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the partition borders of 1947, it did not support the Arab demand to destroy Israel. The Kremlin wanted both a neutral Israel 3 and to obviate any manifestation of a Jewish national revival on its own territory. An international conference in support of Soviet Jewry was held in Paris in mid-September 1960, which an angry Kremlin called an anti-Soviet plot to aggravate the Cold War. Soviet Jews, it
, perceived by listeners as rather dull.8 Filmed news south of the demarcation line, however, maintained some independence and was popular. But in August 1942 the German-run France-Actualités became the sole filmed news broadcaster across France, and it was widely disliked because of its pro-German sentiments. German propaganda had two aims: first, to encourage support for collaboration by stressing its advantages to France, the benevolence of the Reich, and German achievements; and second, to stigmatise enemies: Jews, Freemasons and communists, the treacherous Allies and
to avoid your homes.’19 In contrast to Vichy and collaborationist propaganda, the BBC did not try to obscure what children could see for themselves, but reassured them that ‘it will all be alright in the end’.20 As Vichy and the collaborationists did not talk to children directly about the war, they could not indict the bombers, nor invoke British betrayal. Nonetheless, France’s enemies were luridly drawn: British, Americans, Russians and, behind them all, Jews.21 Joan of Arc was a useful vehicle for Anglophobia. Jennings cites a version of the story in which
which to speak about distressing childhood events. Bombing was not seen as a specifically ‘French’ problem; other countries had it worse; easier, then, to concentrate on what is known to be specifically ‘French’ within the dominant story: collaboration and resistance. It was quite common for interviewees to link their own experiences of bombing, and of hardship more generally, to the persecution and then deportation of Jews from France. Michel and Claude Thomas had witnessed round-ups of Jews and were aware at the time that several of their parents’ business
and Josette Dutilleul, enjoyable evacuation experiences made separation easier to bear. Collaboration has affected how bombing has been remembered. Michel Jean-Bart, despite his terrifying experience in April 1944, felt retrospectively that the most horrible feature of war had been French volunteers fighting alongside the Nazis. Serge Aubrée, the Thomas brothers and Bernard Lemaire in hindsight named the deportation of Jews from France as the most terrible part of the war. Several others mentioned finding out about the Holocaust after the war, new knowledge that
attention has been elsewhere, in particular on resistance, occupation, collaboration, the persecution and deportation of Jews. Although bombs, bomb damage and Allied airmen have long appeared in novels and films, they form part of the backdrop to action that privileges other themes. The individual memories recorded v 39 v Telling stories in interviews are in continual dialogue with public memory; as I show in Part III, people negotiate their own pasts in relation to public understandings of that past. Alistair Thomson’s foundational work on Anzac memories of the First
labour in Germany, round-ups of Jews led by French police, harsher rationing and mounting civil unrest, this was a positive intervention in civilian life. In February 1943 the Service Interministériel de Protection contre les Événements de Guerre (Interministerial Protection Service against the Events of War – SIPEG) was formed to coordinate the work v 105 v Experiencing bombing of diverse public bodies with the intention of improving effectiveness – although its success is this respect is unclear. It placed delegates in each département, and had two well
deeper into collaboration with Germany. Key to occupation and collaboration was economic exploitation: infrastructure, industry and seaboard were harnessed to the Nazi war machine and thus became targets for bombs. As Pétain lost control at the helm, France was steered by others, with an increasing ideological commitment to fascist and Nazi ideals resulting in the deportation of around 76,000 Jews from France, most of whom were murdered. Alongside collaboration, resistance developed: equally home-grown, and equally a mixture of the pragmatic and the ideological
Doriot’s Parti Populaire Français (PPF).17 The COSI’s (many) critics condemned it as a tool of German propaganda but it was at pains to emphasise that its finance came from Parisian trade unions.18 The Germans also gave it one hundred million francs, however, which came from a fine imposed on French Jews.19 A fundraising drive in the collaborationist media raised a further ten million francs, and when Déat entered the government in 1944, he allocated public funding to the COSI. By October 1943, the COSI had set up eighty-seven local committees and claimed to have
. While Soviet Jews supported Israel, they were increasingly fearful of state persecution. 5 Ben-Gurion attacked Communist ideology, saying it was hypocritical and deceitful, even if it was backed by hundreds of armored divisions. He said that Israel should not give up hope for Soviet Jewish immigration when the current regime in Moscow was replaced. 6 Israel hoped the flow of immigrants from Hungary and