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whom we thought to keep calling what they called themselves: “Islamists.” Whether these were moderate or radical—and whether they rose through elections or as armed guerrilla groups. Roy, meanwhile, unshakably repeated his thesis that they belonged to the past—terminologically at least. To Roy, the rising battalions of “beardies” were an avatar of the latest in the crowded field of “post-” concepts: “post-Islamism.” They had, he felt, abandoned the hope of applying a literalist reading of their religious dogma in the political field. I in
is needed to acquire that societal unity, patriotism and those civic virtues which are necessary for the maintenance of a healthy society, is not a metaphysical creed but a civic ‘cult with love of laws’, which teaches the citizens ‘that service done to the State is service done to a tutular god (III, 465). The alternative to Machiavelli’s religious cult is secular version of the same, that is, a ‘purely civic profession of faith of which the sovereign should fix articles, not exactly as religious dogmas, but as social sentiments without which man cannot be a good
one the Egyptian Brothers promote. In a study of transnational religious activity with specific references to Islam, Haynes (2001: 157) argues that ‘global networks of religious activists exist who communicate with each other, feed off each other’s ideas, collectively develop religious ideologies with political significance, perhaps aid each other with funds and, in effect, form trans-national groups whose main intellectual referent derives from religious dogma’. On another level, the promotion of political Islam does not seem to be an entirely autonomous phenomenon