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underwent radical transformation. Indeed, it is possible to argue that the schisms internalized in the legal systems enabled new forms of imperial relations to emerge after the old forms of political colonialism ended. This paper attempts to locate the role of law within debates on the imperialist nature of world political economy after international law, through the UN Charter
. Half a century later the light (or shadow) of Nuremberg lay on the paths to the two ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and to the International Criminal Court.50 Nuremberg also played a crucial role in the development of international human rights law. Holding individuals responsible for violations of international law ‘duties’ necessarily involved regarding those individuals as subjects of international law. The atrocities committed by the Nazis were partly responsible for the notion of international human ‘rights’ as expressed in the UN Charter (1945), the
. Such festivals and illegal entertainments threatened to become permanent London institutions if not stopped. In 1735, London’s Aldermen fought against a new and increasingly popular un-chartered entertainment: illegal and temporary play booths, which were erected not only at fairs, but also in areas such as Hampstead at times of the year not associated with festivals. In an effort to quell illegal play booths and perhaps break the public’s growing taste for this style of entertainment, the Aldermen paid special attention to their regulation at that year’s fairs
Fianna Fáil after the change of government in the summer of 1957 than its coalition predecessor. Cosgrave had based his approach to international affairs on three principles: fealty to the UN Charter; the pursuit of an independent foreign policy; and a commitment to uphold Christian civilisation against the spread of communist influence.26 Yet his emphasis remained on the first and third of these principles. In expressing his commitment to decolonisation in Africa, he warned that the Irish Government could not support ‘any movement which seemed to us determined to ride
-Apartheid Movement. In Scandinavia it ignited widespread interest and helped to inspire greater public action. The diplomatic response was equally swift and condemnatory. Western governments criticised the use of excessive force and the South African administration’s blinkered approach to political reform. At the UN Sharpeville opened a ‘new chapter’ in the organisation’s approach to international disputes.1 A resolution adopted by the General Assembly in its aftermath strongly condemned South Africa’s policies, and in the process opened Article 2.7 of the UN Charter – which
independent character of the state’s approach to foreign policy. Aiken’s fortunes and those of Irish diplomacy were closely intertwined. In the 1960s the Minister’s (and the Irish Government’s) hopes for a prominent role for the ‘fire brigade’ states and for the UN itself were sorely dented. The growing radicalism of the Afro-Asian group (however much he may have sympathised with their essential goals) became difficult to reconcile with Aiken’s fealty to the UN Charter. The Minister’s slow response to circumstances at home and abroad, not least the growing importance of the
France) against the rise of communism and ‘radical nationalists’ in West Africa (Schwab 2004). Furthermore, the war in Indochina suggested that the empire could hardly be held together through force any more, while the Suez crisis of 1956 suggested that the French state could not maintain its world influence and power without the at least tacit support of the US government. In short, the 1950s and 1960s were radically changing the global context of the empire: the UN Charter on the one hand, and the Atlantic Charter on the other, combined to define and redefine the
character of the League’s proposed replacement.33 It is difficult to judge how far the LNU’s memos and statements influenced the thinking of officials negotiating the UN Charter in Washington and San Francisco. In July 1944, Headway thought there to be ‘grounds for believing that our proposals, foreshadowing so much that is to be found in the plans announced by British and American statesmen, have received careful attention in high quarters’, an impression confirmed by Viscount Cranborne during a debate on the forthcoming Charter negotiations in the Lords the following
term referring to a broad range of UN peacekeeping operations. In April 2016, a total of 103,510 uniformed personnel, including almost 90,000 troops, more than 12,500 police and around 1,800 military observers from 123 countries served in sixteen peacekeeping operations, primarily in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, as well as in Haiti.3 Although not explicitly addressed by the UN Charter of 1945, peacekeeping has evolved as one of the main tools employed by the security sector. The concept has been developed over the years to be utilised alongside conflict
victory for the Indians. South Africa’s policies towards Indians were roundly condemned and the government was called upon to treat them in conformity with treaty obligations between India and South Africa, and the provisions in the UN charter. Despite much rejoicing at celebratory rallies in South Africa, however, it proved an anti-climax. Significantly, the British government had refused to support the Indian case, and rather than