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The irresistible force of European imperatives?
Paul Kennedy

the European Community and from the US contributed towards the PSOE leadership’s U-­turn on Spanish membership of NATO during the party’s first term in office (1982–86). No coherent Spanish foreign and security policy was in place when the PSOE took office in 1982. Although the PSOE’s UCD predecessor had put a definitive end to the pariah status bequeathed by the Franco regime within a large part of the international community, foreign affairs always remained subordinate to the priority of steering the country through its transition to democracy. Security concerns

in The Spanish Socialist Party and the modernisation of Spain
Mythologising a nation, performing an alliance
Maria Mälksoo

construction of the sea as a national mythscape; and second, the emerging maritime posture and posturing of NATO in the Baltic Sea region as a case of ritualised performance of deterrence towards Russia. In both instances of cultivating a national mythscape via the sea and performing a multinational military alliance via exercising extended maritime deterrence, the Baltic Sea emerges as a crucial arena for

in The Sea and International Relations
US nuclear weapons and alliances in Europe and Asia

From the start of the Cold War to the presidency of Donald Trump, nuclear weapons have been central to the internal dynamics of US alliances in Europe and Asia. But cooperation on policy, strategy, posture and deployment of US nuclear weapons has varied significantly between US alliances and over time. Partners in Deterrence goes beyond traditional accounts that focus on deterrence and reassurance in US nuclear policy, and instead places the objectives and influence of US allies at the centre of analysis. Through a series of case studies informed by a rigorous analytical framework, it reveals that US allies have wielded significant influence in shaping nuclear weapons cooperation with the US in ways that reflect their own, often idiosyncratic, objectives. Combining in-depth empirical analysis with an accessible theoretical lens, Partners in Deterrence provides important lessons for contemporary policy makers and makes an essential contribution to existing scholarship on alliances and nuclear weapons.

Maja Zehfuss

On 24 March 1999, NATO started a bombing campaign against targets on the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in order to stop, or so it was claimed, alleged human rights’ violations by armed forces in what, in Serbian, is called ‘Kosovo’. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), with a coalition of parties in government, which had previously been opposed to any

in Mapping European security after Kosovo
Abstract only
Return to the West?
James W. Peterson
and
Jacek Lubecki

-Central European dissident thought, as illustrated by the writings of Václav Havel, Györgi Konrád, and Adam Michnik, was that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact represented a nasty logic of “imbecilic militarism” (Konrád) and imperialism. For these dissidents, both NATO and the Warsaw Pact would hopefully disappear in a better world (Konrád 1984 ; Havel & Keane 1985 ; Michnik 1987 ). Akin to the partitions, Poland’s time subjugated by the

in Defense policies of East-Central European countries after 1989
The unexpected security consequences of Brexit
Federiga Bindi

Introduction Will Brexit reinforce or weaken EU security and defense policies? Opinions are divided. A nation with substantial military and diplomatic resources, the UK has traditionally played a prominent role in European defense. Despite cuts in recent years, the UK remains Europe’s largest defense spender and had planned before Brexit to further increase spending in coming years. This includes a commitment to meet the NATO target of spending 2 percent of GDP on defense, increasing the defense budget by 0.5 percent annually to 2020–2021. In addition, the

in The European Union after Brexit
Jacek Lubecki

When the shackles of communist ideology and subjugation to the Soviet Union were thrown off, the initial thrust of defense and security policies of the newly liberated countries was not toward joining NATO and the EU. 1 Two ideological themes which initially dominated the post-communist narratives, nationalism and idealistic, anti-militaristic liberalism, were not friendly to highly

in Defending Eastern Europe
Poland, Romania, and Moldova
Jacek Lubecki
and
James W. Peterson

Romania states as a result, and they have welcomed closer relations with both NATO and the EU, with an emphasis on the former in its Atlanticist/pro-US version. Moreover, both Poland and Romania became liberal democracies, thus diminishing typological distance between them, given that that during the communist period the two countries embraced very different types of communism. Attributionally, besides the

in Defending Eastern Europe
Abstract only
Imperial legacies and post-imperial realities
James W. Peterson
and
Jacek Lubecki

admission to NATO, Hungary bumped into the paradox of the same West requiring a new form of limited militarization, which Hungarian public and politicians have largely embraced in rhetoric and sabotaged in practice. The paradox of Western liberalism being a mix of anti- and promilitary values explains the paradox of Hungary’s success in being admitted to NATO in the first tranche of countries in 1999. Inasmuch as

in Defense policies of East-Central European countries after 1989
Timothy Edmunds

also been subject to a range of pre-conditionality pressures in its bid for membership of the EU and NATO. In common with security assistance programmes – which they often parallel – these have had an important influence over both normative and technical aspects of the reform process. They have also created a link between Croatia’s foreign policy goals and progress in domestic

in Security sector reform in transforming societies