 .
4 K. Brummer and K. Oppermann , Germany’s Foreign Policy after the End of the Cold War: ‘Becoming Normal’? ( Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2016 ).
in post-war history, the SPD closed ranks with ‘never
again war’. In spite of strong anti-militarist sentiments among the rank and ﬁle,
however, the party leadership never subscribed to the full agenda of universal
paciﬁsm. Until 1983 when the Green Party broke into the Bundestag, ‘never
again war’ thus found expression in extra-parliamentarian protest movements.
Starting with the massive anti-rearmament demonstrations of the early 1950s,
these movements became a recurrent phenomenon of post-war Germanpolitical life
The Weimar Republic in the eyes of American political science
started arriving in the 1930s, America was hardly a blank slate as far as Germany was concerned. The new arrivals had to contend with existing perceptions of Germanpolitical thought and institutions.
This chapter will explore the lively interest American political science showed in the Weimar Republic and its Constitution. Perceptions and commentary on Weimar were framed in terms of historical continuity, comparison with the post-bellum US and larger questions about the nature of sovereignty during the interwar period. Positive American views of Germany, as explored
system’.23 However, once again no action ensued – and indeed more rigorous surveillance would have run counter to the policies of government,
particularly after Neville Chamberlain became Prime Minister in 1937,
pursuing a policy of ‘appeasement’ of the Axis powers.
The case of Hans Wesemann
In fact, the ‘Auslandsorganisation’ and visiting journalists did not represent the only possible channels for German espionage on British soil; this
could be achieved through refugee circles as well. The confusion prevailing
in the ranks of the Germanpolitical exiles
A majority on the left, however, remained opposed to any expansion of
Germany’s military role. Even after the Constitutional Court in 1994 ruled outof-area deployments constitutional, Germanpolitics remained split on the issue
and the out-of-area battle was to continue throughout the second half of the
Phase two: reinterpreting the lessons of the past
In the battle’s second phase, the focus and fault line moved. The lessons of the
past became the paramount topics and the dividing line no longer ran between
the centre right and the left but through
of its relationship to an earlier Germany, and reflected too on Henry
Simon’s connection to Germanpolitics and culture, there is a certain
strangeness – but also satisfaction – in contemplating a belated and
renewed connection to that country. It is also, perhaps, an appropriate
way to end a story about travel, exile and belonging.
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[ 244 ]
organisation that is officially registered as right-wing extremist by the German State. For an
overview of these organisations and the ‘official’ number of organised right-wing extremists, see
the annual Verfassungsschutzberichten (further VSB).
the sore spot of Germanpolitics of that time: the Grand Coalition. This government coalition of the two major parties, the Union block of the CDU and
the Bavarian Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union, CSU) and the
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (German Social
appeared to deliberately target civilians, and a humanitarian catastrophe accompanied by a massive exodus of refugees from Kosovo seemed to be looming. The
immediate instinctive reaction across the Germanpolitical spectrum was: ‘not a
United by frustration and the feeling that too little had been done to prevent
previous Balkan atrocities, the outgoing CDU/FDP government and the incoming SPD/Green Government joined forces in pledging for the Bundestag’s
approval of a German contribution to potential NATO air strikes.35 Politicians
from the CDU on the
sinister role in the suicides of Dr Dora Fabian and Frau
Wurm at 12, Great Ormond Street on 1.4.1935’. The report, which was
also informed by the confessions that Wesemann had made to the Swiss
police about his relations with the German Embassy in London, noted that,
through the Embassy, Wesemann ‘was working for a secret department of
the German police which is exclusively concerned in watching Germanpolitical refugees abroad, luring the most dangerous back to Germany or
taking other steps to render them innocuous’.30 It noted further that,
after the Fabian–Wurm deaths
The changing view of Germany in Anglo-American geopolitics
schemes’ that bore no relation to learning. 36
This exchange might give the sense that Bowman and Germanpolitical geographers were in close academic contact, but actually it took place at a distance. Although Bowman worked throughout the decade and a half after the 1919 peace to integrate German geography, the 1920s boycott of Germany by the leading geographers of Allied countries in the International Geographical Congress (IGC), and the following Nazi boycott of the 1934 Warsaw meeting of the IGC, meant that in the area of political geography, intellectual