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The period August 1966–September 1967 saw a decline in Wilson’s commitment to President Johnson and to the United States, both personally and in the wider context of British foreign policy. In February 1967, the Prime Minister tried to use the visit to London of the Russian leader Alexei Kosygin to bring Hanoi and Washington to the negotiating table over Vietnam. Wilson was sincere – if over
Throughout the debates on EEC membership, sovereignty has been referred to by several of the leading actors to either advance or prohibit the cause of Britain in Europe. This chapter is therefore devoted to the history and concept of this highly complex term. The internal and external challenges to parliamentary sovereignty are examined, including the power of the executive, governance, globalisation and British foreign policy. Numerous examples of the various types of sovereignty and how these have been utilised by MPs are included. These examples show precisely how the term can be open to exploitation, particularly over the course of Britain’s relationship with Europe. This chapter therefore demonstrates how this concept has been used by members of the political elite to influence an unaware British public.
analysis noted that Britain’s standing in the United States depended ultimately on ‘our practical contribution to the Western Alliance rather than on any particular feeling of United Kingdom/United States interdependence’. 48 It was commented in 1964 that the ‘alliance with the United States’ was ‘the most important single factor’ in British foreign policy: ‘As much the weaker partner, dependent on overseas trade and with world
. Gordon Walker, Stewart and Brown all supported the idea of close ties between Britain and the United States, but Wilson’s input was such that, as Richard Crossman commented, British foreign policy was characterised above all by the ‘peculiarly Wilsonian touch’ of a ‘personal reliance on LBJ’. 27 The Foreign Office backed up Wilson’s support for the continued close relationship with Washington and for the British ‘great power
Rhetoric of Appeasement: Hitler’s Legitimation and British Foreign Policy, 1938–39’, Security Studies , 24:1 (2015); P.E. Caquet, ‘The Balance of Forces on the Eve of Munich’, The International History Review , 40:1 (2018); Yvon Lacaze, ‘Daladier, Bonnet and the Decision-Making Process during the Munich Crisis, 1938’, in Robert Boyce (ed.), French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918–1940: The Decline and Fall of a Great Power (London: Routledge, 1998); Martin Thomas, ‘France and the Czechoslovak Crisis’, Diplomacy & Statecraft 10:2–3 (1999); Peter Jackson, ‘French
relations between the Labour government and the United States, characterised above all by Wilson’s determination to secure his ties with the White House, in keeping with his personal inclinations and his view that close cooperation with Washington was fundamental to British foreign policy. The Labour victory President Johnson had never feared a Labour victory in Britain, but he felt it necessary to ease any
. II, Germany and Czechoslovakia 1937–38, Department of State Publication 3548 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 1014–16, quoted in William R. Rock, Appeasement on Trial: British Foreign Policy and Its Critics, 1938–1939 , (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1966), p. 138. 44 Rock, Appeasement on Trial , p. 138. 45 Hungary also asked for the transfer of two border crossings (Slovenské Nové Mesto and Šáhy) from Czechoslovakia as a ‘goodwill gesture’. 46 András Frey, ‘Danubian Chronicle’, The Hungarian Quarterly , 4:4 (Winter 1938), p. 769
(London: Andre Deutsch, 1972), p. 298. 50 AN, Fonds Daladier, 496/AP 35, 4DA8, Dr.2, sdrb, Forces aériennes allemandes en 1938 (1er janvier), 27 April 1938. 51 AN, Fonds Daladier, 496/AP 32, 4DA5, Dr.5, sdre, Lettre Vuillemin, 26 September 1938. 52 AN, Fonds Daladier, 496/AP 32, 4DA5, Dr.7: sdrb, Vuillemin à Le Chambre. 53 Documents on British Foreign Policy , 3rd Series, Vol. II, no. 1058, Halifax to Chamberlain, 23 September 1938. 54 AN, Fonds Daladier, 496/AP 3, Dr.2, sdra, Notes manuscrites d’Édouard Daladier. 55 APP, BA 1685, Police reports
frequently to meet tactical pressures from within his own party that … he had left himself no room for manoeuvre’. When Wilson first took office in October 1964, said Bruce, ‘he accepted the principle of the continuity of British foreign policy, which was based upon the long established friendly relationship with the US’. This meant that Wilson was ‘prepared to cooperate with the United States on major American
). 10 The increase of British trade passing through the Danube delta highlighted its increasing importance for British foreign policy. Increasing trade on the Danube created access to markets and the potential for vast material wealth. However, this is not a simple story of interests driving foreign policy. The promotion of free trade was linked intimately with civilizational discourses. In a speech before the House of Commons in 1842, Lord Palmerston advocated for the repeal of the Corn Laws by laying out this liberal