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Rousseau as a constitutionalist
Mads Qvortrup

just republic. It follows, therefore, that the enactment of legislation should be made conditional upon concurrent endorsements of at least two distinct political institutions, such as parliament and the executive, both chambers in a bicameral legislature, etc. To understand this tradition we must temporarily break off the narrative to take a look at its history – or rather its genealogy. The genealogy of constitutionalism It has been asserted – probably correctly – that constitutionalism was originally invented by (or entrusted upon) the Israelites. The law given to

in The political philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau
On the sociological paradoxes of weak dialectical formalism and embedded neoliberalism
Darrow Schecter

foundation empowered to legitimise electoral results. It is likely that this in turn will severely strain relations between legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government.36 But perhaps a great deal that still needs to be explained is peremptorily bracketed out of the discussion if one accepts that each and every project to democratise the economy will end up centralising political power whilst also forfeiting the independence of the judiciary. For a start, it has already been established at the outset of this chapter that (1) political power is centralised in

in Critical theory and sociological theory
On the relation between law, politics, and other social systems in modern societies
Darrow Schecter

have become differentiated in any specific context, one is therefore implicitly posing the following questions: to what extent can sociological and political modernity continue to be reconciled via law and the state, and is it possible to harmonise substantive practices of democracy with institutional pluralism and an independent judiciary capable of safeguarding individual rights?23 Like other observers, J.  A. G.  Griffith notes that it is at times necessary to strengthen democracy by limiting executive prerogative in matters of secondary legislation and other

in Critical theory and sociological theory
Looming constitutional conflicts between the de-centralist logic of functional diff erentiation and the bio-political steering of austerity and global governance
Darrow Schecter

on lines of gender, race, and religion. But they are also accompanied by less spectacularly visible divergences about the criteria defining prevailing standards of economic growth, educational achievement, aesthetic value, equal access to information, and legal validity.18 The normative and integrative features of society-​centred statehood are as yet somewhat difficult to ascertain in view of the continued prevalence of state-​centred perspectives, which privilege the supposed communicative superiority of political parties and state executives over social systems

in Critical theory and sociological theory
The logics of ‘hitting the bottom’
Gunther Teubner

institutionalised politics, must be transparent and accountable. Yet the taboo must not be broken. 101 No discretionary interventions by the political system! Even if that system does possess greater democratic legitimation. The autonomy of the central banks in respect of politics is a necessary precondition of the functioning of plain money reform. Alongside the traditional executive, legislative and judicative

in Critical theory and legal autopoiesis
On social systems and societal constitutions
Darrow Schecter

the globe thereafter. It was already recognised, if perhaps only implicitly, that a political system can only function well if it is sustained and flanked by parallel social systems functioning according to non-​majoritarian codes. First and foremost amongst them was a legal system and a judiciary shielded, to the greatest possible extent, from the abuses of executive power. Later, around the middle of the nineteenth century with observers such as Mill and Tocqueville, the judiciary came to be regarded both as a safeguard against executive usurpation of legislative

in Critical theory and sociological theory
How social subsystems externalise their foundational paradoxes in the process of constitutionalisation
Gunther Teubner

courts – which after all are supposed to be no more than la bouche de la loi – were producing more and more legal norms themselves even in the presence of a dominant political legislature, in direct contravention of the basic principles of the separation of powers and of democratic legitimacy. 1 Yet now we find that in transnational regimes, this trend is continuing unfettered and even accelerating

in Critical theory and legal autopoiesis
David Owen

membership of the demos), and we can in general distinguish executive, legislative and constitutional demoi depending on the political system. 1 For current purposes, it is the distinction between legislative and constitutional demoi that is pertinent. The salient normative difference between these demoi is that the judgements of the constitutional demos structure the fundamental terms of political association and, hence, the foundational

in Democratic inclusion
Abstract only
Darrow Schecter

executive and judiciary with the transnational constitutional design to overrule national-​level legislatures and electoral results when deemed necessary. It is therefore equally possible to apply Marx’s analysis of Bonapartism in conjunction with Gramsci’s concept of the historical bloc to evaluate the dynamics shaping political events in Greece and elsewhere.4 It 2 Critical theory and sociological theory will be seen in due course that a number of the socio-​economic phenomena first diagnosed by Marx and Gramsci, and subsequently taken up in different guises by the

in Critical theory and sociological theory
Abstract only
A plea for politics at the European level
Peter J. Verovšek

holds that the EU and its institutions cannot effectively or legitimately undertake political functions ‘because there is as yet no European people.’ 23 The issues facing Europe in the aftermath of the Great Recession and the populist, neo-fascist revival it has spawned, have also exacerbated the questions of the ‘democratic deficit’ that have haunted the European Communities from the start. Much of the EU’s basic structure, such as its unelected executive commission, which is only partially responsible to an assembly of representatives from the nation-states, has

in Memory and the future of Europe