than a historically informed understanding of the meaning and moral basis of toleration as a political value, which when so understood can also play a substantial role in resolving, or at the very least significantly narrowing the space for legitimate disagreement about, many of the disputes concerning the requirements and boundaries of toleration in cases where these are a matter of serious contention. And, while predominantly theoretical, his work is refreshingly replete with examples of the implications of his theory for practice.
I want to begin, therefore, by
reciprocal exchange of reasons with those whom our actions affect, reasons that they in particular can recognise as valid. Forst distils this core of morality to the recognition of the fundamental ‘right to justification’ of every human being, and the correlative duty to provide appropriate reasons in moral contexts. 1
The Kantian insight that morality must begin from an attitude of respect for other human beings as ‘ends in themselves’ is unassailable, and Forst’s constructivist approach is an important advance in grounding that insight in an analysis of human
appropriately critical spirit, I want to begin with Forst’s reflections on morality.
Let’s begin with Forst’s commitment to the grounding of morality in a second-order practical insight:
The type of moral perception in question can be understood, with Wittgenstein, such that the perceptual ‘seeing’ of a human being at the same time corresponds to a practical attitude towards him, an ‘attitude towards a soul’ … With regard to Wittgenstein’s discussion of ‘seeing aspects’ which as an understanding form of ‘visual experience’ is a form of practical cognition in that a
advocate a traditional
view (Pascal had done the same), neither was Rousseau the first to reject
the prevailing positivist doctrine. Nor, for that matter, was he the last to
do so (Kierkegaard was later to strike similar chords). But Rousseau was
possibly the most eloquent – and the most misunderstood – of the antimodernists.4
John Locke, not normally regarded as an anti-modernist, warned against
the challenge of the atheist philosophers in The Reasonableness of
Christianity: ‘Collect all the moral rules of philosophers and compare them
with those contained in the New
The book argues that the frontier, usually associated with the era of colonial conquest, has great, continuing and under explored relevance to the Caribbean region. Identifying the frontier as a moral, ideational and physical boundary between what is imagined as civilization and wilderness, the book seeks to extend frontier analysis by focusing on the Eastern Caribbean multi island state of St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The continuing relevance of the concept of frontier, and allied notions of civilization and wilderness, are illuminated through an analysis of the ways in which SVG is perceived and experienced by both outsiders to the society and its insiders. Using literary sources, biographies and autobiography, the book shows how St. Vincent is imagined and made sense of as a modern frontier; a society in the balance between an imposed civilized order and an untameable wild that always encroaches, whether in the form of social dislocation, the urban presence of the ‘Wilderness people’ or illegal marijuana farming in the northern St. Vincent hills. The frontier as examined here has historically been and remains very much a global production. Simultaneously, it is argued that contemporary processes of globalization shape the development of tourism and finance sectors, as well as patterns of migration, they connect to shifting conceptions of the civilized and the wild, and have implications for the role of the state and politics in frontier societies.
Drinking to excess has been a striking problem for industrial and post-industrial
societies – who is responsible when a ‘free’ individual opts for a slow suicide?
The causes of such drinking have often been blamed on heredity, moral weakness,
‘disease’ (addiction), hedonism, and Romantic illusion. Yet there is another
reason which may be more fundamental and which has been overlooked or dismissed,
and it is that the drinker may act with sincere philosophical intent. The
Existential Drinker looks at the convergence of a new kind of excessive,
habitual drinking, beginning in the nineteenth century, and a new way of
thinking about the self which in the twentieth century comes to be labelled
‘Existential’. A substantial introduction covers questions of self, will,
consciousness, authenticity, and ethics in relation to drinking, while
introducing aspects of Existential thought pertinent to the discussion. The
Existential-drinker canon is anchored in Jack London’s ‘alcoholic memoir’ John
Barleycorn (1913), where London claims he can get at the truth of existence only
through the insights afforded by excessive and repeated alcohol use. The book
then covers drinker-texts such as Jean Rhys’s interwar novels, Malcolm Lowry’s
Under the Volcano, Charles Jackson’s The Lost Weekend and John O’Brien’s Leaving
Las Vegas, along with less well-known works such as Frederick Exley’s A Fan’s
Notes, Venedikt Yerofeev’s Moscow–Petushki, and A. L. Kennedy’s Paradise. The
book will appeal to anybody with an interest in drinking and literature, as well
as those with more specialised concerns in drinking studies, Existentialism,
twentieth-century literature, and medical humanities.
The development of the European Union as a community-based project of integration with decision-making powers outside the constitutional architecture of the nation-state is the most significant innovation in twentieth-century political organisation. It raises fundamental questions about our understanding of the state, sovereignty, citizenship, democracy, and the relationship between political power and economic forces. Despite its achievements, events at the start of the twenty-first century – including the political, economic, and financial crisis of the Eurozone, as well as Brexit and the rise of populism – pose an existential threat to the EU. Memory and the future of Europe addresses the crisis of the EU by treating integration as a response to the rupture created by the continent’s experience of total war. It traces Europe’s existing pathologies to the project’s loss of its moral foundations rooted in collective memories of total war. As the generations with personal memories of the two world wars pass away, economic gain has become the EU’s sole raison d’être. If it is to survive its future challenges, the EU will have to create a new historical imaginary that relies not only on the lessons of the past, but also builds on Europe’s ability to protect its citizens by serving as a counterweight against the forces of globalisation. By framing its argument through the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, Memory and the future of Europe will attract readers interested in political and social philosophy, collective memory studies, European studies, international relations, and contemporary politics.
members who are not capable of deliberative political speech.
We will argue that these cases raise a fundamental challenge to our theories of
democratic inclusion, not just about who is included, but also about what it
means to be a citizen and how to characterize the underlying moral purposes of
To foreshadow, our argument is that these cases reveal a deep
tension within democratic theory between two models of citizenship: what we
, The Iron Heel, a dystopian
fiction admired by Orwell, The Sea-Wolf, and Martin Eden, a semi-
autobiographical novel), adventurer, world celebrity. John Barleycorn is
one of the first all-out formulations of the writer-as-drinker, mixing the
nineteenth-century temperance view of the habitual drinker who is a
moral failure with the image of the heavy-drinking writer who can attain
truths not available to the run-of-the-mill drunkard, nor indeed available to the run-of-the-mill sober citizen. At the end of the book London
appears ambivalent as to his own
prepared to bind their conscience to a temporal (ecclesiastical or political) authority, and among atheists, since they lack any conscience at all. To remove God ‘even in thought’, 21 according to Locke, would be to dissolve the bonds of human society. This is a notion of the limits to toleration that runs right through the history of Christian societies up to the present day: someone who does not accept divine justice will not be a reliable moral person on earth.
In mentioning these problems with Locke’s approach, my intention is not to diminish this great