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, like debt, that ‘impaired our post-war buying capacity for American goods’ would benefit neither nation.33 So Keynes signalled that Roosevelt might, for example, be willing to accept post-war British cooperation in an international police force as part of the ‘Consideration’ for Lend–Lease, after being present at a long discussion with Halifax and the President in early June 1941. Keynes commented to the Chancellor of the Exchequer that ‘[t]hat sounds to me, at first sight, rather a good idea, but it needs thinking about’. Keynes and Halifax also ranged widely with
passage through Parliament. There are other signs of the embedding of UK–Africa engagement in government policy, driven by Conservative politicians headed by Cameron, Mitchell and Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne. Cameron’s tour of Africa in 2011 provides a high-profile illustration of this. His decision to go ahead with the trip, despite the ‘phone-hacking’ scandal that had erupted in the UK, drew significant criticism. As allegations emerged of News International journalists illegally accessing voice messages on private mobile
own destinies through the granting of sovereignty. In his book on Garibaldi of 1911, G.M. Trevelyan summed up its attractions for statesmen wedded to the ideal of international order by calling it Garibaldi and the Making of Italy, June– November 1860.9 Such a tidy settlement of thorny problems has always appealed to both the statesman and exchequers of status quo states. NWOs are essentially gauged by the ‘realist’ by the extent to which they ensure order. But they are also gauged by whether they seem logically consistent. What Osiander wrote about the 1648