O N 1 AUGUST 2005 , less
than a month after the 7 July bombings of the London underground,
the Australian Attorney-General and former Immigration Minister
Philip Ruddock held an interview outside the Hyatt Hotel in
Adelaide, where he stated that ‘a terrorist attack could occur
in Australia at any time’. Having made such an alarming
/disaster relief (HA/DR). By contrast, the key trend that has been emerging over the past few years, particularly since the inauguration of the second Shinz ō Abe government in December 2012, is that Japan and Australia are going beyond the first evolution and developing bilateral cooperation in more traditional security fields. This is what this chapter calls the second evolution of Japan–Australia security ties.
Even though, to the disappointment of experts and officials in many quarters of both countries, Japan was not chosen as the primary partner
D uring the Cold W ar period Japan and Australia were sometimes referred to as the northern and southern ‘anchors’ of the American alliance system in the Asia-Pacific. These two important ‘spokes’ in the so-called American ‘hub-and-spoke’ regional alliance system therefore found themselves in a condition of indirect alignment – or, to use Victor Cha’s term, ‘quasi-alliance’ ( Cha, 1999 ). This implies that while the two countries participated in no direct defence relationship, by dint of their
Howard had retrieved his
electoral fortunes. First he had reversed some of his more unpopular
domestic policies, but the key turning points came in August and
September. On August 26, the Norwegian merchant vessel the Tampa
properly responded to the distress calls of a sinking boatload of asylum
seekers, mainly Afghans and Iraqis who had been heading for the
northwest coast of Australia. According to
This book provides the first comprehensive analysis of Japan’s new security
partnerships with Australia, India, countries and multilateral security
structure in East Asia, as well as with the EU and some of its member
states. Most books on Japanese bilateral relations focus exclusively on the
Japanese perspective, the debate in Japan, positions of Japanese government
leaders and parties, or the public discourse. This edited volume is organized in
pairs of chapters, one each analysing the motivations and objectives of Japan,
and a second analysing those of each of the most important new security
partners. After solely relying on the United States for its national
security needs during the Cold War, since the end of the Cold War, Japan has
begun to deepen its bilateral security ties. Since the mid-2000s under LDP and
DPJ administrations, bilateral security partnerships accelerated and today go
beyond non-traditional security issue are as and extend far into traditional
security and military affairs, including the exchange and joint acquisition of
military hardware, military exercises, and capacity building. It is argued, that
these developments will have implications for the security architecture in the
Asia-Pacific. This book is a primer for those interested in Japan’s security
policy beyond the US-Japan security alliance, non-American centred bilateral and
multilateral security cooperation through the eyes of Japanese as well as
partner country perspectives. It is also an ideal as a course reading for
graduate courses on regional security cooperation and strategic partnerships,
and Japanese foreign and security policy.
This book addresses some of the neglected problems, people and vulnerabilities of the Asia-Pacific region. It talks about emancipation, human security, 'security politics', language and threat-construction. The book is divided into three sections: agents; strategies and contexts; and futures. The first section outlines a range of possible agents or actors potentially capable of redressing individual suffering and vulnerability in the region. It examines East Asian regional institutions and dynamics of regionalism as potential sources of 'progressive' security discourses and practices. There is focus on the progressive security potential of regional institutions and regionalism has become increasingly prominent in literature on security in the Asia-Pacific. Two common interpretations of the role of epistemic communities in the construction of security are contested: that they are either passive sources of governmental legitimacy, or autonomous agents with the capacity of constructing or creating state interests. The second section reviews strategies and contexts, outlining a range of different sites of insecurity in the region, the ways in which dominant security discourses and practices emerge, and the extent to which such discourses are contested in different contexts. Indonesian government's approach to minority groups and separatism, the issue of civil unrest and human rights abuses in Burma, and the Australian government's attitude towards refugees and asylum-seekers are discussed. The third section deals with security futures, specifically discussing the question of what alternative security discourses and practices might look like. Finally, the book outlines a feminist critical security discourse and examines its applicability to the Asia-Pacific region.
11 D. Bertaux, ‘From the life history approach to the transformation of sociological practice’, in D. Bertaux (ed.), Biography and Society (Beverley Hills,
CA: Sage, 1981), p. 40.
12 P. Thompson, ‘The voice of the past: oral history’, in R. Perks and A. Thomson,
The Oral History Reader (London: Routledge, 1998), hereafter TOHR,
13 R. Samuel and P. Thompson (eds.), The Myths We Live By (London:
Routledge, 1990), pp. 2–3.
14 P. O’Farrell, ‘Oral history: facts and fiction’, Oral History Association of
Australia Journal, 5 (1982–83), p. 8.
sense of dissatisfaction with their own memories, and with national and
international stories of war and suffering. In his study of Australian soldiers’ memories of the Great War and the way that public representations of the Diggers have developed, Alistair Thomson found that when
private memories and public representations diverged, his interviewees’
stories became fragmented, full of unresolved tensions and contradictory identities. Composure was constantly undermined.5 The repeated
weighing of memories of bombing against other experiences, the need to
Attlee government. In
Palestine, the British government faced a Zionist insurgency aimed at
establishing an independent Jewish state, requiring ministers to resort
to extreme measures to implement British policy. The chapter also shows
how the Cold War became a major influence on British imperial policy.
From London, Attlee oversaw the development of security in the
Commonwealth, starting with Australia
This book examines the intellectual frameworks within which the case for war in Iraq has developed in the US and the UK. It analyzes the neoconservative roots of the decision to go to war. The book also analyzes the humanitarian intervention rationale that was developed in the context of the Kosovo campaign, Tony Blair's presentation of it, and the case of Iraq. It looks at the parallel processes through which the George Bush administration and Blair government constructed their cases for war, analyzing similarities and divergences in approach. The book considers the loci of the intelligence failure over Iraq, the lessons for the intelligence communities, and the degree to which the decision to go to war in Iraq represented a policy rather than an intelligence failure. It then complements the analyses of US prewar intelligence failures by analysing what post-war inquiries have revealed about the nature of the failure in the UK case. The book discusses the relationship between intelligence and policymaking. It looks at how US Congress dealt with intelligence before the war. The book also examines how the Bush administration tried to manage public opinion in support of its war policies. It then looks at the decisionmaking process of the Bush administration in the year before the war in Iraq. Finally, the book also provides excerpts from a number of speeches and documents which are key to understanding the nature of national security decisionmaking and intelligence failure.