Thomas P. ‘Tip’ O’Neill Jr.:
the honour of public service
Rosemary D. O’Neill
A ‘New Deal’ Democrat
Thomas P. ‘Tip’ O’Neill Jr. was Speaker of the Massachusetts General
Court (1949–1952) and Speaker of the US House of Representatives
(1977–1986). A quintessential urban ethnic politician who rose to
national prominence, he was often called ‘the last of the New Deal
liberals’. From the era of political party dominance to the period of
media domination of public life, Tip O’Neill was a shrewd practitioner
of the political arts.
Like so many Americans
Edited and introduced by Nobel Laureate John Hume, T.G. Fraser and Leonie Murray, this book provides a range of unique insights into the issues surrounding peacemaking, delivered by major international figures with direct experience in this area at the highest level. Based on a series of lectures on the theme of ‘Peace’ given under the auspices of the Tip O’Neill Chair in Peace Studies at the University of Ulster’s Magee campus and funded by The Ireland Funds, each lecture is presented with an introduction placing it in its proper context within the discourse on peacemaking. The volume makes an invaluable contribution to the study of peace and conflict studies, international history, international relations and international politics.
Constructing cybersecurity adopts a constructivist approach to cybersecurity and problematises the state of contemporary knowledge within this field. Setting out by providing a concise overview of such knowledge, this book subsequently adopts Foucauldian positions on power and security to highlight assumptions and limitations found therein. What follows is a detailed analysis of the discourse produced by various internet security companies, demonstrating the important role that these security professionals play constituting and entrenching this knowledge by virtue of their specific epistemic authority. As a relatively new source within a broader security dispositif, these security professionals have created relationships of mutual recognition and benefit with traditional political and security professionals. The book argues that one important product of these relationships is the continued centrality of the state within issues of cybersecurity and the extension of a strategy of neoliberal governance.
This book explores the evolving African security paradigm in light of the multitude of diverse threats facing the continent and the international community today and in the decades ahead. It challenges current thinking and traditional security constructs as woefully inadequate to meet the real security concerns and needs of African governments in a globalized world. The continent has becoming increasingly integrated into an international security architecture, whereby Africans are just as vulnerable to threats emanating from outside the continent as they are from home-grown ones. Thus, Africa and what happens there, matters more than ever. Through an in-depth examination and analysis of the continent’s most pressing traditional and non-traditional security challenges—from failing states and identity and resource conflict to terrorism, health, and the environment—it provides a solid intellectual foundation, as well as practical examples of the complexities of the modern African security environment. Not only does it assess current progress at the local, regional, and international level in meeting these challenges, it also explores new strategies and tools for more effectively engaging Africans and the global community through the human security approach.
This book explores the way in which the Anglo-American new world order (NWO) debate changed by 9/11, and the encouragement this has given to the 'neoconservatives' or 'neocons' within the George W. Bush Administration. It examines the policy-making process as it developed before the Versailles Conference of 1919. An extensive literature exists on the 'lessons of Versailles' and particularly on the 'failure' of the League of Nations (LON), one that started even before the signature of the Treaty of Versailles. The book then explores how the Conference and the LON attempted to frame the immediate problems of the post-war period. It shows how NWO architects' thinking developed in what might be called the area of 'global security' from the period of the First World War until the present. The clear evidence is that the American thinking on the NWO had a huge impact in Britain's processes in the same direction. President Theodore Roosevelt shared a deep suspicion of British motives for the post-war settlement in line with most Americans. He attributed blame for the inter-war crisis as much to British and French intransigence and balance of power politics at Versailles as to German aggression. The results of the Versailles settlement hung like a cloud over Allied relationships during the Second World War and gave a powerful impetus in American circles for an attitude of 'never again'. The variety of historical archival material presented provided the background to the current and historical American obsession with creating the world order.
visionary. It is a leadership that can
attract support from across the spectrum – hence the incredible diversity
of opinion and experience presented within these covers (all of whom
volunteered their services in the names of John Hume and Thomas P.
O’Neill) – combined with an incredible tenacity to stand by one’s ideals
no matter how dark the hour.
The great conservative political philosopher, Edmund Burke, encapsulated the dilemma when he wrote that ‘[W]hen bad men combine,
the good must associate; else they will fall, one by one, an unpitied
sacrifice in a contemptible
The Weimar Republic in the eyes of American political science
The late historian Detlev Peukert once made the case that the history of Weimar Germany ‘does not consist of just a beginning and an end’, 1 yet I think it is fair to say that political scientists have not heeded his advice. Widely thought of only as a ‘prelude to Hitler’ and as a brief aberration in Germany’s authoritarian Sonderweg , the Weimar Republic played an important role in the development of political science and International Relations (IR) in the US. In the 1930s and 1940s, the critique of the Weimar Constitution served as a backdrop for a number
most brutal dictatorships in human history that committed a genocide of unprecedented dimensions. Until 1945, German foreign policy was associated chiefly with militarism, territorial expansion and a pronouncedly anti-liberal political culture. Today, the country is widely perceived as a ‘civilian power’ – an economic giant but military dwarf that is firmly committed to multilateralism, European integration and the peaceful settlement of disputes. 3
Situated at the intersection of International Relations (IR) and history, this book has two objectives. One is to
date of state unification goes largely undisputed. The division of a nation
is a far more difficult case to argue, however, let alone measure. Elsewhere
I have studied political parties (Sutherland 2001 , 2006a ) and intellectuals (Sutherland 2006c ) as agents of nationalist ideology. In this
case, the focus on state fusion and nation-building calls for analysis of
macro-level actors, namely the governments who negotiate these changes.
Analysts interpret this shift in different ways, with some seeing a move
back towards Russia’s traditional ways, and others seeing a regrettable, or
necessary, hiatus on the road to a fully-fledged democracy.1 However,
whilst there may be discussion about the meaning and extent of President
Putin’s change in approach, that there has been such a change is no longer
In this book we argue that our understanding of a shift in the content
of Russian politics can be served by refining our analytical approach
towards Russia. Using a concept developed in the field of