This book is about the securitisation of Islam in the United States from the Bush to the Trump administration. It explores the ways in which the securitisation is legitimised and felt when President George W. Bush, President Barack Obama and even President Donald J. Trump securitise through deception and covert language rather than by mobilising a security grammar of existential threats. This book is also about the consequences of using covert forms of hate speech to securitise minority groups and the ways in which everyday racism is linked to
States state that ‘Islam is peace’, these words serve the larger Orientalist discourse that views Islam as inherently violent. This chapter explains the relation between reality and language necessary to understand the rest of the book.
The conduct of research is significantly affected by the position the researcher adopts in regard to objectivity, subjectivity and intersubjectivity. There are three images of possible worlds, each informed by different epistemological assumptions for explaining human action: the
Thus far, I have concentrated on the CT and counter-radicalisation practices in the US and on the representational aspect of the indirect securitisation of Islam – that is, the discursive dimension of this securitisation – in other words, on practices that can be analysed through language. This chapter adds body to this analysis by exploring the emotional experiences that accompany the indirect securitisation of Islam and the affective process of indirect securitisations more generally. Following the work of social psychologist Margaret
‘end of days’, that shaped Freeman’s redemptive view of past and present politics and accounts for the urgency with which he engaged with contemporary debates on the nature of history, issues of race and imperialism, and the Islamic ‘other’.
An understanding of the importance of the Arnoldian framework in Freeman’s thought allowed, first, for a reassessment of his best-known work, the Norman Conquest . In Chapter 1 , I demonstrated that the connections Freeman made between race and politics served a specific historiographical function. The idea of a Teutonic race
“turn towards Islam.” My attraction towards the object that was to remain the core of my professional life for the long term was more prosaic. It emerged from a conjunction. On the one hand was the rise to visibility in world media of a new generation of political players. On the other, in the context of the 1980s, was my encounter with the Tunisian version of that dynamic. Beneath the thick veneer of its bureaucracy and its authoritarianism, the “socialism” of the Algerian state that I had studied throughout my PhD had quickly shown the limits of its revolutionary
Before he became “Muslim,” the Other was once “Arab.” Even before the alchemy of the rise of political Islam took us from the era of the “ fellaga s” into the age of the “fundamentalists,” the ethnic and linguistic Othering of Arabness had been quite enough to create powerful reflexes of rejection towards it. Things took a distinct turn for the worse, however, once the Other, after he had “spoken Arab” to us, got it into his head to start wanting to “speak Muslim” too.
The Egyptian jurist and writer Tarek al
studies, faced with the deadline for obligatory military service, I had very conventionally opted for deferment.
Once the deadlines for enlisting ran out, I signed up for “Volunteering as Active National Service.” This made me, for a year and a half, a “VSNA.” I am often asked: “At what point did you begin to feel especially drawn to the Arab world?” Periodically, some even dare to ask: “When did you begin to feel drawn to Islam?” In truth, going to Algeria was not a choice. Not a moral one—nor a political one. On the Ministry’s forms, my
Christian “Holy Land” at a very young age. At the time, I had not been in a position to separate out the two, almost contradictory realities that attach to the existence of a state that is barely older than I am. The first of these realities is Israeli society. This is complex—and, of course, shifting. 3 It includes a significant, majority-Muslim Arab component—even if, unsurprisingly and like elsewhere in the region, its Christian minority wields substantial political weight. It is also affected by the trend towards re-Islamization. Even while I have not carried out
To this day, the (very) French difficulty in reaching a rational relationship with Islamic Otherness is expressed through a tendency to refuse to communicate directly with the Other in corporeal form. How much cosier it is to not have to look in the eye the hideous Arabic-speaking, Muslim, Arab male, guilty of every sin. So what if, along with his hijab- clad wife, they make up the demographic majority in the region? We more or less consciously prefer to deal with those who, in the immediate vicinity of those creatures, have the good
It was during the Crimean War that Freeman first concluded that supporting Turkish rule in south-eastern Europe was an act of ‘deliberate wickedness’, as it meant facilitating the oppression of Christian subjects by a Muslim government. 1 In his first volume on Eastern affairs, The History and Conquests of the Saracens , Freeman had used the past to argue that the Islamic faith meant that Muslim rulers would always be despotic, that Muslim societies would always be ‘backwards’, and that Muslims could never live on equal terms with Christians. While the