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, owing to growth in telecommunications, wholesale and retail trade, and financial services. Prior to the global economic slowdown (which began ostensibly in the last quarter of 2000, compounded by the uncertainty produced by September 11, 2001), the US economy played an important role in supporting global demand – accounting for more than 50 per cent of the growth of global demand. While this was reflected in record US current-account deficits, these deficits proved to be an important buffer against global recession. Japan, on the other hand, has failed to live up to
in 1980 (Giersch, Paqué and Schmieding n.d. ). Similar developments were seen in other industrialised countries. In the United States annual growth in labour productivity fell from 3.6 per cent between 1948 and 1953 to 1.4 per cent between 1973 and 1980 (Sprague 2017 ). In the United Kingdom it shrank from an average of 3.1 per cent between 1950 and 1973 to 1.7 per cent between 1973 and 1990, the fall in France in the same period was from 5.1 to 2.9 per cent, and in Japan from 7.7 to 3.0 per cent (Broadberry and O
The well-being of Europe’s citizens depends less on individual consumption and more on their social consumption of essential goods and services – from water and retail banking to schools and care homes – in what we call the foundational economy. Individual consumption depends on market income, while foundational consumption depends on social infrastructure and delivery systems of networks and branches, which are neither created nor renewed automatically, even as incomes increase. This historically created foundational economy has been wrecked in the last generation by privatisation, outsourcing, franchising and the widespread penetration of opportunistic and predatory business models. The distinctive, primary role of public policy should therefore be to secure the supply of basic services for all citizens (not a quantum of economic growth and jobs). Reconstructing the foundational has to start with a vision of citizenship that identifies foundational entitlements as the conditions for dignified human development, and likewise has to depend on treating the business enterprises central to the foundational economy as juridical persons with claims to entitlements but also with responsibilities and duties. If the aim is citizen well-being and flourishing for the many not the few, then European politics at regional, national and EU level needs to be refocused on foundational consumption and securing universal minimum access and quality. If/when government is unresponsive, the impetus for change has to come from engaging citizens locally and regionally in actions which break with the top down politics of ‘vote for us and we will do this for you’.
, the fall of the won resulted in further competitive devaluation throughout 3 The Asian financial crisis Table 1.2 Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand China Hong Kong (SAR) Taiwan Japan USA Changes in real GDP (%) 1996 1997 1998 8.0 6.8 8.6 5.8 7.6 5.5 9.6 4.5 5.7 5.0 3.7 4.5 5.0 7.5 5.2 8.4 −1.3 8.8 5.3 6.8 1.6 4.5 −13.7 −5.8 −7.5 −0.5 0.4 −10.0 7.8 −5.1 4.8 −2.5 4.3 Source: World Bank (2000). East Asia. Faced with such mounting problems, the Korean government initially approached Japan for financial aid, but the request was turned down
for success and embeddedness and networks as frictions, or ‘conspiracies against the public’. Dore (1983) argued that the success of Japanese capitalism, with its strongly embedded economic relations, involving long-term commitments among firms and between large firms and their key workers, demonstrated that the liberal model of capitalism was faulty. There was not one capitalism but several kinds, none of which was to be regarded as the norm, and the more embedded and regulated Rhenish and Japanese capitalisms were looking stronger than the Anglo-American neo
, the post-WWII Bretton Woods system also had strongly anti-Keynesian elements, particularly in the way it disciplined trade-deficit but not trade-surplus countries. The greatest national economic success stories of the period, Japan and West Germany, had anti-Keynesian domestic policies imposed upon them after the war but prospered, not least through export orientations. The third section considers the crisis of the 1970s and the abandonment of the Bretton Woods system. Keynes’s followers are understandably less keen to accept responsibility. Now, for Davidson, the
IMF package for Thailand. Similarly, 252 Why China survived the crisis Singapore’s minister for information, the indefatigable George Yeo, while accusing Japan of abdicating its global responsibilities, noted that “the determination of the Chinese government not to devalue the renminbi in order not to destabilize Asia further will long be remembered” (Kelley 1998, 28). Another observer noted that the RMB was a “pillar of stability” in the region (Dassu 1998). How did China respond to the Asian financial crisis? Why did China come through such a severe region
markets in the US, Germany and Japan and the general globalisation of capital markets that have taken place since the 1980s have encouraged borrowers and investors to look more to international capital markets. The rapid growth in eurosecurity issues in the latter part of the 1990s reflects the strong surge in corporate restructuring, and the growth in 2000 in particular was partly
expanding at an annual rate of over 8 per cent, Korea’s per capita income had grown to US$10,973 by mid1997.2 This earned the country its coveted membership of the exclusive OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) group of nations.3 Already the world’s eleventh largest economy in 1996, Korea’s publicly stated ambition was to outperform Japan technologically in the new millennium. Indeed, the “miracle on the Han” seemed to know no bounds. As the world’s top producer of the dynamic random access memory (D-RAM) computer chips, the second largest
made by the traders were focused on manipulating Japanese yen (JYP) LIBOR, with at least 1900 documented internal requests, external requests and broker requests directed towards that end. These include ‘open collusion’, requests to ‘spoof’ the market and requests to manipulate screens. There is no record of such direct requests being made by other traders, although manipulation of LIBOR by other banks may well have resulted in false information being displayed on broker screens. Trader A asked certain brokers to manipulate their screens for the purpose of