the political nature of these violent situations. For example, the murder of Lee Rigby, a British soldier killed in the UK, was justified by the killer, recorded on video moments after the attack arguing: ‘The only reason we have done this is because Muslims are dying every day’ ( Dodd and Halliday, 2013 ). The response by Boris Johnson, then Mayor of London, was clear: ‘It is certainly not a question of blaming any aspect of Britishforeignpolicy or what British troops do in operations abroad when they risk our [sic] lives on behalf of all of us’ ( Channel 4 News
non-intervention, and the only sanctions he
could accept were ‘the power of opinion and moral force’. 78 His condemnation of intervention had as its
primary target Britishforeignpolicy under the sway of Palmerston, whose
interventionism, according to Cobden, was against the interests of the British
people. 79 The fact that the
‘international man’ was also a pacifist activist 80 made his absolute principle of non-intervention
more convincing. 81 Moreover, Cobden
, BritishForeignPolicy towards Turkey 1959–1965 (London:
Frank Cass, 2003), pp. 7–25.
William Hale, ‘Turkey, the Middle East
and the Gulf crisis’, International Affairs , 68:4
(October 1992), pp. 679–92.
John Kent, ‘Bevin’s imperialism and
Euro-Africa, 1945–49’, in BritishForeignPolicy,
1945–56 , eds Michael Dockrill and John Young (New
York: St Martin’s Press, 1989 ), pp. 47–76.
Brecher, Nehru , p. 372.