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states, others, like the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], were only for the capitalist world. There was an order, which, in theory, combined Western democracy with a more-or-less regulated capitalism: the so-called liberal order – although perhaps ‘liberal’ isn’t the most precise term, either in political or economic terms. There were of course other characteristics. The promotion of human rights became one, for example, albeit selective. When South Korea was still under dictatorship, we would ask ‘What about South Korea? Shouldn’t it
. ( 2013 ), ‘ 21st Century Welfare ’, New Left Review , 84 , 5 – 40 . Lebaron , G. and Ayers , A. ( 2013 ), ‘ The Rise of a “New Slavery”? Understanding Unfree Labour through Neoliberalism ’, Third World Quarterly , 34 : 5 , 837 – 92 . Mair , P. ( 2013 ), Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy ( London : Verso ). Meagher , K. ( 1990 ), ‘ The Hidden Economy: Informal and Parallel Trade in Northwestern Uganda ’, Review
chances of a new and prolonged Cold War, or even a hot one. In conclusion, while the external threats to the West are real—far more than “risks and challenges”—internal weaknesses could block Western democracies from working together to deal with them. If transatlantic solidarity fails, then the future of the West would be in doubt. The transatlantic community is more than ever dependent on the right choices being made on both sides of the Atlantic. The United States has not recently been inclined to ride in on its white horse to rescue the old continent. Perhaps the
This chapter provides an overview of UK anti-terrorism policy. The chapter begins by tracing the historical evolution of contemporary anti-terrorism powers, before comparing the UK’s experience to that of other Western democracies. The chapter argues that the UK’s approach to anti-terrorism is distinctive because it is characterised by hasty, repetitive and continuous activity in which terrorism is approached as a distinct security problem of exceptional significance.
Norman Angell, J. A. Hobson, Alfred Zimmern and John Dewey, contributed to the creation of a so-called German theory of the state and to the ideology of German power politics as liberal internationalism’s ‘other’. 51 Zimmern was among those British intellectuals who already declared in 1914 that Britain was fighting for the democratic cause and thus anticipated the rise of an ideological key concept, being ‘Western democracy’. 52 As an expert working for the Political Intelligence Department, he tended to view victory over Germany as a necessity and spurred
insurgents operate, typically against weak or failing states. On the other hand, we are aware that insurgent groups such as al Qaeda, ISIL, and other holy warriors have used the Internet to stimulate “lone wolves,” especially in places that are out of these groups’ reach. This is one way these groups may target the Western democracies they oppose, yet do so from a distance. Their secret weapon is the disenfranchised, perhaps naïve, maybe even “notoriety-seeking”13 individuals who reside in every society. In democratic societies, these individuals tend to enjoy the types of
good deed 20 – and yet many citizens from Western democracies still despised its authoritarian political regime. Since the image of a country often drastically changes over time during global mega-events such as war, epidemic or sports events, China may still have an opportunity to become an active participant in global affairs and a potential ally to those nations that are
reflects the extrapolation of Hofstadter’s framework on to the world at large. Like populism on the margins of Western democracy, conspiracy theory is thought to be a potent force on the international periphery from the point of view of these commentators. This underlying structure, I argue, indicates a powerful dynamic of ideological reproduction embedded in the
–30 . Carreiras , Helena ( 2006 ), Gender and the Military: Women in the Armed Forces of Western Democracies ( London : Routledge ). Chappell , Louise ( 2006 ), ‘ Moving to a comparative politics of gender? ’, Critical Perspectives on Gender and Politics , 2 , 221–63 . Chappell , Louise , and Georgina Waylen
states, but several persisted for more than a decade or even longer (let us keep in mind that one of the most memorable political regimes in history, Nazi Germany, existed only for 12 years). Their survival was largely dependent on their linkage with Western democracies as much as their internal political resources and their organizational power (Levitsky and Way 2010 , p. 5). Two