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Issues for the intelligence community
Richard Kerr
Thomas Wolfe
Rebecca Donegan
, and
Aris Pappas

resources had a significant adverse impact on intelligence community capabilities. Nonetheless, during the 1990s the intelligence community confronted numerous crises in which to demonstrate the relevance of intelligence analysis to policy deliberations. Regional conflicts, such as the first Gulf war and follow-on sanctions against Iraq, the breakup of Yugoslavia, and emerging threats from North Korea and

in Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq
Arabs, Israelis, and the limits of military force

The Arab–Israeli conflict has been at the centre of international affairs for decades. Despite repeated political efforts, the confrontation and casualties continue, especially in fighting between Israelis and Palestinians. This new assessment emphasizes the role that military force plays in blocking a diplomatic resolution. Many Arabs and Israelis believe that the only way to survive or to be secure is through the development, threat, and use of military force and violence. This idea is deeply flawed and results in missed diplomatic opportunities and growing insecurity. Coercion cannot force rivals to sign a peace agreement to end a long-running conflict. Sometimes negotiations and mutual concessions are the key to improving the fate of a country or national movement. Using short historical case studies from the 1950s through to today, the book explores and pushes back against the dominant belief that military force leads to triumph while negotiations and concessions lead to defeat and further unwelcome challenges. In The sword is not enough, we learn both what makes this idea so compelling to Arab and Israeli leaders and how it eventually may get dislodged.

Tony Blair, humanitarian intervention, and the “new doctrine of the international community”
Jim Whitman

continuous reconfiguration of values and beliefs tempered and shaped by the hard experience of violent conflict, has greatly conditioned “our received idea of war.” 1 In our own time as in any other, we struggle to make ordered sense of the recent past (the first Gulf war; instances of genocide) and events on the periphery of living memory (both World Wars), against shared values and perceived threats. Of

in Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq
Matt McDonald

concerted political debate. 7 This debate began in earnest during the (first) Gulf War, when the Japanese government failed to commit troops to the international coalition. This decision subsequently loomed in discussions about whether Japan should contribute (and if so in what form) to the ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan and later Iraq. As Christopher Hughes ( 2004 : 431) argues, ‘Japanese

in Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific
Satoru Nagao

. In 1950, the Japanese coast guard joined the Korean War to sweep sea mines. And after the first Gulf War in 1991, Japan deployed mine sweepers to the Persian Gulf. If India needs to deal with sea mines set up by China’s submarines, Japan and India can jointly detect them under the Japan–India strategic cooperation. Therefore, to deal with China’s naval activities in the Indian Ocean, Japan–India strategic cooperation could be very effective and useful. In addition, even when we think about developing infrastructure in countries around

in Japan's new security partnerships
Jeremy Pressman

Organization, expressed the same hope: ‘My people are hoping that this agreement which we are signing today will usher in an age of peace, coexistence and equal rights’.32 In short, sprinkled among the many forceful statements and actions is the idea that negotiation and reconciliation are pathways by which to advance a state’s national objectives.33 Ultimately, I agree with Jennifer Milliken that different ideas make possible or impossible different foreign policies.34 In her example using the first Gulf War, she notes how ‘an elite’s “regime of truth”’ made military

in The sword is not enough
Jeremy Pressman

Gulf War and the subsequent call to address the Arab–Israeli conflict. Both in the 1970s and 1990s, a gradual, or step-by-step, approach was important to at least some of the diplomatic breakthroughs. Ultimately, gradualism became an impediment to the Oslo process when the passage of time without a final 187 Sword.indb 187 25/03/2020 15:11:04 The sword is not enough agreement resulted in a decrease in trust and confidence and growing antagonism rather than the hoped-for confidencebuilding. Rather than manifestations of peaceful relations, many Palestinians noted

in The sword is not enough
Richard Jackson

analogies actually constructs particular meanings and profoundly affects the way they are subsequently understood. In addition, analogies are so powerful because they work to suppress relevant questions. In the First Gulf War, it was not unusual to hear President Bush Sr and his top officials refer to the analogy of World War II and in particular, Chamberlain’s appeasement of Hitler following the invasion of

in Writing the war on terrorism
James P. Pfiffner

, especially nuclear, and that they had been destroyed after the first Gulf War. 63 This meant that Saddam was bluffing about his WMD, probably in order to scare his enemies in the Middle East. But when this crucial intelligence was communicated back to CIA headquarters and the White House, it was ignored. The administration was interested in the source if he wanted to defect, but

in Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq
Abstract only
Jeremy Pressman

war. In 1973, the United States airlifted emergency military supplies to Israel during the war. In 1991, the United States worked to protect Israel from Iraqi missiles during the first Gulf War. At other times, the United States urged Israel to stop or restrain its military response against Arab countries or organizations. President Ronald Reagan grew furious with Israeli military actions in Lebanon in 1982. During the second intifada and then subsequent Hamas–Israel clashes, the United States under George W. Bush and Barack H. Obama accepted Israel’s right to

in The sword is not enough