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Introduction Soon after the end of the Cold War, America led the West to embrace the concept of expanding the membership numbers in NATO. There were other international organizations, such as the OSCE. However, NATO received the call from the West, and it had real implications for the relationship between the United States and Russia. Key decisions that will receive attention in this chapter include the setting up of the PfP program in 1994, the inclusion of three former communist nations in 1999, the admission of four more plus three former Soviet
ICRC held a roundtable in Geneva on ‘Translating humanitarian law into military tactics’. The aim was to consider how to conduct military operations within the limits of IHL and, in particular, to ponder appropriate, effective and yet legally acceptable rules of armed engagement. The four panellists included two military legal advisors (from NATO and the United States) and a colonel. While this may seem extremely cynical, the effort to better incorporate IHL into military
scale of the disaster, while host states have an interest in exaggerating the figures in order to increase financial support ( Crisp, 1986 ). Governments fudge humanitarian figures to justify military interventions. Here we can think of the way NATO justified their bombings using the figure of 100,000 Kosovar Albanians massacred by Serbs – a figure ten times higher than the reality ( Crisp, 1999 ). Humanitarian agencies themselves may have an interest in overestimating
: Hurst ). Mazurana , D. and Donnelly , P. ( 2017 ), Stop the Sexual Assault against Humanitarian and Development Aid Workers Feinstein International Center Somerville, MA . Médecins Sans Frontières International Movement ( 2013 ), Famine and Forced Relocations in Ethiopia 1984–1986 MSF Speaks Out . Médecins Sans Frontières International Movement ( 2014a ), Violence against Kosovar Albanians, NATO’s Intervention 1998–1999 MSF Speaks Out . Médecins Sans Frontières International Movement ( 2014b ), War Crimes and Politics
Дмитро Лубінець] ’, 3 September, https://ukrainian.voanews.com/a/ombudsman_lubinets_interview/6729554.html . Washington Post ( 2022a ), ‘ Russia Could Seize Kyiv in Days and Cause 50,000 Civilian Casualties in Ukraine, U.S. Assessments Find ’, 5 February, www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/05/ukraine-russia-nato-putin-germany/ . Washington Post
Why did the Russian take-over of Crimea come as a surprise to so many observers in the academic practitioner and global-citizen arenas? The answer presented in this book is a complex one, rooted in late-Cold War dualities but also in the variegated policy patterns of the two powers after 1991. This book highlights the key developmental stages in the evolution of the Russian-American relationship in the post-Cold War world. The 2014 crisis was provoked by conflicting perspectives over the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, the expansion of NATO to include former communist allies of Russia as well as three of its former republics, the American decision to invade Iraq in 2003, and the Russian move to invade Georgia in 2008. This book uses a number of key theories in political science to create a framework for analysis and to outline policy options for the future. It is vital that the attentive public confront the questions raised in these pages in order to control the reflexive and knee-jerk reactions to all points of conflict that emerge on a regular basis between America and Russia.Key topics include struggles over the Balkans, the expansion of NATO, the challenges posed by terrorism to both nations, wars fought by both powers in the first decade of the twenty-first century, conflict over missile defence, reactions to post-2011 turmoil in the Middle East, and the mutual interest in establishing priorities in Asia.
not long in coming. Like other successor states of the multi-national USSR, Moldova (Transnistria) and Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), Ukraine began to fracture as a result of Western forward pressure. In this chapter, I investigate how the coup regime, encouraged by its backers in Washington and Brussels, responded to the anti-Maidan movement among Russian- Ukrainians with extreme violence. I will argue that this can be traced to the determination of key players in the United States and NATO to raise the stakes in the trial of strength between an
134 5 Aftermath: A failed state on NATO’s frontline The downing of MH17 swept aside EU reservations about the new round of US sanctions against Russia announced the day before and killed the ‘Land for Gas’ negotiations at one stroke. It also set the planned South Stream energy link to Europe back while accelerating Kiev’s efforts to uncouple the Ukrainian economy from Russia’s defence-industrial base. The West was clearly ready to scuttle the chances for a compromise settlement and leave Ukraine an economic wasteland and a failed state as the price of
not far from where Zoran Djindjić would later be shot and killed, not far from where the NATO cruise missile landed on the maternity wing of the Dragiša Mišović hospital in the spring of 1999, not far from where the fortress of Kalemegdan stands purposeful watch on the headland over the fortuitous juncture of two rivers. In Sarajevo, in 2002 on the tenth anniversary of the beginning of the Bosnian war, I paused to look at the Zoran Filipović postcards for sale – black and white photographs of grave markers standing like sentinels on the outskirts of the city
38 2 Divided Ukraine Western advance into the former Soviet space drew several former republics of the USSR into the NATO sphere of influence. In 1994, Ukraine joined the Partnership for Peace, the waiting room for membership of the Atlantic Alliance and also became a member of the GUAM group along with Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova. American democracy promotion contributed to colour revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine in 2003 and 2004 and, despite repeated warnings from Moscow that it would no longer tolerate NATO adventures on its borders, encouraged