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, the US had learned that by utilising a number of tactics, including the temporary cancellation of nuclear and intelligence cooperation, they had managed to ensure that the British would, if forced, operate bilaterally with the US in opposition to Heath’s desire to formulate common EEC political and foreign policies. As shown in Chapter 3, US bilateral pressure on British interests could have profound effects upon the direction of British foreign policy. It is the coercive elements in US diplomacy towards its British ally that are currently omitted from existing
of other member states or a European dimension. These words of a senior British foreign policy-maker reflect the experience of foreign policy cooperation between member states of the European Union for more than a quarter of a century. 1 Over the years, the level of ambition to speak with ‘one voice’ in foreign affairs has steadily increased to include even security and
relations. Likewise, for Henry Kissinger, ‘international relations cannot be conducted without an awareness of power relationships’.37 Edward Heath was equally frank in articulating that ‘realism’ had to be the bedrock of any British foreign policy.38 The following chapters, therefore, provide an analysis of the key political engagements between the two countries. 01_Strained_partnership_001-023.indd 13 06/11/2013 12:43 14 A strained partnership? The context for US–UK relations The Nixon presidency has long fascinated historians, political scientists, journalists and
-assessing foreign policy 25 such arguments. The Nixon administration’s indifference towards the special relationship coupled with a British foreign policy pursuing a more European path resulted in the special relationship becoming near redundant. It was only once the consequences of the global economic and energy crisis of 1973–74 became apparent that the special relationship became prevalent again.6 Central in many of these accounts is the role played by certain individual policy-makers. Henry Kissinger, in particular, is seen to have had a malevolent effect upon US
3 A year of discord 1973–74 No special relations. Correct. They’ll [Britain] have the relation with the French. President Nixon to Henry Kissinger, 9 August 19731 A year of discord At the onset of 1973, the US–UK relationship was entering a new epoch. The East of Suez withdrawal had lessened Britain’s global commitments and Britain officially entered the EEC on 1 January 1973. Heath was determined to chart a more Euro-centric British foreign policy, which would involve the creation of common political, foreign, monetary and energy policies within the EEC. The
attitudes in this field, however, do not necessarily translate easily into specific political choices. For example, in the 1930s liberals were divided on ‘appeasement’ as the mainspring of British foreign policy, and in recent years they have been divided on Western intervention in the Gulf, the Balkans, Africa and, recently, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Liberalism in the twentieth century The twentieth century began
eventually won.3 Callaghan took office on 5 April 1976, and Anthony Crosland took over from the new prime minister as foreign and commonwealth secretary. In his previous position, Callaghan had been influential in the formulation of British foreign policy and he was determined to retain a dominant role in foreign policy-making. Callaghan’s promotion to number 10 Downing Street thus ensured a degree of continuity in the conduct of British foreign policy.4 On the other side of the Atlantic, events were tumultuous for the Ford administration, both domestically and in the
in British foreign policy that would place a renewed emphasis upon the US–UK relationship. Heath’s seemingly Euro-centric foreign policy was to be reversed and Wilson let it known that he would not be trying to create common political policies within the EEC. In fact, Wilson’s renegotiation of the terms of Britain’s EEC entry even questioned Britain’s membership.14 Wilson’s appointment of James Callaghan as foreign and commonwealth secretary, coupled with the prime minister’s willingness to allow Callaghan a degree of freedom in conducting foreign policy that was
, these delegates would also oppose any attempt to transform an essentially defensive war into a war of conquest. In so doing they sought a justification for supporting the war compatible with their record 244 Labour, British radicalism and the First World War of criticism of secret diplomacy, militarism and imperialism, and their support for democracy and even ‘the peaceful Federation of the United States of Europe and the world’.12 In effect Labour argued that Germany’s bad behaviour outweighed ‘the contributory negligence of British foreign policy in consequence of
Party of Greece (KKE) played the major role. The military branch of EAM was the Greek People’s Liberation Army (ELAS). Churchill was aware of the vital role Greece played in British foreign policy. Initially, he supported the struggle of EAM/ELAS against Nazi 123 124 Convergences, divergences and realignments on the left occupation. However, the steep growth in popularity of EAM/ELAS among the masses led the British prime minister to direct his support towards the right-wing resistance group, the National Republican Greek League. This choice guaranteed to