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represented the post-war solidification of a series of ‘special’, highly compartmentalised intelligence relationships spanning the fields of human intelligence, signals intelligence, counter-intelligence, special operations and analysis, which burgeoned in the post-war period and which, because of their specialised nature, were resistant to wider tensions in transatlantic relations. 8
Transatlantic relations have been a core issue in European – especially West European – security since the end of the Second World War. The first section of this chapter examines the nature of the transatlantic relationship and its Cold War evolution. Attention then moves, in the second section, to considering its development during the years since 1989. It will then be argued, in the third and final
against Terror: The Fall of NATO and Europe’s Reluctant Coming of Age’, European Security , Vol. 12(2), 2003, pp. 73–4. 10 Cited in T.G. Carpenter, ‘The Bush Administration’s Security Strategy: Implications for Transatlantic Relations’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs , Vol. 16(3), 2003
in the field of security. After the Fuchs and Pontecorvo scandals, ministers reacted quickly to repair any damage to transatlantic relations by introducing new security procedures known as ‘positive vetting’. The chapter also uses newly released archival material to shed light on ministerial reactions to the disapperance of the Foreign Office diplomats, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, in the spring
guided by another principle: the existence of domaines privés or issues that cannot be submitted to discussion and interference from the rest of the member states. These areas have traditionally included security issues (national defence, borders, nuclear status or neutrality) and special relationships (like the US–UK relationship). For example, a member of a group dealing with transatlantic
power. The post-September 11 world is one which has revealed a serious chasm in transatlantic relations. Much has been made of the differences between the Bush Administration and the EU, with many urging the transformation of the EU into a global actor that can either counter US hegemony or at least balance it or influence it in a positive manner. US unilateralism has serious implications for the
this is the case, it is vital to be able to identify such areas in order better to understand past disputes, and foresee possible future crises, in transatlantic relations. It is useful to know precisely on which fundamental issues individual European leaderships have tended to agree and disagree in the recent past. It might be expected that the actors will diverge on a number of important standpoints
’ – gained impetus in early 1950, largely because of pressure from across the Atlantic. The minutes of GEN 183 reveal that ministers and senior Whitehall officials were aware of the impact of the Fuchs case and other security lapses on transatlantic relations and were keen to make amends in return for access to American secrets. At a meeting of GEN 183 chaired by the Prime Minister on 5 April, it was agreed that an
). However, the Iraq War and the resulting transatlantic rift delayed an agreement on the deployment of the EU mission (Reichard, 2006 : 22). It was only a year later, after transatlantic relations had improved and the EU had successfully taken over the NATO operation in Macedonia, that preparations for EUFOR Althea started in Mons and Brussels. The launch of the mission had to await NATO’s official
. Mungiu-Pippidi, ‘Facing the “Desert of Tartars”. The Eastern Border of Europe’, in Zielonka (ed.), Europe Unbound , p. 69. 113 J. Van Oudenaren, ‘The Changing Face of Europe: EU Enlargement and Implications for Transatlantic Relations’, Policy Report (The American Institute for