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all, the notion of ‘security’ had to adapt itself to the core constitutive themes of individual rights, exchange and openness. As Andreas Behnke has argued, the security argument was employed in a derivative and protective manner, rather than in a productive way. 29 During ‘Kosovo’, the notion of security was deprived of its traditional linkages to sovereignty and instead referred to the
territorial boundaries, market economies, private religiosity, and the priority of individual rights? Or will it be Islam, with its emphasis on the universal mission of a transtribal community called to build a social order founded on pure monotheism natural to humanity? ( 1993 : 117) Islamic fundamentalists answer this
the community. In order to produce and reproduce the national security agenda, societies in conflict make demands of the citizen that otherwise peaceful societies would not. As the Israeli context demonstrates, women have been particularly torn between their individual rights and their collective duties. On the one hand, war has served as the catalyst for the political mobilization of Israeli women as
the person directly affected, but against all civilized States. His conclusion is that under these circumstances collective intervention is ‘obligatory’. 50 Bluntschli of Heidelberg University asserted that ‘[t]he civilized nations in particular are called upon to develop the sentiment of the common laws of humanity’ 51 and that ‘[o]ne is authorized to intervene to ensure respect for the individual rights recognized
privatization of ethnicity in liberal democracy maximizes individual rights but minimizes collective rights. 43 Examples of countries that embrace civic nationalism are the United Kingdom and the United States. These states possess a civic national identity where democracy, citizenship and national identity are closely intertwined with the state. With the individual’s rights at the
amendments in 2002. These entailed arrangements at entity level mirroring those at the level of the State, including strong communal-veto powers which ‘accentuated the predominance of group representation over individual rights’ (Bieber, 2006: 130). As Misha Glenny (1999: 651–2) observed, ‘Dayton brought the fighting to an end, in itself a considerable achievement. But as a model for reconciliation and for
individual rights, and the conservative stance that it was lawful to obey even a tyrannical government on the condition that it maintained social order. 71 Tuck’s focus on natural rights theories shared with Skinner the view that post-1649 English political culture, of which Ascham’s works were a case in point, was increasingly dominated by secular and rational arguments disseminated by the works of
strategic notice of risk. He argues nonetheless that ‘The formal aim of CONTEST – which is being achieved – is [. . .] to reduce the risk from terrorism so that people can go about their normal life freely (that is, with the rule of law upheld and without the authorities having to interfere with individual rights and liberties) and with confidence’ ( 2015 , p. 16). Reducing (violent) radicalisation and extremism arguably modernises classic counter-insurgency doctrine. However, Omand emphasises that CONTEST was originally conceived in such a way as to clearly separate
subject of self-government as well. This way, the participation of the governed in their government is not due to their allegedly natural individual rights or freedoms, but ‘because government already depends on the liberties and capacities of the governed exercised within an economy’ ( Dean, 1999 , p. 174). Hence, notwithstanding there is not a natural relationship between liberalism, rule of law and democracy, Foucault’s conception of liberal government enables putting them within this rationality of government. Despite Foucault’s conception of liberal government
radicals Overton and Lilburne. In his Observations Parker opposed the theory of the total resignation of individual rights to the king, invoked in the early 1640s by the royalists of the Great Tew circle, stating that in the name of salus populi ‘it is not possible for any nation so to enslave it selfe and to resigne its owne interest to the will of one Lord, as that Lord may destroy it without injury