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Bryan Fanning

dysfunctional interplay of liberalism, clientelism and corporatism. Many of the elements that made the banking crisis possible, he notes, ‘were intrinsic elements of market liberalism’. These included the limiting of public regulation, the rejection of political guidance of the economy, the indifference of private regulation to securing the common good and the structural importance and discursive privileging of markets and particularly finance.3 Such malign liberalism, he argues, combined with clientelism during the 2000s to destabilise a creative corporatism that had done

in Irish adventures in nation-building
Kieran Allen

the decades before. Traditions, practices and experiences of past battles won form a sedimented framework which elites draw on to create styles of rule. These styles give a ruling elite its distinctive quality and can be an important factor in the management of social discontent. It is to these longer-term historic patterns we need now to turn. 4147 Inglis–Are the Irish different_BB_Layout 1 29/07/2014 09:26 Page 57 The Irish political elite 57 From populism to corporatism The Irish political system has historically been shaped by the domination of Fianna Fáil

in Are the Irish different?
Joe Larragy

variety of tripartite corporatism or concertation. Roche (1992) provided an early theoretical grounding in these terms for understanding social partnership as it emerged from 1987, and stressed its potential as an alternative to industrial relations pluralism. Hardiman (1998; 2000) developed her earlier approach (Hardiman 1988) to explore the post-­1987 social partnership model by providing an account that distinguishes between it and the failed model of the 1970s. She also examined innovative aspects such as the CVP. Up to a certain point, too, O’Donnell and O

in Asymmetric engagement
Joe Larragy

detailed examination of the Pillar arises because traditional discourse on neo-­corporatism and indeed industrial relations pluralism has focused specifically on organisations that are functionally connected through relations of production – principally as employer bodies and organised labour. The issue is whether the adaptation of the model to accommodate other types of association – in particular community and voluntary sector associations without any equivalent functional interdependence to that of employers and unions – leads to a qualitative change in the underlying

in Asymmetric engagement
Abstract only
Joe Larragy

corporatist models applied elsewhere (Hardiman 1988). Instead of the positive sum game that post-­war social corporatism facilitated elsewhere, things never quite gelled in the Irish case. Social reform aspirations were dashed by the oil shocks and stagflation; government deficits followed and centralised bargaining was viewed as part of the problem rather than the solution. Although free collective bargaining resumed in 1981, the NESC continued to function during the 1980s and contributed to the establishment of a tripartite system of bargaining in 1987. Two important

in Asymmetric engagement
Joe Larragy

their objectives. When they did so, success depended to a considerable extent on shifts in the sentiment of the electorate. More concrete argumentation can be found in the ongoing debate among scholars with a specific focus on the phenomena of corporatism, industrial relations and political theory. Here the debate has explored the implications of the Pillar in more refined theoretical, historical and comparative terms, although still without any detailed account of the Pillar and its principal actors. In this debate there are shades of opinion but also some noteworthy

in Asymmetric engagement
Abstract only
Bryan Fanning

in the economy, for example by controlling wage levels and promoting indigenous capital formation.10 Academic comparative analyses of the Celtic and East Asian tigers have identified much stronger state controls over the factors of production than were evident in the Irish case. During the 1980s the Irish state put in place a system of developmental corporatism or ‘social partnership’ that negotiated national development plans, and wage agreements with employers and trade unions fell considerably short of the degree of state control and co-ordination of economic

in Irish adventures in nation-building
Class polarisation and neo-liberalism in the Irish Republic
Kieran Allen

help European capitalism become more healthy, vibrant and competitive and prevent its decline into the cosy corporatism that so much of the European left used to espouse’.29 Key instruments for achieving this objective have been the transition to the single European market and the single currency. On one level, these were designed to stimulate the emergence of stronger EU companies that can compete more effectively on a global scale. But the moves to a single market and currency have also been accompanied by a shift to a greater adoption of neo-liberal economics. Far

in The end of Irish history?
Bryan Fanning

conditions that would nurture and sustain individual adaptability, flexibility and risk-taking; a ‘sustainable balance between dynamism and security’.12 In this context it was unsurprising that the Fanning_01_Text.indd 17 23/11/2010 14:05 18 Immigration and social cohesion major statements since then about immigration and integration policy that are examined here have de-emphasised ethno-cultural rules of belonging. From blocking coalitions to competitive corporatism In answering the title question of his 2004 book Preventing the Future: Why Was Ireland so Poor for so

in Immigration and social cohesion in the Republic of Ireland
Executive versus legislative power
Cameron Ross

conflicts were complicated and exacerbated by the dominance of independents in the majority of assemblies and an absence in all but a few of strong disciplined parties.27 However, the specific nature of executive–legislative relations in a region depend on a number of other factors other than the powers of the respective elites at the time the charters/constitutions were laid down. Other important factors determining this relationship are the electoral support of the chief executive, the social composition of the assembly (see section on corporatism and clientelism below

in Federalism and democratisation in Russia