twenty-one well-known theory books, representative of diverse traditions in the field and analyses the references to countries made in them. Germany’s central role in IR is, in Lebow’s judgement, attributable to several reinforcing factors. Germany was Europe’s dominant power from 1870 to 1945 and for much of that period sought to advance its interests through the exercise of military and economic power. Germanpolitical and historical thought greatly influenced the realist tradition, and many first-generation realist IR scholars emigrated from continental Europe to
civilian powers ’, Foreign Affairs , 69 : 5 ( 1990 ), pp. 91 – 106 ; H. W. Maull , ‘ From “civilian power” to “trading state”? ’, in S. Colvin (ed.), Routledge Handbook of GermanPolitics and Culture ( London : Routledge , 2014 ), pp. 409 – 24 .
3 P. H. Gordon , ‘ Berlin’s difficulties: the normalization of German foreign policy ’, Orbis , 38 : 2 ( 1994 ), pp. 225 – 43 , at p. 225 .
4 K. Brummer and K. Oppermann , Germany’s Foreign Policy after the End of the Cold War: ‘Becoming Normal’? ( Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2016 ).
The Weimar Republic in the eyes of American political science
started arriving in the 1930s, America was hardly a blank slate as far as Germany was concerned. The new arrivals had to contend with existing perceptions of Germanpolitical thought and institutions.
This chapter will explore the lively interest American political science showed in the Weimar Republic and its Constitution. Perceptions and commentary on Weimar were framed in terms of historical continuity, comparison with the post-bellum US and larger questions about the nature of sovereignty during the interwar period. Positive American views of Germany, as explored
The changing view of Germany in Anglo-American geopolitics
schemes’ that bore no relation to learning. 36
This exchange might give the sense that Bowman and Germanpolitical geographers were in close academic contact, but actually it took place at a distance. Although Bowman worked throughout the decade and a half after the 1919 peace to integrate German geography, the 1920s boycott of Germany by the leading geographers of Allied countries in the International Geographical Congress (IGC), and the following Nazi boycott of the 1934 Warsaw meeting of the IGC, meant that in the area of political geography, intellectual
Germany in American post-war International Relations
integrate, people need to be able to talk to each other. To this end, a common language has to be established. 45 As the émigrés arrived in a country where English was the official language, communication required more effort from them. They had to learn the language and ensure the translation of their Germanpolitical thought.
For many of these scholars, this meant that they had to demonstrate proficiency in a language they had not studied profoundly prior to their emigration. German humanistic secondary education required the study of Latin and ancient Greek, but it
Germany, historically, seems to have or have had a ‘problem’ with power because its recent history has clearly been shaped by Germanpolitical power being abused. This was undoubtedly true of the Nazi regime, but there is a body of opinion that sees a tradition of German power being mishandled reaching further back, to the 1871 Empire or even beyond, with the foundations of what is seen as ‘Prussian militarism’ having perhaps been laid early on in the development of the Prussian state (see Leonie Holthaus’ and Annette Weinke’s chapters on early
illustrate the limitations of many considerations of the use of force in
IR. Habermas was in favour of the intervention in Kosovo, and he
articulated his views most clearly in an article published in Die
Zeit in April 1999, later translated and published in English.
Although the article is written in the context of contemporary Germanpolitics, Habermas’s cosmopolitan world perspective is
towards (social) reform. Like American students of political science, many British intellectuals spent time in Germany, especially during their academic education. 3 However, in view of the German rise to power, admiration of Germany’s culture and uneasiness with the dubious Germanpolitics became entangled. In ‘Representative Government’ (1861), John Stuart Mill still provided a balanced comparison of the American federal constitutions and the German confederation. 4 But the tone altered after German unification in 1871 and in view of increasing imperial rivalry. 5
Twentieth-century Germany in the debates of Anglo-American international
lawyers and transitional justice experts
is a coinage by L. Douglas , The Memory of Judgement: Making Law and History in the Trials of the Holocaust ( New Haven : Yale University Press , 2000 ).
74 A critical appraisal of this legalistic version of twentieth-century history is provided in C. S. Maier , ‘ Consigning the twentieth century to history alternative narratives for the modern era ’, American Historical Review , 105 : 3 ( 2000 ), pp. 807 – 31 .
75 J. H. Herz , ‘ The fiasco of Denazification in Germany’, Political Science Quarterly , 63 : 4 ( 1948 ), pp. 569 – 94 .
violence and pretense’, factors particularly evident in Nazi Germany and
Soviet Russia.53 He developed his thesis on the nature of German ‘imperialism’ in a document of April 1941 when he was based in Berlin. Whatever
sympathy he may have temporarily harboured for German order in 1939
had evaporated as he saw them fritter away their advantage by their
‘clumsiness, stupidity and brutality’. The National Socialist Reich could not
cope with non-Germanic peoples, he concluded, precisely because it was
pan-German and therefore it had ‘nothing to offer them [non-Germans