terms of advancing UK national interests. ‘What happens in Somalia’, Cameron said, ‘if it’s a good outcome, it’s good for Britain, it means less terrorism, less migration, less piracy; ditto South Sudan’ (Mason, 2015 ). Moreover, Defence Secretary Michael Fallon, stated in 2016 that ‘it’s part of our effort to tackle the instability that leads to mass migration and terrorism. It will help keep Britain safe while improving lives abroad’ (Ministry of Defence, 2016b ). Terrorism also plays a significant role in the UK Government’s justification for the deployment of up
The Conservative Party and Africa from opposition to government
, during this short time we see significant new engagements with Africa. In September 2015, Cameron announced that 300 soldiers would be sent to South Sudan and seventy to Somalia to support peacekeeping efforts. This was linked by Cameron directly to wider UK national interests, with the PM suggesting that ‘bringing stability to both countries could help to ease the migration crisis that is seeing hundreds of thousands of migrants cross the Mediterranean to reach Europe’ (Riley-Smith, 2015 ).
Following Cameron’s resignation, Priti Patel, an
Development (LCID) (Harman, 2011a ; Labour Campaign for International Development, 2014 ; Lewis, 2012 ; National Policy Forum, 2014 ; Osamor, 2017a ). 20 Yet this position not only raises questions about the potential tension between the two rationales, but also reveals differences within each: differing accounts of what is the moral imperative for aid and multiple notions of what aspects of the national interest are served by aid – from curbing migration, to economic growth, to improving security (see for example Harman, 2011a ; Lewis, 2013a ; 2013b ; 2013c
given their ability to bring significant financial
resources and expertise to bear, smaller countries and specialized international organizations have sought—often with success—a greater role
in partnering with African countries and organizations. Canada, Japan,
and many of the Scandinavian countries are now heavily engaged in
human security initiatives, as are specialized IGOs like INTERPOL, the
International Organization for Migration, the Wassenaar Arrangement,
and the Nordic Development Fund. Also the expanding role and mission
of both the international and
Organization for Migration, Mission in Ukraine. Migration in Ukraine. Facts and Figures, 2nd
edn. Kiev: IOM-MU, 2013, p. 4.
114 International Organization for Migration, Mission in Ukraine. Migration in Ukraine, pp. 11–12. Remittances
from the diaspora in e.g. North America are included in the total.
115 Yurchenko, ‘Capitalist bloc formation’, p. 171.
116 Victor Pinchuk Foundation, n.d. (online); Yalta European Strategy, n.d. (online).
117 De Ploeg, Ukraine in the Crossfire, p. 47.
118 Leshchenko, ‘Ukraine’s puppet masters’.
119 Matuszak, The Oligarchic
those of us who live in working states, is a highly attenuated chequerboard construction of recent origin. Many states are already a patchwork of significantly different ethnic and cultural communities. With the pace of international migration, this phenomenon can only increase. The need for difficult negotiation between communities or across cultural difference within the state is already a reality. Nor, in practical, lived life, does community – as a sustained process of mutual responsibility and deliberation, to borrow loosely from the terms of Brown’s Hegelian
Whatever changes the macro-level forces of globalisation and
regionalisation may bring about, the regionalist ideologies of Vietnamese
and German governments are subordinate to their nation-building project.
Although dynamic transnational flows such as migration and diaspora
communities may reconfigure national self-understanding to a limited extent,
governments continue to pursue state legitimation through nation
.8 billion (Sayigh 1999: 243). This was accompanied by a rhetorical commitment to enhanced regional planning and co-operation through several Pan-Arab economic institutions.
In addition, massive labour migration took place from poor to rich states, which acquired manpower for their ambitious oil-financed development while worker remittances flowed back to stimulate the economies of the labour-exporting states. From 1970 to 1980 the number of Arabs working in other Arab countries had swelled from 648,000 to nearly 4 million. In 1984 as many as 3
, for the Turks’ purchasing power is one-third the EU average 14
Similarly threatening is the migration of millions of industrious Turks who would move in to take the jobs of Europeans. There remains the issue of human and minority rights, and the abolition of Article 312 of the Turkish penal code – that practically accuses anyone who dares to criticize the state with violating the law against preaching hatred. Disputed aspects of Turkish democracy also mar relations, for instance, the issue of political freedoms, the role of the military in
decisive defeat of the Cham empire by Lê
Thánh Tôn in 1471, conflicts were rather about prestige, people
and treasure than a coherent policy of extending Vietnamese
Lebensraum beyond the cramped Red River Delta. Thereafter,
devastating wars between the Lê and the Mạc, compounded by failed
crops and famine, caused many to flee southwards for survival, and most
officially sanctioned migration was in order to establish military