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specifically, was only to emerge at a later stage of the deliberations, it is clear that in the early months of the post-merger period Ferranti and ISC proved to be more than willing bedfellows. As we saw in the last chapter, the new board of directors had been agreed prior to the merger, with Basil de Ferranti stepping down as non-executive chairman, to be replaced by Sir Derek Alun-Jones as the new executive chairman and Jim Guerin as executive deputy chairman.2 Many across Ferranti especially were rather bemused at the way Basil had been treated in these negotiations

in Ferranti: A History

3 A step too far? Merger with ISC of the last two chapters, attempts have been made to provide a balanced view of the relative positions of Ferranti and ISC by the mid-1980s. The dual analysis will be sustained in this chapter, especially in trying to explain why the two companies entered into a merger in September 1987, outlining how the relationship between Ferranti and ISC evolved slowly over the course of that decade, culminating in extensive rounds of detailed investigations by both executive teams and a plethora of professional advisors selected from

in Ferranti: A History

shareholdings in a variety of British firms, Ferranti had starkly differing ownership and managerial characteristics. These changes are recorded in Table 1.1 (replicated from Volume 2), highlighting how the replacement of the de Ferranti brothers as executive directors with Derek Alun-Jones, alongside the dispersal of the firm’s equity to largely institutional shareholders, converted Ferranti from being a family firm into a more conventional expression of managerial capitalism. Taking this comparative exercise further, the third row in Table 1.1 highlights how Derek Alun

in Ferranti: A History

the firm by 1990 was the combination of dramatic changes in international political rivalries that precipitated the end of the Cold War with a severe economic recession, materially affecting the markets in which Ferranti International competed against much stronger corporations. While as a widely acknowledged ‘company doctor’, Gene Anderson was naturally familiar with the circumstances in which he found himself, in settling into his new role as chairman and chief executive of Ferranti International it is unlikely that he had ever been faced with such a challenging

in Ferranti: A History
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6 The rescue strategy HILE THE LAST chapter has outlined the exhaustive nature of the multiagency investigation into the fraud and other crimes perpetrated by Guerin and his closest associates, culminating in a fifteen-year jail sentence for the former ISC chief executive, we now have to analyse how those left with the horrendous task of effecting a recovery of Ferranti International coped with this enormous challenge. The fraud had created a huge hole in the company’s accounts, estimated at approximately £400 million, while the acquisition of bank debt

in Ferranti: A History

examined at the end of the last chapter, it is indicative of the scale and complicated nature of Guerin’s fraud that as late as 2012 investigators were still searching for the money he squirrelled away as a result of his covert trading and fraudulent activities. Even though in 1991 James Guerin was jailed for a variety of crimes, including money-laundering through front companies, the fine details of all the fraudulent deals, arming embargoed nations and duping financiers and business executives into supporting ISC will probably never emerge. Furthermore, the trial of

in Ferranti: A History
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the Greek track record on legislation and executive leadership, this would be no small feat. Opti­mistic analysis anticipated that this could be done by February; however, many remained understandably sceptical that such predictions would prove correct. The programme required intensive work and left little scope for inertia or delay. Developments in the Eurozone and continued anxiety in the markets continued to pose a risk to the programme of reform and the time frame laid out for its implementation. The delays and shortcomings that had plagued 161 Greece.indb 161

in The European debt crisis

a technocratic system that marginalises citizens and restricts their ability to engage with economic issues. Econocracy is a system where some have access to economic knowledge and authority and others do not. While improving the quality of experts would undoubtedly be good for society, the wider system will still be incompatible with democracy and with some of our most deeply cherished political beliefs. Therefore, to finish we must return to the wider question of society and politics in order to show how we need more than just better experts; we need a new

in The econocracy
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any public predictions that the merger would not work. Indeed, as we shall see in the next chapter, it was seen as a good move for both companies, given the apparent complementarities. On the other hand, key figures in both business and political circles privately regarded ISC as highly dubious, highlighting the need to investigate a corporation that few could claim to know very well. The analysis of this debate will be divided into two main sections: firstly, we shall examine ISC’s progress since its creation in 1971, outlining what to many seemed to be extremely

in Ferranti: A History

increase of inequality over time as the alreadywealthy cement their position.53 Piketty argues that ‘the history of the distribution of wealth has always been deeply political, and it cannot be reduced to purely economic mechanisms’.54 He uses the example of changes in corporate governance in the UK since the 1980s, which have seen boards legally obliged to maximise shareholder value. In Germany, in contrast, firms typically have worker representatives on their boards, who are naturally less enthusiastic about higher shareholder pay-outs and executive pay, and income

in The econocracy