shared commonsensical and self-evident ‘truths’. We recognise this
rejection in the critical position against phenomenology and the traditional metaphysics that feeds into Deleuze’s double assault against
the already constituted (and yet to be revealed) forms (that is, clichés),
and against the unformed (and yet to be made present; that is, chaos).
The consequent philosophy to emerge is then distinctly not a science of
discovery but, rather, philosophy as concept creation; concisely on this
point, ‘the purpose of concept creation lies in the fight against
on a host of factors, including interpersonal dynamics. Ben Anderson, meditating on the phenomenology
of Mikel Dufrenne and others, observes that ‘[atmospheres] are perpetually forming and deforming, appearing and disappearing, as bodies
enter into relation with one another. They are never finished, static, or at
rest’ (2009: 79). They are, additionally, ‘a kind of indeterminate affective
excess through which intensive space-times can be created’, like those
intensive space-times of theatrical performance, for instance (ibid.: 80).
Anderson describes atmospheres as
importance of the dæmon
bond is signified and highlighted through a number of different theatrical/dramaturgical layers; sound, lighting, set and, of
course, an embodied/acted layer, all interact to both semiotically
and phenomenologically iterate and reiterate this central element
of the story to the audience.
Through Bert O. States’ notion of ‘binocular vision’ (1985: 8),
Stanton B. Garner has convincingly argued that semiotics and
Being there: the ‘presence’ of trauma
phenomenology are ‘complementary ways of seeing that disclose
the object two ways at once
Hegel, theatrality and the magic of speculative thinking
Peter M. Boenisch
which we will return in greater depth below.8
The restless spirit of Regie
Žižek wondered whether Hegel’s system of thinking would have been at all capable
of absorbing the rational mathematisation of modern (natural) sciences, with their
reliance on measuring and empirical testing, which characterised the further course
of the nineteenth century. He described Hegel’s approach as ‘the last great attempt
to “sublate” empirical-formal science into speculative Reason’ (Žižek 2012, 458).
Similarly, in his seminal reading of the Phenomenology of Spirit, Jameson
happen in this time and place but without recourse to other temporal
Two tales of my dying neighbours
and spatial zones by which their conditions of possibility might be
rationalised, there is thus no possibility of ‘facing something other than
this other’. In such a situation the other, like the self, is expelled. It is now
necessary, in concluding this chapter, to try to draw its disparate threads
together in thinking about a potential phenomenology of emergencies.
Towards a phenomenology of emergencies
I want to begin this conclusion with a (perhaps long
Constructing death constructing death in the 1790s–1820s
Terry Castle accords
Radcliffe’s The Mysteries of Udolpho a special place in the
development of a post-Romantic model of the self that underpins
Freud’s idea of the subject. She claims that ‘ Udolpho
was more than simply fashionable; it encapsulated new structures of feeling, a new
model of human relations, a new phenomenology of self and other’
(p. 125). This was
-Ponty to highlight the shortcomings of ontology and existential
A poststructuralist reading of Fanon
phenomenology in dealing with the Erlebnis of the black and the
consciousness of blackness in a white world. Second, drawing on Sartre,
he refers explicitly to the theme of Negrophobia which he discusses
in the light of Sartre’s Anti-Semite and Jew and Black Orpheus. As we
saw in Chapter 1, Fanon rejects Sartre’s Marxist eschatology that
conceives of negritude as a negative term in a dialectical schema which
objectifies the Negro’s subjectivity. Furthermore
image of the whole self, but precisely the kind of non-identical mismatch between subject and object which would facilitate social and political rupture. Gilbert Ryle had been Adorno’s supervisor at Oxford University in 1935, while he worked on a dissertation which attempted a critique of the ‘resigned, late bourgeois character of phenomenology’. 120 Adorno respected Husserl’s thought as ‘the final serious effort on the part of the bourgeois spirit to break out of its own world, the immanence of consciousness, the sphere of constitutive subjectivity’, but only a
: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 29.
Introduction: Marlow, realism, hermeneutics
53 Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, p. 352.
54 Dermot Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology (London: Routledge, 2000)
55 Heidegger, On The Way to Language, p. 29.
56 Richard E. Palmer, ‘The Liminality of Hermes and the Meaning of Hermeneutics’, MacMurray College Homepage <http://www.mac.edu/faculty/
richardpalmer/liminality.html> (2001) [Accessed 23 April 2006]
57 Barthes, S/Z, p. 15.
’s account of the embodied and affective experience of
encountering faces, which confirms but modifies Levinas’s account
by combining phenomenology and enactive cognitivist approaches.
Although Gallagher agrees with Levinas that ‘the transcendence
at stake’ in face-to-face encounters ‘involves one’s capacity to
perceive in the other … the potential to take one beyond oneself’,20
he grounds this intersubjective experience in cognitive perception
and, importantly, in affective response which ‘involves complex
interactive behavioral and response patterns arising out of … the