twenty-one well-known theory books, representative of diverse traditions in the field and analyses the references to countries made in them. Germany’s central role in IR is, in Lebow’s judgement, attributable to several reinforcing factors. Germany was Europe’s dominant power from 1870 to 1945 and for much of that period sought to advance its interests through the exercise of military and economic power. Germanpolitical and historical thought greatly influenced the realist tradition, and many first-generation realist IR scholars emigrated from continental Europe to
civilian powers ’, Foreign Affairs , 69 : 5 ( 1990 ), pp. 91 – 106 ; H. W. Maull , ‘ From “civilian power” to “trading state”? ’, in S. Colvin (ed.), Routledge Handbook of GermanPolitics and Culture ( London : Routledge , 2014 ), pp. 409 – 24 .
3 P. H. Gordon , ‘ Berlin’s difficulties: the normalization of German foreign policy ’, Orbis , 38 : 2 ( 1994 ), pp. 225 – 43 , at p. 225 .
4 K. Brummer and K. Oppermann , Germany’s Foreign Policy after the End of the Cold War: ‘Becoming Normal’? ( Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2016 ).
The Weimar Republic in the eyes of American political science
started arriving in the 1930s, America was hardly a blank slate as far as Germany was concerned. The new arrivals had to contend with existing perceptions of Germanpolitical thought and institutions.
This chapter will explore the lively interest American political science showed in the Weimar Republic and its Constitution. Perceptions and commentary on Weimar were framed in terms of historical continuity, comparison with the post-bellum US and larger questions about the nature of sovereignty during the interwar period. Positive American views of Germany, as explored
The changing view of Germany in Anglo-American geopolitics
schemes’ that bore no relation to learning. 36
This exchange might give the sense that Bowman and Germanpolitical geographers were in close academic contact, but actually it took place at a distance. Although Bowman worked throughout the decade and a half after the 1919 peace to integrate German geography, the 1920s boycott of Germany by the leading geographers of Allied countries in the International Geographical Congress (IGC), and the following Nazi boycott of the 1934 Warsaw meeting of the IGC, meant that in the area of political geography, intellectual
Germany in American post-war International Relations
integrate, people need to be able to talk to each other. To this end, a common language has to be established. 45 As the émigrés arrived in a country where English was the official language, communication required more effort from them. They had to learn the language and ensure the translation of their Germanpolitical thought.
For many of these scholars, this meant that they had to demonstrate proficiency in a language they had not studied profoundly prior to their emigration. German humanistic secondary education required the study of Latin and ancient Greek, but it
Germany, historically, seems to have or have had a ‘problem’ with power because its recent history has clearly been shaped by Germanpolitical power being abused. This was undoubtedly true of the Nazi regime, but there is a body of opinion that sees a tradition of German power being mishandled reaching further back, to the 1871 Empire or even beyond, with the foundations of what is seen as ‘Prussian militarism’ having perhaps been laid early on in the development of the Prussian state (see Leonie Holthaus’ and Annette Weinke’s chapters on early
dilemma over the function of the armed forces.’ 4 Others, coming
from a more constructivist perspective, have made similar observations
about the signiﬁcance of the draft. John Duﬃeld, for one, posited that
the anti-militarism innate to Germanpolitical culture ‘has fostered a
strong, if not universal, attachment to conscription, despite its disadvantages in the circumstances of the post-Cold War era and even
though it has no longer been necessary to prevent a replay of the militaristic excesses of the past’.5 Thomas Berger came to the same
conclusion, maintaining that
Germany, the use of force and the power of strategic culture
of a broader undercurrent of intellectual
change in Germanpolitics and society, and suggests that German strategic culture is maturing in line with the Berlin Republic’s growing sense
of conﬁdence. Additionally, the ‘domestics’ of future German security
policy may remain fragile and complex, and as a result the role of the
Bundeswehr and its reform programme, not to mention the issue of
conscription, will continue to be highly contested and politicised issues.
In conclusion, it can be said that Germany’s strategic culture has not
changed in a fundamental sense
’s election programme ‘Green Is the Change’,
the 1998 version still aimed at abolishing both NATO and the
Longhurst, Germany and the use of force.qxd
Adjusting to life after the Cold War
Bundeswehr.34 The Greens’ position was that only in cases of genocide,
and then only with a UN mandate, should the Bundeswehr be used.
Of perhaps less consequence at this stage of developments was the
perspective of the former Communist Party on the use of force: the PDS’s
stance resulted in the most uncompromising policy of any of those in
debate which followed illustrated the various strands
of thinking apparent in Germanpolitics on the use of force. Speaking
ﬁrmly against the war, the PDS saw that a military campaign in
Afghanistan was not the most appropriate means of tackling international terrorism; moreover, such an undertaking could spark a new
divide between the Islamic world and the West. Since the CDU and
the CSU supported the deployment, criticism was instead levied directly
at the coalition’s inability to govern. Aside from noting the damage
inﬂicted on Germany’s international reputation and