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waged in the name of jihad. The most prominent groups waging insurgencies and using terrorism have fundamentalist religious ideologies and associations (current or former) with al Qaeda. These include the Islamic State (ISIL), the Pakistani Taliban and their allies, Afghanistan’s Taliban, Nigeria’s Boko Haram, Somalia’s al Shabaab, and al Qaeda, along with its other franchises and affiliates. Several of these groups have managed to seize significant territory, including major cities, such as ISIL’s capture of Mosul in northern Iraq, not far from the Syrian and Turkish

in The role of terrorism in twenty-first-century warfare
The dynamics of multilateralism in Eurasia

, are status-quo oriented and seek to ensure that no single power can dominate. Moreover, the states of Eurasia and interested external powers such as the United States all view radical political Islam and international terrorism as common threats and share interest in the quest for international order. Eurasia is not a region where interstate war is likely.4 And yet, traditional security concerns dominate the dynamics of multilateralism. The inability of the Eurasian states to develop western-style institutions or to embrace cooperative multilateralism effectively is

in Limiting institutions?

involvement. Second, the US commitment to confronting the terrorist threat posed by Al-Qaeda and associated fundamentalist Islamic terrorist organizations in the region (such as Jemaah Islamiah (JI), responsible for the 2002 terrorist bombings on the Indonesian island of Bali) involved an increase in the American military presence in the region, particularly in the Philippines

in Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific

supra-state identity became as important in shaping Arab state behaviour as the distribution of material power stressed by realism. The contradiction between the global norm of sovereignty, in which state interests are legitimately the object of foreign policy, and the regional norms of Pan-Arabism (or, to a lesser extent Pan-Islam) which expect these interests to be compatible with the values of the indigenous suprastate identity community, have caught Arab foreign policy making elites, in Korany’s (1988: 165) words, between the logics of raison d’état and of ‘raison

in The international politics of the Middle East

looked towards the impact of American foreign policy in the Middle East and thought about Al-Qaeda in this context. It emphasised the involvement of the CIA in a covert war against the Russian occupation of Afghanistan in the mid-1980s, which mobilised, supplied and trained the very Islamic mujahideen that would later turn against America in the post-Cold War years. It also noted the

in Conspiracy theory and American foreign policy

, in many cases forcefully converting them to Islam or making them serve as sex slaves, or both. The group continues to send suicide bombers on missions to destroy various government targets. Over TERRORISM AS A TACTIC OF WIDER-SCALE WARFARE 153 this same span of time, Boko Haram has also conquered territory, proclaimed a caliphate on the land under its control and proceeded to behead fellow Nigerians whom these jihadists believe have seriously violated Sharia law. The situation in Afghanistan, though hardly identical, is similar. Although alQaeda Central is no

in The role of terrorism in twenty-first-century warfare

suprastate Arab and/or Islamic identities are strong, regime legitimacy may be contingent on adherence to Arab-Islamic norms in foreign policy. This may mean contesting the penetration of the region by the core powers and it may de-legitimise relations with certain states: thus, while some Arab states have been pushed by economic dependency or security considerations to establish relations with Israel, these remain largely illegitimate at the societal level. The impact of identity is not, of course, uniform. Where there are high levels of public

in The international politics of the Middle East

September 11 2001 attack by Islamic terrorists on the very heart of America led the US into its second Middle East war in a decade. At the end of 2001, the region, far from entering the ‘zone of peace’, was at risk of becoming the arena for a ‘clash of civilisations’. What went wrong? Such an outcome might have been anticipated given the way globalisation was ushered into the Middle East – namely by a profoundly unequal war whose outcome gave the Western victors excessive power over the region and insufficient incentive to satisfy the interests and values of the region

in The international politics of the Middle East
Abstract only

when faced with an external threat. With some notable exceptions, such as the trans-Sahara caravan trade, Islamic pilgrimage routes across West Africa or the trading coastal communities of East Africa, contact with, or knowledge of, the outside world was highly limited. Thus, identity in the pre-colonial era tended to be a very Identity conflict 37 narrowly defined and personalized concept that was highly localized and independent of the larger world outside the village environs. All this began to change with the onset of European colonialism that began in earnest

in African security in the twenty-first century

Judeo-Christian and Islamic histories and traditions contain strong combative elements.15 Nevertheless, peacemaking as a duty is central to all three religions and the avoidance of war was often an overwhelming enough prospect, though there are significant positive MUP_Hume_Peacemaking.indd 7 11/10/2013 15:25 8 Leonie Murray peace elements in all three traditions also. In Judaism, peace (negative) was recognised as a guiding practice and in time acquired important social and political connotations and after expulsion from the ‘Holy Land’, Jews who inhabited

in Peacemaking in the twenty-first century