Search results
This book addresses the major theoretical and practical issues of the forms of citizenship and access to citizenship in different types of polity, and the specification and justification of rights of non-citizen immigrants as well as non-resident citizens. It also addresses the conditions under which norms governing citizenship can legitimately vary. The book discusses the principles of including all affected interests (AAI), all subject to coercion (ASC) and all citizenship stakeholders (ACS). They complement each other because they serve distinct purposes of democratic inclusion. The book proposes that democratic inclusion principles specify a relation between an individual or group that has an inclusion claim and a political community that aims to achieve democratic legitimacy for its political decisions and institutions. It contextualizes the principle of stakeholder inclusion, which provides the best answer to the question of democratic boundaries of membership, by applying it to polities of different types. The book distinguishes state, local and regional polities and argues that they differ in their membership character. It examines how a principle of stakeholder inclusion applies to polities of different types. The book illustrates the difference between consensual and automatic modes of inclusion by considering the contrast between birthright acquisition of citizenship, which is generally automatic, and naturalization, which requires an application.
postnational political community on a continent haunted by violence, bloodshed, and unprecedented atrocity is unexpected, to say the least. 4 Instead of standing in the way of international cooperation by increasing historical grievances, the experience of the rupture of 1945 provided Europeans with the impetus to pursue peace through integration. From the beginning, collective remembrance of the atrocities of war and fascism served as important cognitive, motivational, and justificatory resources for integration, culminating in what I call the ‘classic narrative of
Introduction In his illuminating essay Rainer Bauböck advances a comprehensive approach to the question of how to determine membership of a democratic political community, that takes into account alternative theoretical principles, a variety of kinds of contemporary membership claims, and the complexities of current multiple levels of political structures. He identifies his all citizen stakeholders
conditions continue to exist. But the trend is to greater mobility, and it may be that some state of greater mobility, short of extreme mobility, will pose greater challenges to the state than Bauböck allows. I use the archetypes of diaspora communities to critique his position on citizenship inside and outside the territory of the state. Diaspora communities may be disconnected from the political community of their state of residence even as they
, local and regional polities and argue that they differ in their membership character, which I identify as birthright-based, residential and derivative respectively. My conclusion is again that these are not alternative conceptions of political community but complementary ones. Each supports the realization of specific political values (of continuity, mobility and union) and taken together local, state and regional polities form nested
comprehensive conception of democratic inclusion for democratic polities. Projecting such a comprehensive conception to the global level is in my view deeply problematic. However, this does not rule out a thinner conception of global democracy that relies only on the principle of including affected interests without aiming to build a global government and to forge humanity into a single political community. Global democracy in this sense should be
citizenship not just because we regard them as future citizens. If this were the case, one might as well wait until they have reached the age of majority and consider them until then subjects within the jurisdiction who have a claim to equal protection. The reason why we recognize them as citizens is that political communities are transgenerational human societies. The status of membership in such communities is
possible agenda must be included in the demos” (p. 22). 3 Taken literally, this would mean that the demos must be global in scope, since any decision taken by a less inclusive body is liable to affect the interests of at least some outsiders, and Bauböck recoils from this conclusion, arguing that democracy presupposes the existence of a plurality of bounded political communities. Nevertheless, he concedes to the defenders of AAI that “those whose interests are
distinguished from questions about membership, so that ASC cannot be used tout court as a guide to the allocation of citizenship. Finally, I share many of Bauböck's views about who ought to be granted citizenship in a democratic political community and why. He prefers the language of stakeholdership (ACS) and I prefer the language of social membership in exploring these issues, but in substantive terms our views of what democratic principles entail
that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state. 17 For Aristotle, only those with “the power of speech” to “set forth the just and unjust” can be party to a political relationship or members of a political community. Humans who lack this power, like other animals, may have