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differentiated legal form that, as such, does violence to its social environment. Where the modern philosophy of law followed Kant in 169 Postmodern legal theory as critical theory 169 seeking to bring social and political violence under control by installing politics and the polity as an “applied branch of law,”8 the postmodern theory of law discerns that element which the Kantian legal tradition wished to pacify by all legal means at the very center of the law: the positing of law is a “violence without ground.”9 Violence, as Christoph Menke puts it, “is not only part of

in Law and violence
Reflections on Menke’s ‘Law and violence’

framework must try to subjugate every other form of association, of human relation, or simply of human life that crosses its path? Law as such is externally inert: it is entirely indifferent to what lies outside its scope, whether a natural or a social world. It is politics –​ 118 118 Responses or, more precisely, the political will of the executive power pro tempore in charge of ruling a political community –​that is first and foremost responsible for the attempt to extend the reach of domestic law to new areas, both geographical and social, which previously were

in Law and violence

Benjamin’s 97 Law without violence 97 philosophical-​political program as the attempt to rigorously eliminate violence from law (instead of prolonging it against its own will, p. 61) can it guide a social transformation that truly does justice to the victims of past and present legal violence. I will proceed in four steps. First, I  will attempt to reject Menke’s thesis about the necessary connection of law and violence by discussing two cases of non-​coercive law:  international law as presented in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals (1) and Jewish law as conceptualized by

in Law and violence

, ‘Résumé des nouvelles’, 16 January 1943. 51 BBC WAC, French Scripts, ‘Dépêche du soir’, 10 March 1942. 52 AMBB, 22J.1:  ‘Les Usines Renault travaillaient pour l’Allemagne. Les Usines Renault ont été frappées’, 1942. 53 BBC WAC, E1/706:  Resistance facsimile of La Nouvelliste, ‘no 305, 31 Dec 1943’. 54 TNA, FO 371/31999:  Text circulated by Bruce Lockhart (Political War Executive), 17 March 1942. 55 BBC WAC, French Scripts, ‘Courrier de France’, 6 March 1942. 56 BBC WAC, E1/706:  Resistance facsimile of La Nouvelliste, ‘no 305, 31 Dec. 1943’. 57 BBC WAC, French

in French children under the Allied bombs, 1940–45

interventionism and fatalistic disengagement – both of which could be justified by the view of the population of the region as inherently recondite and irrational. Consociationalism remained as the ‘common sense’ answer during activist periods. The Chief Executive Officer of the Community Relations Council (and political scientist), Duncan Morrow, explained its instrumental attraction bluntly: ‘[I]t makes

in The Northern Ireland experience of conflict and agreement
Abstract only

demonstrated the importance of a collective approach by both British and Irish Governments to Northern Ireland but did not engage the political parties in the process of reaching that Agreement. In contrast, the Good Friday Agreement came about as a result of both Governments (along with the US) and the political parties in Northern Ireland working together (to a greater and lesser extent) to bring the conflict to a close by accepting the value of a power-sharing Executive. In a sense, all were stages in the long struggle to give

in Inside Accounts, Volume I
Abstract only
Europeanisation breakthrough

settlement allocated three strands of relationships. Northern Ireland’s internal political organisation was established through the creation of a Northern Ireland Assembly proportional to party strength and an Executive based on power sharing (Strand 1). Arrangements between Northern Ireland and Ireland included a North–South Ministerial Council (NSMC) and North-South Implementation Bodies (Strand 2

in The Europeanisation of conflict resolution

suspicion to be transcended and for life, as well as politics, to become truly normalised. It may be some time before female politicians reach a critical mass and are comfortable collaborating across party lines, which will delay their gaining influence over business conducted by the Northern Ireland Executive, Assembly and local government, when they will be able to ensure that it

in Everyday life after the Irish conflict

attempt to establish an executive in July 1999, Blair said: ‘Only one thing remains outstanding: it is a matter of trust.’ He warned that if politicians did not ‘learn to build trust’ then ‘normal politics in Northern Ireland’ would ‘never take root’. 113 Yet the premiss of the architecture of the agreement, the perpetual absence of trust, prevented just this scenario emerging

in The Northern Ireland experience of conflict and agreement
Labour and intelligence during the Second World War

attempted to remove propaganda from Dalton by proposing the formation of a new department, the Political Warfare Executive (PWE). 56 While partially responsible for the new organisation, Dalton found himself increasingly marginalised by Bracken, which forced him to capitalise on Labour’s position in the War Cabinet in an attempt to strengthen his own, now shrinking, empire. Recognising that Churchill had a

in Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51