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Jenny Andersson

policy was hardly a matter of individual rights, but rather a form of mercantilist politics directed at the lower strata of society. 9 German Kathedersocialismus had a decisive influence on Swedish economic thought at the turn of the century, and particularly on the conservative and liberal economists of the Old Stockholm School. Gustaf Cassel and Eli Heckscher, key figures in the older generation of

in Between growth and security
Jannika Brostrom

Sans Frontiers co-founder Bernard Kouchner, who argued that the triumph of liberal ideas of individual rights and democracy after the end of the Cold War reinforced a moral obligation of liberal democracies to intervene where violations of these rights were occurring. His 1992 article on the ‘duty to interfere’ drew on Immanuel Kant’s notion of a categorical imperative that compelled

in Violence and the state
Jenny Andersson

such as a citizen’s wage, as a social policy reform that would strengthen individual rights and avoid a direct link between social policy and productive participation. The report also contained a critique of universalism and the underlying ideas in the notion of ‘general social policies’ that had been a core postulate of party ideology since it was introduced during the Depression by the legendary

in Between growth and security
Active internationalism and ‘credible neutrality’
Christine Agius

’ that Berger and Luckmann refer to (see Chapter 2 ). This had a profound effect upon Swedish society. In SAP ideology, the sense of individualism relates to social well being. Swedes in general are not comfortable about the idea of individual rights over that of the social group or community. As Palme put it: Democratic socialism starts with

in The social construction of Swedish neutrality
Abstract only
The need for pragmatism
Charlotte Wagnsson

discord between Russia and the EU. While the EU portrays itself as an ethically good promoter of individual rights, Russia maintains its tradition of prioritising the security of the state. Putin’s 2003 Address to the Nation is illustrative of the Russian tendency to prioritise the need to preserve territorial integrity as well as high politics, maintaining Russia as a strong power in international

in Security in a greater Europe
Mark Webber

financial and technical assistance. The most extensive of these was the PHARE programme 13 adopted in December 1989. This was intended to support economic reform in the target countries but, in turn, had a political purpose: to ‘help […] establish democratic societies based on individual rights’ and thus support ‘the development of a larger democratic family of nations within a prosperous and stable

in Inclusion, exclusion and the governance of European Security
Democratisation, nationalism and security in former Yugoslavia
Paul Latawski
and
Martin A. Smith

privatization of ethnicity in liberal democracy maximizes individual rights but minimizes collective rights. 43 Examples of countries that embrace civic nationalism are the United Kingdom and the United States. These states possess a civic national identity where democracy, citizenship and national identity are closely intertwined with the state. With the individual’s rights at the

in The Kosovo crisis and the evolution of post-Cold War European security
Pertti Joenniemi

all, the notion of ‘security’ had to adapt itself to the core constitutive themes of individual rights, exchange and openness. As Andreas Behnke has argued, the security argument was employed in a derivative and protective manner, rather than in a productive way. 29 During ‘Kosovo’, the notion of security was deprived of its traditional linkages to sovereignty and instead referred to the

in Mapping European security after Kosovo
Abstract only
Robin Wilson

amendments in 2002. These entailed arrangements at entity level mirroring those at the level of the State, including strong communal-veto powers which ‘accentuated the predominance of group representation over individual rights’ (Bieber, 2006: 130). As Misha Glenny (1999: 651–2) observed, ‘Dayton brought the fighting to an end, in itself a considerable achievement. But as a model for reconciliation and for

in The Northern Ireland experience of conflict and agreement
Aislinn O'Donnell

strategic notice of risk. He argues nonetheless that ‘The formal aim of CONTEST – which is being achieved – is [. . .] to reduce the risk from terrorism so that people can go about their normal life freely (that is, with the rule of law upheld and without the authorities having to interfere with individual rights and liberties) and with confidence’ ( 2015 , p. 16). Reducing (violent) radicalisation and extremism arguably modernises classic counter-insurgency doctrine. However, Omand emphasises that CONTEST was originally conceived in such a way as to clearly separate

in Encountering extremism