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Westphalia was signed by approximately 150 European ‘territorial authorities’, but at that time there were only six or seven modern states. After the Napoleonic Wars, at the beginning of the ‘imperialist age’ (1840–1914), this number increased due to the independence of American states, and at the end of the Second World War the UN Charter was signed by 50 independent states. It was in the second half of the twentieth century that the inter-state system expanded more rapidly. Today there are almost 200 sovereign states with a seat at the UN
This chapter discusses what makes the constituent treaty of the UN and similar IGOs different from other multilateral treaties and whether it is appropriate to use the term ‘constitution’ in relation to such treaties. The term ‘constitution’ should not be seen as a judgmental one. In a minimal sense, the UN Charter constitutes, or establishes, an organisation with organs possessing legal powers and members with rights and duties, justifying the use of the term ‘constitution’. Furthermore, the legitimacy and strength of constitutions varies so the UN Charter may
, many of these limitations lie in the philosophical or legal foundations of the UN. They are the result of the historical processes in which the UN was founded, through which it developed and which it helped to advance. This chapter shows how these processes have shaped the conception of democracy in the making of the UN, from the early planning stages to the writing of key documents, such as the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). What emerges is a view of ‘us versus them’, in which democracies assume a higher moral place than non
As we have seen in Chapter 7 , non-forcible sanctions potentially put IGOs into conflict with principles and rules of international law such as human rights. Forcible sanctions, namely the use of force organised or authorised by the UN, or regional or defence organisations, raise issues of the framework of the rules governing the use of force in international relations, the primary norms of which are found in the UN Charter. This chapter considers the role of IGOs not only in implementing and upholding those rules, but also being a part of them, necessitating
This chapter examines non-forcible measures adopted by the UN and other IGOs, their legality (both in terms of constitutionality and conformity to international law), legitimacy and effectiveness. Are sanctions used to punish breaches of law by member states or do they serve wider purposes? The main focus will be Article 41 of the UN Charter, a provision that expressly empowers the Security Council to adopt sanctions. It used this power largely against states in the Cold War but, given that the real culprit was not the population of the state but the regime
powerful solvents of liberal interventionism. I organise these different arguments into several different types that are discussed in turn: pluralist, Charterist, realist and normaliser. The first strand comes from the pluralist wing of English School theorising in International Relations, perhaps the most venerable and influential of anti-interventionist critiques. The second group are those I call ‘Charterists’ as they are concerned to preserve international law and order, especially as concretely embodied and articulated in the UN Charter. Realists are those scholars
possible similarities between the five operations that were carried out in this period and those executed by the UN during the Cold War. In addition, I describe the response of the international community towards Iraq after the conquest of Kuwait in August 1990 – an enforcement operation carried out in accordance with the directives of Chapter 7 in the UN Charter. Finally, I present the chain of events leading to the execution of the most ambitious operation of the UN until that time: the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). New thinking: The end
consideration of the claims to constitutionality of the UN Charter and other foundational documents within the UN system. The book then explores the nature of an IGO’s autonomy from member states by considering the meaning and significance of international legal personality, and the nature of the powers that flow from it. The next step is to consider whether the powers of IGOs incorporate that most crucial feature of any legal order – the ability to make law – a competence which, if present, has the potential to radically change the nature of international lawmaking. The
collective security system.6 Below I describe UN powers with regard to the peaceful settlement of disputes and the organisation’s powers of enforcement. In order to maintain international peace and security, the UN Charter gives the Security Council several powers, described in Chapters 6 and 7 of the Charter;7 Chapter 6 (Articles 33–38) deals with resolving disputes by peaceful means.8 Thus, all parties involved in a dispute that is likely to develop into a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security must use these tools to try to resolve 14 The UN and
subjects – states. In 1945, such an idea was still a radical one given the domination of international relations by states hitherto. This explains why the UN Charter was silent on the matter of international legal personality (although it granted the UN legal capacity in national legal orders). However, by 1949, the matter was settled in favour of the UN having international legal personality with the concomitant right to bring claims against states following the ICJ’s advisory opinion in the Reparations case (see Case Study 7). That ICJ opinion, however, is just the